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This dissertation describes the nature of what has been called kalām-e jadīd (new 
theology) in the Islamic Republic of Iran. It argues that there are currently two kinds of 
―new theologies‖ in practice. One new theology that is more widely adhered to is an 
extension of classical theology and stays true to traditional precepts, while the second is 
postmodern in nature and breaks with tradition completely. The first strand of kalām-e 
jadīd, referred to as ―theology of selectivity,‖ is represented here by the works of Mohsen 
Kadivar, the person who epitomizes the intellectual but tradition-bound wave of post-
revolutionary theological thought in Iran. The second strand of kalām-e jadīd, referred to 
as ―postmodern theology,‖ is presented via the works of Abdolkarim Soroush, the most 
representative thinker of this type of kalām. In making this distinction, this dissertation 
therefore delineates the different forms of post-revolutionary reformist theology in Iran 
and presents Soroush‘s work in terms of the greater postmodern discourse that feeds his 
work. The interest and importance placed on Soroush‘s work also speaks volumes about 
the receptiveness of Iranian reformist intellectual communities towards postmodern 
thought and the possibility of placing these communities within what has come to be 
known as the postmodern condition. Thus, in essence this project can be seen as a 
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comparative work that also points towards the ideological distance between these two 
modernizing trends in current Iranian Islamic thought.   
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Chapter 1: Overview 
This dissertation describes the nature of what has been called kalām-e jadīd (new 
theology)1 in the Islamic Republic of Iran. It argues that there are currently two kinds of 
―new theologies‖ in practice. The one which is more widely adhered to is an extension of 
classical theology and stays true to traditional precepts, while the second, is postmodern 
in nature and breaks with tradition completely. The first strand of kalām-e jadīd under 
consideration here, which will be referred to from now on as ―theology of selectivity,‖ is 
presented through the works of Mohsen Kadivar, the person who epitomizes the 
intellectual yet tradition-bound wave of post-revolutionary theological thought within 
Iran.2 The second strand of kalām-e jadīd, which I will refer to as ―postmodern theology‖ 
                                                 
1 Kalām-e jadīd literally translated means ―new theology.‖ A brief exposition of classical and new kalām is 
given in Chapter two. 
2 Hojjat al-Islam Mohsen Kadivar is arguably one of most outspoken clerics against the concept of velāyat-
e faqīh. Since the 2009 presidential elections he has also taken to openly criticizing the regime and its 
inhumane and un-Islamic treatment of protestors. He is a founding member of one of the main Green 
Movement opposition websites, Jonbesh-e Rah-e Sabz or Jaras for short (Green Path Movement: 
<www.rahesabz.net>) and seems to have a personal relationship with Moussavi (this became evident from 
our personal conversations shortly after the election). Hojjat al-Islam Kadivar was born in the town of Fasa 
in Fars province in 1959. After abandoning his studies in electrical engineering at Shiraz University in 1978 
he graduated with the equivalent of a bachelor‘s degree in Theology and Islamic Studies from Qom 
University in 1989. His Ph.D. studies in Islamic Philosophy and Theology with a specialty in al-Hikmat al-
Mota’ālīyah (Transcendental Philosophy) were at Tarbīyat Modarres University in Tehran, from which he 
graduated in 1999. During his graduate studies at the university he also received his Ijazat al-Ijtihad 
(Independent Legal Reasoning) from the Howzeh-ye Elmmiyeh-ye Qom (Qom Theological Seminary) in 
1997 under the supervision of Grand Ayatollah Hossein Ali Montazeri Najaf Abadi. Of Kadivar‘s many 
books the two which caused the most stir are direct criticisms of Ayatollah Khomeini‘s velayat-e motlaqeh-
ye faqih theory (sole political rule, or sole guardianship of the jurist): Nazaryiha-ye Dowlat dar Fiqh-e 
Shī`i (1997; Theories of State in Shī`ī Law) and Hukūmat-e Vilāyī (1998; Government by the Guardian). In 
these two works, Kadivar criticizes the notion of velāyat-e moṭlaqih-ye faqīh by attempting to show the 
lack of qurʾanic, rational, and fiqh (jurisprudential) grounds for the idea of political rule by the clergy, 
headed by a supreme jurisprudent (the leader). As a result, the Special Court for the Clergy charged him 
with propaganda against the Islamic Republic, dissemination of lies, and creating confusion in public 
opinion, for which he served a prison term of eighteen months. For more on Kadivar‘s court hearings see, 
Mohsen Kadivar, Baha-ye Azadi: Defa’īyat-e Mohsen Kadivar [The Price of Liberty: Text of Mohsen 
Kadivar’s Defense in the Special Clerical Court] (1999). For more on Kadivar‘s work see Mahmoud Sadri, 
―Sacral Defense of Secularism‖ (2001). Kadivar spent virtually all of his imprisonment in solitary 
confinement
 
and was released from Evin Prison on July 17, 2000. He is a currently a Visiting Associate 
Professor of Religion at Duke University. For more on Kadivar, see especially Yasayuki Matsunaga, 
―Mohsen Kadivar, an Advocate of Postrevivalist Islam in Iran‖ (2007) and Roger Hardy,  The Muslim 
Revolt, a Journey through Political Islam (2010), especially pp. 54-55;  and Shireen T. Hunter, ed., 
2 
 
from now on, will be presented through the works of Abdolkarim Soroush, the most 
representative thinker of this kind of kalām-e jadīd.3 In making this distinction, this 
                                                                                                                                                 
Reformist Voices of Islam: Mediating Islam and Modernity (2009), especially Chapter 1:  ―Islamic 
Reformist Discourse in Iran, Proponents and Prospects,‖ pp. 57-68, and  ―Islamic Revolution: Impact on 
Islamic Reformist Thinking, Reformist Clerics.‖. For details on all bibliographic citations, see the complete 
bibliography. 
 See also:  Yousra Y. Fazila, ―Between Mullahs‘ Robes and Absolutism,‖ especially  pp. 51-53;  
three entries in the Oxford Encyclopedia of the Islamic World (2009):  ―Islamic State,‖ ―Kadivar, Mohsen,‖ 
and ―Wilayat Al-Faqih‖); Shahrokh Akhavi, The Middle East, the Politics of the Sacred and Secular 
(2009), especially Chapter 6: ―The State‖ and Chapter 7: ―Conclusion,‖ pp. 230-33 & 245;  Said Amir 
Arjomand, After Khomeini (2009), especially Chapter 2: ―Dual Leadership and Constitutional 
Developments after Khomieni,‖ and Chapter 5: ―The Rise and the Fall of President Khatami and the 
Reform a Movement,‖  pp. 52-54, 76, 94, & 108; Nader Hashemi,  Islam, Secularism and Liberal 
Democracy (2009), especially Chapter 3: ―A Concise Anatomy of Secularism,‖ p. 101; Fakhreddin Azimi, 
The Quest for Democracy in Iran (2008), especially Chapter 11: ―The Culture of Politics,‖ p. 419; Arshin 
Adib-Moghaddam, Iran in World Politics (2008), especially Part IV: ―Iran‘s Pluralistic Momentum and the 
Future of Iranian Democracy,‖ pp.161 & 168;  Eva Patricia Rakel,  The Iranian Political Elite (2008), 
especially, Section 4.3.3.1: ―Lay and Clerical Public Intellectuals,‖ pp. 123-24, and ―The Political Elite in 
the Islamic Republic of Iran‖ (2009), pp.109, 114, 117 & 120; Yasuyuki Matsunaga, ―Mohsen Kadivar, an 
Advocate of Post Revivalist Islam in Iran‖  (2007), pp. 317-29;  Farhang Rajaee,  Islamism and Modernism 
(2007), especially Chapter 4: ―The Fourth Generation,‖ pp. 208-21; Olivier Roy, Secularism Confronts 
Islam (2007), especially Chapter 2: ―Islam and Secularization,‖ p. 45l;  Charles Kurzman, ―Critics Within‖ 
(2004), especially Chapter 4, pp. 88-89; Nikki R. Keddi, Modern Iran (2003), especially Chapter 12: 
―Society, Gender, Culture and Intellectual Life,‖ pp. 307-10; Genevieve Abdo and Jonathan Lyons, 
Answering Only to God (2003), especially Chapter 5: ―Reinventing the Islamic Republic,‖ pp. 123-50; and 
Asef Bayat, Making Islam Democratic (2007),  especially Chapter 3: ―The Making of a Post-Islamic 
Movement,‖ and Chapter 4: ―Post Islamism in Power: Dilemmas of the Reform Project,‖ pp. 86-94, 101, 
12, & 186-89. 
 Useful in this context as whole are:  Lloyd Ridgeon, ―Introduction: Iranian Intellectuals (1997–
2007)‖ (2007);  Shahra Razavi, ―Islamic Politics, Human Rights and Women‘s Claims for Equality in Iran‖ 
(2006); Farzin Vahdat, ―Religious Modernity in Iran‖ (2005);  Bahman Bakhtiari and Augustus Richard 
Norton, ―Voices within Islam‖ (2005); Farhad Khosrokhavar, ―The New Intellectuals in Iran‖ (2004); 
Mahmoud Sadri, ―Sacral Defense of Secularism‖ (2001 or 2003);  Said Amir Arjomand, ―The Reform 
Movement and the Debate on Modernity and Tradition in Contemporary Iran‖ (2002); Ervand Abrahamian, 
Book Review of Political Thought in Islam (2001); Ahmad Ahsraf  and Ali Banuazizi, ―Iran‘s Tortuous 
Path Toward ‗Islamic Liberalism‘‖ (2001);  Mohsen Milani, ―Reform and Resistance in the Islamic 
Republic of Iran‖ (2001); Reza Afshari, Human Rights in Iran (2001); and Farzin Vahdat and Mohsen 
Kadivar, ―Post-Revolutionary Discourses of Mohammad Mojtahed Shabestari and Mohsen Kadivar‖ 
(2000). 
3 Abdolkarim Soroush, born Farajollah Hossein Dabbaq, is arguably one of Iran‘s most influential 
contemporary thinkers. He has been called the Erasmus of Islam. Mahmoud Sadri in ―Attack from Within:  
Dissident Political Theology in Contemporary Iran,‖ published in Iranian.com, claims that some Western 
thinker has called Soroush Erasmus but fails to give the name of the person(s) who did so. Soroush was 
awarded the 2004 Erasmus prize, so Sadri might be referring to that prize. Robin Wright in ―Tehran Meets 
the Scholar Whose Ideas Could Reconstruct Muslim Societies,‖ published in The Los Angeles Times on 
January 18, 1995, called Soroush the Luther of Islam. Considering that Martin Luther made a break with 
tradition while Erasmus, unlike Luther, did not break from the church but remained a vocal and influential 
critic of the tradition, I have to agree that Soroush is more like Luther than Erasmus. As noted by Forough 
Jahanbakhsh in her introduction to the English translation of The Expansion of the Prophetic Experience 
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dissertation therefore delineates the different forms of post-revolutionary reformist 
theology in Iran and presents Soroush‘s work in terms of the greater postmodern 
discourse that feeds his work.4 The interest and importance placed on Soroush‘s work5 
                                                                                                                                                 
(Leiden: Brill, 2009), Soroush was also named one of the 100 Most Influential People in the World by Time 
magazine in 2005.  Notwithstanding how he compares with historical Christian thinkers and how he is 
viewed in the West, Soroush is considered an intellectual father of the reform movement by insiders and 
scholars of Iran. In the introduction to selected writings of Soroush in Abdolkarim Soroush, Reason, 
Freedom, and Democracy in Islam (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), Mahmoud Sadri and Ahmad 
Sadri call Soroush the ―enfant terrible‖ and the ―bête noir‖ of the regime, a superintellectual that holds the 
―mantle of a roushanfekr intellectual,‖ a persona whose scholastic credentials even the ―ideologically 
correct scholars of the establishment no longer challenge‖ (xi-xii). Jahanbakhsh claims that Soroush is ―one 
of the most eminent, influential and controversial figured of contemporary Iran.‖ After the controversial 
2009 presidential elections that ended with Mahmoud Ahmadinejad‘s re-election Soroush, who now lives 
in the U.S., joined other expatriates, including dissident cleric Mohsen Kadivar, Abdol-Ali Bazargan 
(Islamic thinker and son of a first post-revolutionary prime minister),  Ata‘ollah Mohajerani (former 
parliamentarian and Islamic Guidance Minister),  and Akbar Ganji (investigative journalist and champion 
of secularism), to create a diasporic front in support of the Green Movement. Together they published a 
manifesto to that effect (the statement can be found on drsoroush.com). Soroush has penned close to thirty 
books and numerous articles. He spent his high school years in the famous Islamic ‗Alavi school in Iran 
(this high school turned out to be the training ground for many of the Islamic Revolution‘s leaders). He 
obtained his Master‘s degree in chemistry from the University of London but soon became interested in the 
subject of the indeterminacy of science and enrolled in a Ph.D. program in the History and Philosophy of 
Science at Chelsea College. He studied for more than four years but never finished his thesis. He became 
an integral part of the very influential student expatriate community during the years leading up to the 1979 
revolution, and his influential speeches prior to and during the revolution were published in book or 
pamphlet form. After the revolution Soroush was placed in charge of the university system‘s cultural 
revolution, during which time controversial decisions were made—decisions for which he is still criticized. 
In 1984, disenchanted with the destructive turn the cultural revolution had taken, Soroush abandoned his 
governmental post and dedicated himself to teaching and research. In 1991 he began publishing a series of 
controversial pieces questioning the Velayat-e Faqih (Rule of the Jurist).  After being stripped of his 
university position, banned from public speaking, and suffering several attempts on his life (allegedly by 
government-supported vigilante groups), Soroush left Iran for the West in 2002. These details of Soroush‘s 
life are extracted from Chapter 4 of Ghamari-Tabrizi‘s Islam and Dissent in Postrevolutionary Iran: 
Abdolkarim Soroush, Religious Politics and Democratic Reform (2008). Other critical secondary sources in 
English on Soroush are: Hassan Abbas, ―Islam versus the West and the Political Thought of AbdolKarim 
Soroush‖ (2006); Mahmoud Alinejad, ―Coming to Terms with Modernity‖ (2002); R. Scott Appleby, ―The 
Fundamentalist Factor‖ (2001); Said Amir Arjomand, ―The Reform Movement and the Debate on 
Modernity and Tradition in Contemporary Iran‖ (2002); Ahmad Ashraf and Ali Banuazizi, ―Iran‘s 
Tortuous Path toward ‗Islamic Liberalism‘‖ (2001); and Asma Barlas, ―Reforming Religious Knowledge‖ 
(2005).   
4 Soroush claims that he was not aware of Gadamer‘s work when he created his theological position but has 
since become aware of similarities in their work (Soroush, Reason, Freedom, and Democracy in Islam, 7). 
5 Behrooz Ghamari-Tabrizi describes Soroush‘s importance in the following way: ―After Ayatollah 
Khomeini‘s death in 1989, Abdolkarim Soroush emerged as one of the most controversial intellectual 
figures on the Iranian political scene. At the core of this controversy was Soroush‘s rejection of the 
ideological claim of the Islamic regime as the sole bearer of ―true‖ Islam‖ (Ghamari-Tabrizi, Islam and 
Dissent, 89). Ghamari-Tabrizi also says that Soroush was poised to become the ―court philosopher‖ (GH, 
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also says volumes about the receptiveness of the Iranian reformist intellectual 
communities towards postmodern thought and the possibility of placing these 
communities within what has come to be known as the postmodern condition.6 Thus, in 
essence, this project must be seen as a comparative work that also points towards the 
ideological distance between these two modernizing trends in current Islamic thought.   
The postmodern Soroush seeks to have traditional Islam engage directly and 
unapologetically with Western thought, sometimes at its peril. He often mirrors 
Heideggerian tendencies seen in Gadamer and Ricœur,7 placing his works at a great 
distance from the tradition-bound reformers working on new theology, mainly Mohsen 
Kadivar, who are concerned with ―adapting‖ the tradition to a new era. By proxy then, 
this comparative study of Soroush‘s and Kadivar‘s theological positions reflects the 
ideological spectrum within the reformist movement by comparing the theologies of its 
two most politically active, academically prolific, and at times controversial 
representatives.  As such, this juxtaposition also illuminates what is particularly political 
about theology in this era and how theological debates need to be seen directly as 
potential interventions into the vision of a polis, a state, and the political logic of 
citizenship. 
                                                                                                                                                 
128). This did not, however, pan out as Soroush started distancing himself from the regime several years 
after the revolution.  
6 As argued by Jean-François Lyotard in his book by the same name, the Postmodern Condition is 
―incredulity toward metanarratives. This incredulity is undoubtedly a product of progress in the sciences: 
but that progress in turn presupposes it. To the obsolescence of the metanarrative apparatus of legitimation 
corresponds, most notably, the crisis of metaphysical philosophy and of the university institution which in 
the past relied on it. The narrative function is losing its functors, its great hero, its great dangers, its great 
voyages, its great goal. It is being dispersed in clouds of narrative language elements—narrative, but also 
denotative, prescriptive, descriptive, and so on . . . Where, after the metanarratives, can legitimacy reside?‖ 
(Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge, trans. Geoff Bennington and Brian 
Massumi [Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1979], xxiv-xxv). 
7Kevin J. Vanhoozer in Cambridge Companion to Postmodern Theology (2003) claims that although they 
are not usually considered postmodern in cultural studies, in the context of theology Gadamer and Ricœur 
are ―significant postmodern philosophers in their own right whose ideas have been appropriated by many 
theologians albeit in a usually unsystematic way‖ (171).  
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Before further progress is made into the subject, a word should be said about 
methodology and why this work is relevant to the fields of theology, philosophy, and 
political science. This study is organized around the structure of Soroush‘s work. 
Chapters 3 and 4 present Soroush‘s analysis of a major theological debate followed by an 
account of how Kadivar has dealt with the same issue in his body of work. This 
preference for presenting Soroush‘s work first and then Kadivar‘s response mirrors the 
intellectual relationship of the two thinkers in real life, where Kadivar has repeatedly felt 
the responsibility of defending the faith in response to Soroush‘s controversial and 
unorthodox positions. Their overriding, epistemological disagreements not only portray 
points of divergence between the two thinkers but also within the current reformist 
movement.  
Based on what will be shown to be Soroush‘s postmodern epistemology, along 
with his immense popularity among university youth who grew up in the 1990s, much 
can be said about contemporary Iranian culture‘s denial of grand-narratives. The 
postmodern condition, according to Jean François Lyotard, is first and foremost 
contemporary culture‘s epistemological denial of metanarratives, which he considers a 
quintessential feature of modernity.8 It goes beyond the purview of this work, however, to 
analyze what this tendency against grand-narratives could mean for the reformist culture. 
Also, this investigation‘s outlook towards the works of Soroush and Kadivar is inspired 
not only by Western philosophies of religion but also by the work of Christian 
theologians. That said, enough is doctrinally different between the traditions of 
Christianity and Islam and its practitioners that associations made between the two are 
mainly analogical and should be taken as such.  
                                                 
8 Lyotard, 5. 
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Although some work has been done to present Soroush‘s and Kadivar‘s political 
theologies, this work is the first of its kind in either English or Persian to lay out 
Soroush‘s and Kadivar‘s revelation theologies and positions on soteriology in a 
comprehensive way.9 The project also adds to efforts in creating dialogue between 
Islamic theology and Western philosophy of religion. By placing the study of Iranian 
theology in the context of a global, postmodern ethos, the work better fuses the 
discussion of Islamic theology with the extra-religious sciences and thus opens a window 
on how even revelation and soteriology can be a viable politics, a link often lost in the 
West since the early modern period. 
Despite postmodernity‘s elusive nature and its resistance to being defined, a word 
should also be said about the postmodern condition that I am attributing to Soroush‘s 
work—in particular, the more general epochal concept used to bring the disparate parts 
that make up the postmodern ethos under a single umbrella. In The Postmodern 
Condition: A Report on Knowledge Lyotard suggests what he calls an extreme 
simplification of the postmodern as ―incredulity towards meta-narratives.‖10 These meta-
narratives are all-encompassing, large-scale theories about the world and how it works, a 
set that includes our understanding of the progress of history, the possibility of full 
disclosure through science, and absolute freedom from restraint. Lyotard argues that we 
no longer believe that narratives of this kind are adequate to represent and contain us all 
within a single public sphere. We have become alert to difference, diversity, the 
incompatibility of our singular aspirations, beliefs, and desires, and for that reason we 
have come to persistently oppose universals, meta-narratives, and generality—especially 
                                                 
9 Refer to footnotes 2 and 3 of this chapter for secondary works about Soroush‘s and Kadivar‘s political 
theologies. The goal for the expansion of this project includes an analysis of the thinkers‘ political 
theologies.  
10 Lyotard, 7.  
7 
 
many universalist claims of the Enlightenment. For the purposes of this dissertation, what 
makes postmodernity unique as an ethos is the collapse of grand-narratives, which in the 
context of Islamic theology is a set of collapsed grand-narratives focused on four issues 
(involving revelation theology, or the nature of the Qur‘ān): 1) the Qur‘ān is not the 
unmediated word of God but is already an interpretation of the Prophet (this is a claim 
made by Soroush), 2) reason as complimentary to the word of God, 3) ethics as moral 
progress through self-realization, and 4) soteriology, or the exceptionality of the Islamic 
`umma (community) as having the highest chance of salvation as a result of  Muhammad 
having received the final divine message. Soroush breaks with orthodoxy and questions 
grand-narratives, exhibiting postmodern tendencies on all these issues. In order to 
maintain manageability however, only two of these four non-political theological issues 
will be covered in this dissertation.  
As a theocratic state, much in the Islamic Republic of Iran is dictated by theology. 
Although it seems as though the state-sanctioned theology tries to dominate all outward 
manifestations of the personal and political, Iranian Islam is actually influenced by three 
conflicting theologies: 1) the previously mentioned and apparent state-sanctioned 
theology, a hyper-politicized and totalitarian version of Shī`ī orthodoxy (representatives 
of this theology include state-supported ayatollahs like Mesbah Yazdi),11 2)  the theology 
of selectivity that seeks to ―amend‖ the orthodoxy and is the most consistent with pre-
revolutionary trends in Shī`ī orthodoxy (representatives of this theology include many 
high-ranking ayatollahs and young seminarians in Qom, especially the late Ayatollah  
Montazeri12 and his protégé Mohsen Kadivar), and 3)  a postmodern theology that seeks 
                                                 
11 For more on Ayatollah Mohammad Taqi Mesbah Yazdi and his position as the ―archconservative‖ cleric, 
see: Mehran Kamrava, Iran’s Intellectual Revolution (2008), 85-118. 
12 Grand Ayatollah Hossein-Ali Montazeri was ―the loudest clerical voice of dissent,‖ especially after the 
allegedly fraudulent 2009 presidential election and before his untimely death on December 19, 2009 
(Hooman Majd, The Ayatollahs’ Democracy: An Iranian Challenge [2010], 258). In fact he has been called 
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to rewrite basic theological concepts, such as the nature of reason, ethics, revelation, and 
human agency, even if those rewritings seem to counter traditional readings of the divine 
message.   
The links between theology and politics are most visible in the concept of vilāyat-
e muṭlaqih-ye faqīh, arguably the backbone of state-sanctioned political theology. 
According to orthodox Twelver Shī`ī political theology the guardianship of the ʿumma in 
the post-occultation period of the Twelfth Imam (Mahdi) falls to the faqīhs (Islamic 
jurists). Traditionally this guardianship was limited to non-litigious matters (al-umūr al-
ḥisbīyah),
 
including religious endowments (waqf), family law,
 
and the property for which 
no specific person is responsible. Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini‘s innovation was to 
extend this guardianship to include all issues for which the Prophet and the Imams were 
deemed responsible, including governance. The idea of guardianship as rule is now 
presented in the constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran in the concept of Valī-ye 
Muṭlaqeh-ye Faqīh (The Absolute Jurist Guardian). This guardian is also known as the 
―Supreme Leader,‖ a position first occupied by Imam Khomeini himself and currently 
held by Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Khamenei.   
Such state-sanctioned theology has much in common with the theology of 
selectivity in non-political issues, but almost nothing in common with post-modern 
theology. Theology of selectivity is looking for solutions that better fit with the public‘s 
modern lives while staying (more or less) within the confines of orthodoxy. Tradition 
                                                                                                                                                 
the spiritual leader of the Green Movement (pedar-e Ma`navi) by Hossein Bashirieh. According to Kadivar 
he began as an orthodox (sonnati) cleric and ended up a democratic orthodox cleric (rowhani-ye sonnati-ye 
democratic). Both statements were mentioned in a December 20, 2010 interview with <roozonline.com> on 
the first anniversary of Ayatollah Montazeri‘s death (Kadivar, ―Montazeri was the Voice of the People,‖ 
accessed July 15, 2011, 
<http://kadivar.com/Index.asp?DocId=2602&AC=1&AF=1&ASB=1&AGM=1&AL=1&DT=dtv)>. For 
more on Montazeri, see: Genevieve Abdo, ―Rethinking the Islamic Republic: A ‗Conversation‘ with 
Ayatollah Hossein `Ali Montazeri‖ (2001). For more on how Montazeri initiated vocal clerical support for 
President Khatami‘s reform movement in 1997, an act that led to his house arrest, see: Ali Gheissari and 
Vali Nasr, Democracy in Iran: History and the Quest for Liberty (2006), 135.  
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plays a large role in this theology and its attempt to transform Islam from within. 
Engaging with theological literature of the classical era and maintaining continuity within 
Islam of shared hermeneutical principles is paramount. That these two theologies open up 
new political possibilities has not gone unnoticed, as leaders and supporters of the 
reformist movement are theologically influenced by these two camps. 
Yet, despite its appeal to conservative roots, the theology of selectivity can be set 
apart from its state-sanctioned counterpart by way of its innovations in qur‘ānic 
hermeneutics. Theology of selectivity, the ―legitimate‖ heir to the Islamic classical 
tradition, has made great strides in determining new limits for the Qur‘ān. These limits 
become clear by investigating the two defining hermeneutic strategies used by Kadivar. 
In line with tradition, Kadivar believes that the Qur‘ān contains a determinate and stable 
main message that is inviolable and timeless in its meaning. In other words, the intentions 
of God (the author) can be retrieved through methodic excavation, justifying the exegetic 
tradition. This is in stark contrast to Soroush‘s views. Soroush holds that although certain 
parts of the Qur‘ān are inviolable today, that can change if and when we become ready to 
forgo metaphysics altogether.13 For Soroush, not only does exegesis not have access to 
the mind of God (and never will), but if the Qur‘ān itself is already an interpretation 
(Soroush claims that the Qur‘ān is the Prophet‘s personal reading of God‘s words), then 
the foundational text—the purportedly infallible word of God itself and the integrity of 
1,400 years of exegetic tradition—is brought under question.14 
In Kadivar‘s reliance on textual exegesis, or hermeneutics, and commitment to 
finding an exegetic ―method,‖ the text‘s meaning is accessible through tested exegetic 
and theological practices, yet he too insists that there are changes necessary within these 
                                                 
13 Abdolkarim Soroush, ―Islamic Revival and Reform: Theological Approaches,‖ in Reason, Democracy 
and Freedom in Islam (2000), 26-37. 
14 Details covered in Chapter 2. 
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practices, requiring classic hermeneutics to be amended and modernized. In fact, Kadivar 
is willing to even situate the Qur‘ān itself as a historical document. Explicitly expressed, 
Kadivar‘s second interpretive strategy thus maintains that the Qur‘ān, which is classically 
understood to be inviolable and containing necessary and timeless wisdom, also includes 
verses that are no longer relevant and need to be abandoned when practicing 
contemporary exegesis. What makes Kadivar‘s work relevant, powerful, and dangerous 
to the regime is that he takes specifically those parts of the Qur‘ān to task that are at odds 
with precepts of human rights and this is what makes his theology political. 
In reality, the situating of the Qur‘ān in history has been practiced by exegetes 
since the early centuries after the death of the Prophet, but while the act of putting into 
relief certain verses of the Qur‘ān and dismissing other relevant ones has been used 
consistently in classical hermeneutics, it has rarely if ever been openly acknowledged as a 
strategy.15 Kadivar writes as if this age-old practice needs to be openly and 
unapologetically reclaimed as a necessary hermeneutic approach.16 By maintaining this 
position, Kadivar is in effect supporting the unrepentant historicizing of the unmediated 
holy word.  He is, for example, willing to bend orthodoxy for verses that relate to the 
mistreatment of non-Muslims in Muslim majority lands and the unfair treatment of 
women. Kadivar‘s Qur‘ān is inviolable within its historical spaces, but not necessarily 
complete in all its horizons.17 
Kadivar‘s new theology is based on admitting an already established reading 
approach: that the Qur‘ān must be read historically. But whereas certain fundamental 
theological points for Islam (such as the nature of prophethood, revelation, and 
soteriology) remain sacrosanct and untouchable, he highlights principally those verses 
                                                 
15 A later section in the Introduction goes into further detail. 
16 Examples of this can be seen in his treatment of women and minorities and will be covered in Chapter 2. 
17 This issue will be covered in Chapter 2. 
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where the Qur‘ān is less authoritative in its coverage. This is not postmodern in nature; 
Kadivar argues simply for interpreters‘ historical optics on the text as relevant to the truth 
it contains. 
Postmodern theology, in contrast, is a clear break with tradition in a way that is 
unacceptable to Kadivar. Not only does it try to rewrite orthodox theories about 
revelation and soteriology, it also tries to redefine ethics, the nature and role of rationality 
(`aql) as will be further discussed in Chapter 4; it also expands the field of religious 
agency (and by extension, in the case of Iran, political agency) in Ricœurian fashion, 
whereby the text creates its own world.18 In that tradition it is then up to the reader to 
inhabit that world, finding within it realities that explain her/his own particular 
situation. Overarching master-narratives regarding nationality, identity, and political 
unity are also relinquished as contingent, and individuals move toward micro-politics, 
identity politics, local politics, and necessarily never-ending institutional power 
struggles, questioning the place of themselves as individuals both within the Tradition 
and the `umma (the greater Muslim community).  
Perhaps the most controversial of these master narratives, the singular point of 
reference from whence all foundationalism emanates in Islamic theology, is the claim 
that the Qur‘ān is the word of God, or kalām Allah. But the Qur‘ān, according to Soroush, 
is not the direct and unmediated word of God; it is already an interpretation of God‘s 
word by the Prophet, and as a result, much more contingent than our traditional 
understanding of the Qur‘ān allows. Even though the existence of God and his nature, 
certain aspects of Muhammad‘s prophethood, and soteriology are currently considered 
sacrosanct in Soroush‘s theology, he goes so far as to suggests that it is not impossible to 
envision a day when even these fundamentals of the religion become indefensible and 
                                                 
18 This issue will be covered in Chapter 3.  
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need to be abandoned for less traditional readings. This might happen because, according 
to Soroush, a verse does not need to ―remain certain or ambivalent forever.‖19 Soroush‘s 
theology can be divided into two distinct moments: 1) the distinction between religion 
and religious knowledge and 2) the desacralization of the Qur‘ān.   
Soroush‘s first hermeneutic innovation stresses the distinction between religion 
qua religion and religious knowledge. The early Soroush (circa 1991) still suggested that 
the Qur‘ān was the unmediated word of God and as a result proposed that, while the 
primary source of Muslim knowledge, the Qur‘ān, is beyond reproach, knowledge about 
the Qur‘ān (and by default, renditions of Islam) are not.20 Just like any other human 
knowledge, our understanding of the Qur‘ān and Islam are legitimately susceptible to 
error and incompleteness.  
It is not that the Qur‘ān is incomplete and some verses questionable; it is that they 
are questionable according to our contemporary sensibilities and abilities to decipher it. 
The Qur‘ān is complete. When we assemble the present state of the human condition (our 
current knowledge of how the world works) alongside our current understanding of the 
Qur‘ān, we have no choice but to consider certain parts (historical and scientific) 
questionable. What was innovative in Soroush‘s 1991 study was not the error-prone 
nature of tafsīr, per se; this fact can be attested by the polysemic nature of the genre 
during the heyday of qur‘ānic science in the third and fourth centuries A.H (ninth and 
tenth centuries A.D.). What was different about Soroush‘s study was his distinction 
between the ―complete‖ Qur‘ān and the ―incomplete‖ Islam. If the Qur‘ān and Islam were 
conflated in the believer‘s imagination, then Soroush helped separate the two and assign 
                                                 
19 Soroush, Reason, Freedom, and Democracy in Islam, 35. 
20 An earlier incarnation of Soroush‘s book, The Theoretical Contraction and Expansion of the Sharī’ah, 
was first presented from May 1988 to March 1990 in a four-part essay in Kayhān-e Farhangī (a cutting 




different ontological and normative signification to each. Islam, as a religion and system 
of beliefs, is based on error-prone readings of the complete Qur‘ān. Islam, as a human 
and social construction, and in its many manifestations, is not only based on possible 
error but also keeps generating an ever growing corpus of religious knowledge (by 
extension, also error-prone), making itself increasingly hefty (farbih). Thus, Islam, 
though based on divine revelation, is ultimately a human construction.21 
Soroush‘s second innovation reworks his earlier notions about the Qur‘ān and 
suggests that the Holy Book, which he earlier called the exact, complete, and infallible 
word of God, is in fact itself already an interpretation by the person of the Prophet. The 
word of God was revealed to the Prophet, but what has been handed down to us is the 
Prophet‘s interpretation of revelation. If the epistemological distinction between religion 
qua religion and religious knowledge set the stage for greater freedom in breaking with 
orthodox interpretations, then this second game-changing strategy, considering the 
Qur‘ān as an interpretation rather than the unmediated word of God, serves to desacralize 
the Qur‘ān and leaves the field open for Soroush‘s postmodern theological break.  
Does this mean that Soroush believes there is no stable and determinant meaning 
contained in the Qur‘ān that will remain safe from the ravages of time or the 
interpretations of fallible humans (all humans being fallible)?22 On the one hand, Soroush 
is a firm believer in the ―complete and flawless‖ message of God, but we can only have 
access to that message through experiencing God or following those who do. Although 
much can be gleaned from the Prophet‘s encounter with the divine as well as the 
                                                 
21 This is the basic message of Abdolkarim Soroush, Qabz va Basṭ-e Tiorīk-e Sharī’at: Nazariyyih-
yeTakammul-e Ma`rifat-e Dīnī [The Theoretical Contraction and Expansion of the Shariah: The Theory of 
Evolution of Religious Knowledge] (Tehran: Sirāṭ Cultural Center, 1994). 
22 An important note to make here is that Soroush is also questioning the Shī`ī concept of `ismah or 
infallibility of the Prophet and by extension his ahl al-bayt (the 14 ma`ṣūms [infallibles], which include 
Fatima, the Prophet‘s daughter, and Ali, his cousin and son-in-law, and their progeny).  
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experiences of mystics like Rumi, their interpretations of the divine are nevertheless 
historically mediated and contingent and, as a result, error-prone. Our understanding of 
the divine, our religious knowledge, is inextricably dependent on non-religious learning 
and wisdom about the world. Although the divine experiences of past religious saints and 
prophets are a place to start, it is up to each believer to question and search the truth on 
their own.  
The tracing of Kadivar‘s and Soroush‘s theological attempts to modernize Islamic 
thought and the situating of their innovations within both religious and political thought 
is the topic of this dissertation. Kadivar is faithful to the traditions of Islam, while 
Soroush works outside the orthodoxy.  To proceed systematically, the thinkers‘ works 
must first be situated with respect to Islamic traditions so that the power and appeal of 
their innovations make sense.  
To that end, then, Chapter 2 of this dissertation will discuss the kalām tradition, 
the nature of classical Islamic hermeneutics, the ―new kalām‖ tradition, the elusive nature 
of postmodernity, and the relationship between theology and postmodernity in the West. 
That is, Islamic hermeneutics will be presented both within its own space of 
interpretations and with respect to twentieth-century Western epistemological 
innovations. Reclamations of past hermeneutic trends (Sufi tafsīr, in the case of Soroush) 
and Western innovations ground Kadivar‘s and Soroush‘s innovations.  
In turn, Chapters 3 and 4 will respectively outline the two main theological issues 
that are key to their innovations. Chapter 3 begins with an introduction to classical 
revelation theology, followed by Soroush‘s and Kadivar‘s views on the nature of 
revelation and the position of the Qur‘ān in exegetic practice. Chapter 4 covers the topic 
of religious pluralism, which shows the potentially political and dangerous nature of 
revised theology. The main topic of Chapter 4 is religious pluralism, but in the process 
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Soroush‘s pluralist views on society and culture are also touched upon (including his 
views on the unclear bases for social / national / ethnic unity, his sense of a fragmented 
and decentered self, and his conception of Iranian identity as arising from a multiple and 
conflicting web of cultures, all of which are some of the defining characteristics of the 
Postmodern Condition). Soroush argues for religious pluralism, holding that as humans 
we are epistemologically unable to determine the superiority of any one religion, while 
Kadivar rejects pluralism on the grounds that it makes faith obsolete. 
This discourse of pluralism, when applied to religious thought, has manifested 
itself in terms of a decentered religious epistemology, which is mired in indeterminacy, 
contingency, and polycentric sources of information. That is, the pluralism debate has all 
too often been thought of as an emergence of Western relativism trying to counter the 
singular, interpretive authority of the Shī`ī cleric and the strict, superior position of the 
Muslim‘s salvation in relation to the other People of the Book. As a result, Soroush‘s 
response to charges of relativism is also provided in Chapter 4. 
The conclusion of this study will briefly discuss the other remaining theological 
points of contention mentioned earlier: views on rationality, ethics, and political 
theology. Thus, the goal of the next three chapters is to isolate two classical theological 
issues dealt with by Iranian new theology—revelation and soteriology—and in doing so, 
make a cultural statement, however tentative, about the capacity of this ―Muslim‖ public 












Chapter 2: Key Concepts 
CLASSICAL KALĀM TRADITION 
The power of theology has always been its comprehensiveness, its claim to 
explain the broad panoply of issues experienced by a community of co-religionists, as 
posed by human life in this world and the next. In the Muslim world Islamic theology 
(`ilm al-kalām) arose as an apologetic meant to counteract nonbelievers‘ charges against 
the new religion.23 Over time, however, theology not only filled this traditional role, just 
as it had in other religions, but it also became, in the words of Mark Juergensmeyer:   
 
A repository for a whole range of human activity . . . Long before the advent of 
modern academic principles: structure, the social, ethical, political, and spiritual 
aspects of a culture‖ were brought together in theology . . . [In classical literature] 
there often exists no clear distinction between Islamic theology, in the sense of 
kalām, and other Islamic and not so Islamic sciences, such as grammar, 
jurisprudence (fiqh), philosophy (falsafa/hikma), sufism, and the more specific 
activities of learning how to operate with the traditions of the Prophet, and how to 
assess and rank the chains of narrators which differentiate their levels of 
reliability.24 
Muslim theologians did not separate what they did from other scholarly activities, and so 
it is not easy today to provide a neat account of the definition and boundaries of Islamic 
theology over and against other frames of religious thought.25 Norman Calder states in the 
Encyclopedia of Islam: ―Ghazālī for instance described the science of kalām as the most 
general or universal (ʿāmm) of the religious sciences, the others being concerned with 
                                                 
23 ―ʿIlm al-kalām is ‗defensive apologetics,‘ or ‗the science of discourse‘ (on God)‖ (Louia Gardet, ―ʿIlm 
al-Kalām,‖ in Encyclopædia of Islam, 2nd ed., eds. P. J. Bearman, et al. [Leiden: Brill, 2002], 3: 468). 
24 Mark Juergensmeyer, ―Beyond Words and War,‖ Journal of the American Academy of Religion 78, no. 
4, (2010): 886. 
25Oliver Leaman and Sajjad Rizvi, ―The Developed Kalām Tradition,‖ in The Cambridge Companion to 
Classical Islamic Theology, ed. Tim Winter (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 77. 
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particulars (juzʾī).‖26 It is no wonder that theology used to be called the ―queen of all the 
sciences‖ in both Christianity and Islam.27  
In fact, the first four centuries of Sunni Islamic theology were a time of vibrant 
creativity, as known by the popular slogan, man talaba al-dīn bi’l kalām tazandaqa 
(whoever seeks religion through kalām becomes a heretic).28 This accusation of heresy 
was inspired by the differences in the way rival schools where divided according to their 
views on the limitations of the use of reason in trumping tradition.  
In Western accounts, the over-arching distinction between the different schools of 
early Sunni theology (the first four centuries) have been delineated by somewhat 
tendentious names: the Traditionalists and the Rationalists, where the Traditionalists are 
―known‖ to have favored ―irrationality‖ (they were insistent on using hadīth to ground 
their readings), while the Rationalists (who used hadīth along with rational arguments) 
were known for their reliance on rational thought process. Western reliance on 
Enlightenment values almost automatically favors the Rationalists; only in critique of the 
Enlightenment is space made for the value of irrationality. These labels are thus not very 
helpful overall, and in fact can be misleading in assessing theology and its capacity to 
innovate for a community or state. The fact of the matter with kalām is that no one group 
within this landscape of early Islam operated without rationality, and as to the matter of 
methodology, this era‘s theologians seem to have differed more in emphasis rather than 
in their possible abandonment of either reason or tradition in reaching theological 
pronouncements.29 The Rationalists emphasized the use of reason while the 
Traditionalists emphasized reliance on hadīth. Still, by the fourth century, Sunni kalām 
                                                 
26 Norman Calder, ―Uṣūl al-Fiqh,‖ in Encyclopædia of Islam, 2nd ed., eds. P. J. Bearman, et al. (Leiden: 
Brill, 2002), 10: 931. 
27 Juergensmeyer, 886. 




went silent alongside tafsīr, right around the time when the doors of ijtīhād30were deemed 
closed.31  
There were many strands of early Shī`ī kalām, but the present project will 
concentrate on the Twelver Shī`ī strand, as it is the one most relevant to work on 
contemporary Iran. The development of theology for the Shī`a was a function of their 
intellectual encounter with the Mu‘tazilite rational theology and later with the falsafa 
tradition32 in second to fourth century Iraq.33 It was Sheikh al-Mufīd34 (d. 413 A.H./ 1022 
                                                 
30 Ijtihād is the making of a decision in Islamic law by personal effort, independently of any school 
(madhhab) of jurisprudence (fiqh). Ijtihād is in direct contrast to taqlīd, which is copying or obeying 
without question. 
31The claim that Sunni kalām went silent is made in 2008 by Leaman and Rizvi in a book about classical 
Islamic theology, but it was countered in 1982 by Wael Hallaq in his seminal article ―Was the Gate of 
Ijtihād Closed?‖ (IJMES 16, no. 1 [1984]: 3-41), where he argues that claims made by the likes of Joseph 
Schacht (An Introduction to Islamic Law [Oxford: Clarendon, 1964], 70-71), Norman Anderson (Law 
Reform in the Muslim World [London: Athlone, 1976], 7), H. A. R. Gibb (Modern Trends in Islam 
[Chicago: University fo Chicago, 1947], 13) and W. Montgomery Watt (Islam  and  the  Integration  of  
Society [London: Routledge & Paul, 1961], 206-07, 242-43) are ―baseless and inaccurate‖ (Hallaq, 4). By 
the beginning of the fourth century A.H. (some argue the seventh century), the scholars of the established 
schools of fiqh (Hanafī, Shāfi‘ī, Malikī, and Hanbalī) and by extension other qur‘ānic fields of study, felt 
that all essential questions had been thoroughly discussed and finally settled. From this, a consensus was 
gradually established suggesting that henceforth no one might be deemed to have the necessary 
qualifications for independent reasoning in law (and by extension, theology), and that all future activity 
would have to be confined to the explanation, application and, at most, interpretation of the doctrine as it 
had been laid down once and for all. What followed was a demand for taqlīd, which came to mean the 
unquestioning acceptance of the doctrines of the four established schools of law and their authorities. This 
theory, known as insidād  bāb al-ijtihād (closing of the door of ijtihād), is arguably still the dominant 
position on the issue. In his response, Hallaq suggests ―that ijtihād was not only exercised in reality, but 
that all groups and individuals who opposed it were finally excluded from Sunnism‖ (Hallaq, 4). 
32 Falsafa (Islamic philosophy) can be said to have been ―almost entirely based on Arabic translation of the 
Greek texts‖ (Hossein Ziai, ―Islamic Philosophy [Falsafa],‖ in The Cambridge Companion to Classical 
Islamic Theology [Cambridge: Cambridge, 2008], 55). The relationship between early kalām and falsafa 
was so close that the formative period of falsafa was actually ―shaped by the problems posed by kalām 
scholars‖ (Ziai, 56). This does not, however, mean that Islamic philosophy became a handmaiden of 
theology (Ziai, 56.). ―After the seventh and eighth centuries A.H. falsafa died out in Sunni Islam but was 
kept alive in Iranian centers of learning‖ despite being a ―marginal scholastic activity‖ (Ziai, 56.). For more 
on Islamic philosophy see: Seyyed Hossein Nasr and Oliver Leaman, eds., History of Islamic Philosophy 
(1996); Daiber Hans, Bibliography of Islamic Philosophy (1999); Peter Adamson and Richard C. Taylor, 
The Cambridge Companion to Arabic Philosophy (2005). 
33 The Mu‘tazilites were an Islamic school of theology that flourished in Iraq (Basra and Baghdad) during 
the second to fourth centuries A.H. They are best known for their theory of the created Qur‘ān. The theory 
stems from their belief in the perfect unity and eternal nature of God. Because God is eternal in nature the 
Qur‘ān must have therefore been created, as it could not be co-eternal with God. Because the Qur‘ān was 
created by God, the Mu‘tazili school posits that the injunctions of God are accessible to rational thought 
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A.D.) who reconciled Twelver Shī`ī theology with Mu‘tazilite thought. The distinction 
between Sunni Traditionalist and Rationalist divide was also very much alive for the 
Shī`īs. The Traditionalists at the time, like their Sunni counterparts, gave greater 
significance to the Qur‘ān and aḥadīth (pl. ḥadīth; prophetic sayings and recorded 
opinions of the Imāms) as opposed to independent reasoning. Shī`ī Twelver 
Traditionalists had also acquired a reputation for believing in determinism, literalism, and 
anthropomorphism.35 It was al-Mufīd who, through such works as Taṣḥiḥ al-I`tiqādāt 
(Correction on Beliefs), ―distance[d] Twelver Shī`ī theology from such forms of 
irrationalism.‖36 But the ―adoption of Mu‘tazilite thought was never wholesale or 
uncritical.‖37 Unlike in the Mu‘tazilite case, Sheikh al-Mufīd ―felt strongly about the role 
of reason in theology but did not allow for the supremacy of unaided reason as a source 
for discovering truth.‖38 So, we see the foundations and limitations of current day Iranian 
Shī`ī Theology being set by Sheikh al-Mufīd. Al-Mufīd, through his rejection of the 
Mu`tazilite position on the supremacy of reason above all else, is making sure that the 
―content‖ and main message of the Qur‘ān remained untainted.  
Later Shī`ī theology is known for the Akhbārī-Uṣūlī schism. The Akhbārīs are a 
minority within Twelver Shī‗ism who, according to Lawson, reject the use of reasoning 
in deriving verdicts and believe only that the Qur‘ān and aḥadīth should be used as 
                                                                                                                                                 
and inquiry. Also, since knowledge is derived from reason, reason is the ―final arbiter‖ in distinguishing 
right from wrong. It thus follows according to Mu‘tazili reasoning that ―sacred precedent‖ is not an 
effective means of determining what is just, as what is obligatory in religion is only obligatory ―by virtue of 
reason.‖
 
For more on Mu‘tazilite theology see: Josef van Ess, The Flowering of Muslim Theology (2006); 
John A. Nawas, ―The Mihna of 218 A.H./833 A.D. Revisited: An Empirical Study‖ (1996); Nagel Tilman, 
The History of Islamic Theology from Muhammad to the Present (2000). 
34 Sheikh al-Mufīd is considered one of the most eminent of Twelver Shī`ī theologians and the most 
important figure in early Twelver Shī`ī theology. For more on al-Mufid see Tamima Bayhom-Daou, 
Shaykh Mufid (2005) and Martin J. McDermott, The Theology of al-Shaikh al-Mufid (1978). 
35 Leaman and Rizvi, 91. 





religious sources. ―In some cases, we are told some scholars only accept hadīth as a 
proper source.‖39  Akhbārīs do not follow marja‘s (clerics deemed models for imitation) 
and ―in short reject ijtihād [independent legal reasoning].‖40 Akhbārīsm crystalized as a 
distinct movement with the writings of Muhammad Amīn al-Astarābādī (d. 1036 A.H./ 
1627 A.D.) and achieved its greatest influence in the late Safavid and early post-Safavid 
era. However, shortly thereafter, Muḥammad Bāqir Behbahānī (d. 1206 A.H./ 1792 A.D.) 
along with other Uṣūlī mujtahids crushed the Akhbārī movement.41 Today it is found 
primarily in the Basra area of southern Iraq, where they form the majority in many 
districts, although no longer within the city. Akhbārī are also found in the island nation 
of Bahrain with reportedly ―"only a handful of Shī`ī ulema‖ remaining Akhbārī ―to the 
present day.‖42 
Since the crushing of the Akhbārīs in the late eighteenth century A.D. (thirteenth 
century A.H), Uṣūlīsm has been the dominant Twelver Shī`ī school of thought. Uṣūlis 
favor the use of ijtihād (i.e., reasoning in the creation of new rules of fiqh, or 
jurisprudence); they insist on assessing hadīth to exclude traditions they believe 
unreliable and consider it obligatory to obey a mujtahid when seeking to determine 
correct behavior. The task of the legal scholar is to establish intellectual principles of 
general application (uṣūl al-fiqh)43, from which particular rules may be derived by way of 
deduction: accordingly, legal scholarship has the tools in principle for resolving any 
                                                 
39 Todd Lawson, ―Akhbāri Shī`ī Approaches to Tafsīr,‖ in Approaches to the Qur’ān, ed. G. R. Hawting 
(New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 1993), 173-74. 
40 Ibid., 174. 
41 Moojan Momen, An Introduction to Shī`ī Islam: The History and Doctrines of Twelver Shī`ī sm (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1985), 222. 
42 Ibid., 127. 
43 Uṣūl al-fiqh is the study of the origins, sources, and principles upon which Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh) is 
based. It refers to the sources of Islamic law. In an extended sense it includes the study of the philosophical 
rationale of the law and the procedures by which the law applicable to particular cases is derived from the 




situation, whether or not it is specifically addressed in the Qur‘ān or ḥadīth. I will discuss 
the Akhbārī-Uṣūlī debate in more depth later in this dissertation when I address the 
stability of the qur‘ānic text. Soroush and Kadivar are working off of this Uṣūlī 
tradition.44 
These two different strategies for evolving theologies, these two cognitive 
styles—one more reliant on rational thought and the other on the salaf45 for interpreting 
the Qur‘ān—thus exists next to each other within the Imāmī tradition. In reality, although 
everyone in Qom is working off an Uṣūlī platform, there are those who are more willing 
to be creative and rely on their intellect. These two intellectual styles define the kind of 
Islamic theology one is engaged in. Although both thinkers presented in this work 
ostensibly operate within an Uṣūlī framework, we can clearly see Kadivar placing limits 
on his creativity in order not to step outside the traditional boundaries, and Soroush 
nearly abandons the tradition altogether.  
KALĀM-E JADĪD (NEW THEOLOGY) 
In his 2009 presidential address for the American Academy of Religion (AAR) 
Mark Juergensmeyer, an expert on post-secularism, noted that ―while in 1909 (the year 
the AAR was founded), the study of religion was the study of words, specifically sacred 
text,‖ the study of religion in the global age (the postmodern, post-national, post-secular, 
                                                 
44 For more on the Shī`ī Akhbārī/Uṣūlī debates see: Wilferd Madelung, ―Imamism and 
Muʿtazilite Theology‖ (1970); Norman Calder, ―Doubt and Prerogative: The Emergence of an Imāmī Shīʿī 
Theory of Ijtihād‖ (1989); Andrew J. Newman, ―The Nature of the Akhbārī/Uṣūlī Dispute in Late Ṣafawid 
Iran‖ (1992); Hossein Modarressi, ―Rationalism and Traditionalism in Shî'î Jurisprudence: A Preliminary 
Survey‖ (1984); Robert Gleave, Scripturalist Islam: The History and Doctrines of the Akhbari Shī`ī School 
(2007); J. R. I. Cole, ―Shi'i Clerics in Iraq and Iran, 1722-1780: The Akhbari-Usuli Conflict Reconsidered‖ 
(1985); Mangol Bayat and Ahmad Kazemi Moussavi, ―The Usuli-Akhbari Controversy,‖ in Expectation of 
the Millennium: Shiʿism in History (1989). 
45 A member of the salaf is an early Muslim (first three generations after the advent of Islam).  
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post-Cold war era) is the study of ―epistemic world views.‖46 Religious perceptions, 
according to Juergensmeyer, ―coalesce around notions of social reality‖ and ―produce 
powerful ways of looking at the world.‖47 As Juergensmeyer points out, this invokes 
Foucault‘s concept of episteme, a paradigm within a particular discourse based on a 
common set of understandings about the basis of knowledge within that discourse. 48  We 
are also reminded of Bourdieu‘s notion of habitus, the social location of shared 
understandings (set of acquired schemata, sensibilities, dispositions and taste) about the 
world and how it should work.49 Juergensmeyer‘s statement again points towards 
theology assuming the role of a master discourse on culture and society, not just a 
―science of religion,‖ as it is often presented in the secularized West. 
Juergensmeyer further claims that theology has always studied the episteme and 
the habitus of religion—a study of society, not just of abstracts. These structures of 
knowledge were traditionally understood in language that only recently has been named 
religious and opposed to the public sphere, or civil society. Thus, remaining today the 
comprehensive science that it was during its classical heyday, kalām has close affinities 
with this notion of theology being the science of an epistemic worldview. Where there 
was little if any difference between what we deem today as religious and non-religious 
                                                 




Foucault more specifically defines episteme ―as the strategic apparatus which permits of separating out 
from among all the statements which are possible those that will be acceptable within, I won‘t say a 
scientific theory, but a field of scientificity, and which it is possible to say are true or false. The episteme is 
the ‗apparatus‘ which makes possible the separation, not of the true from the false, but of what may from 
what may not be characterized as scientific‖ (Michel Foucault, Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and 
Other Writings, 1972-1977, trans. Colin Gordon, et al. [New York: Pantheon, 1980], 197). For more on 
episteme see Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge (1972), especially p. 168. 
49 For more on habitus see Pierre Bourdieu, Outline of a Theory of Practice (1977), especially p. 76. 
23 
 
discourse, theology had been the ultimate study of all things rational and logical, and it 
remains so today.50  
In the current project I abide by an additional analogy: that theology, defined in 
this way, is also a political study of society, equivalent in many ways to Western political 
science. This allows me to argue that, in the case of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the 
epistemic worldview of the Iranian reformist public (their social location of shared 
understandings about religion and its role in the world) can be characterized in terms of 
theology, not just politics. Most particularly, Soroush‘s and Kadivar‘s theologies, as we 
will come to know them, represent particular definitions of the public sphere and society, 
not just issues concerning revelation theology. (These issues are the topic of Chapter 3; 
positions on the salvation of the Other are the topic of Chapter 4, and values, ethics and 
morality will be the topic of a later piece.) By looking at Soroush‘s and Kadivar‘s 
theologies, we can gather their sense of reform in terms comprehensible to their publics. 
What Soroush and Kadivar are presenting in their theologies is a study of present-day 
Iranian episteme and habitus—a study of the society, not mere theological abstractions.  
With the classification of the reformist theology into the Soroush and Kadivar camps, I 
am not suggesting that reformist leaders and their followers are affiliated strictly with one 
of these two thinkers. Instead, my claim is that the way they see the world and their role 
in it (particularly their identities as public intellectuals) are reflected and defined, to a 
large extent, by these two schools of new theology: the modern, as exemplified by 
Kadivar, and the postmodern, as exemplified by Soroush. 
                                                 
50 This can be seen in the works of Ibn Sina, Mulla Sadra, Ibn Hayyan, al-Khawrazmi and al-Kindi. For the 
expansion of this project into a longer mongraph, I plan to expand this part of the chapter to include an 
exposition of their outlined theologies, which were simultaneously studies of their corresponding epistemes 
and habitus. For more on the aforementioned thinkers see: Seyyed Hossein Nasr, The Islamic Intellectual 
Tradition in Persia (1996); Seyyed Hossein Nasr and Mehdi Amin Razavi, An Anthology of Philosophy in 




But what exactly is the make-up and history of this kalām-e jadīd? The first ever 
mention of the term kalām-e jadīd can be found in `Alāmah Shiblī Nu`mānī‘s `Ilm Kalām 
Jadīd (first published in 1949 but written earlier), a tract in which he mentions how 
certain topics formerly not considered within the purview of theology should, as a result 
of Islam‘s encounter with modernity, become part of Islamic theology. In his introduction 
to the book, Shiblī gives us the reason why he felt it necessary to consider a ―new 
kalām‖:  
 
Old kalām dealt exclusively with doctrinal issues (`aqā’id). This is because 
complaints (e`terāzāt) about Islam were couched against its doctrinal issues. 
Today religion is also considered and judged according to its historical, ethical, 
civilization and social merit. It is not doctrinal topics but instead legal and ethical 
questions about a religion that take precedence for European scholars. Polygamy, 
divorce, slavery and finally jihad in order to vanquish an opposing religion [they 
are referring to European fascination with the concept of jihad against the 
Christians] are better criteria for judging the truth value of a religion. It is because 
of this reason that I will commence a discussion about kalām-e jadīd.51  
Most of the topics Nu`mānī covers in his book overlap with orthodox kalām. Topics such 
as the place of reason in Islam, the nature of God, and prophethood overlap in all versions 
of the kalām. What is different is that, even though classical kalām was at some level 
apologetic, it spoke from a position of power and entitlement. `Ilm Kalām Jadīd is 
defensive and acknowledges the subordinate place of kalām in reference to the 
Enlightenment. The pages of each chapter are filled with scientific terminology from the 
late nineteenth century, and Nu`mānī‘s rebuttals are defenses against them. There are, 
however, four interesting chapters towards the end of the tract that signify it as a work of 
new theology, issues that make Nu`mānī‘s text address the modern world, specifically 
with topics not seen in classical theology: human rights, women‘s rights, and inheritance 
and civil rights (hoqūq-i āmmeh-i nās).    
                                                 
51 `Alāmah Shiblī Nu`mānī, Tārīkh-i `Ilm-i Kalām: `Ilm-i Kalām Jadīd (Tehran: Chāp-i Rangīn, 1949), 4. 
The English translation is mine and done directly from the Persian text. 
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According to Abdolhossein Khosropanah,52 prior to becoming popular in the post-
revolutionary period, kalām-e jadīd was taught by Morteza Motahhari in his theology 
classes at Tehran University during the Shah‘s reign.53 Today, although the concept is 
written about extensively in Iran, ―what in fact sets kalām-e jadīd apart from its 
predecessor is not very clear.‖54 According to Khosropanah, there are four views 
regarding what is distinctive about kalām-e jadīd: 
 
1. Kalām-e jadīd has become synonymous with Religious Studies / Philosophy of 
Religion: Contemporary theologians need to learn new sciences in order to 
adequately respond to modern qualms. If in the past the responsibilities of kalām 
were to respond to doubts, describe religious knowledge, and produce proofs for 
doctrinal foundations, today it has the added responsibility of devising the field of 
Religious Studies (Dīn Shenāsī). Since Religious Studies is an extra-religious look at 
religion, new theology has sometimes also been called Philosophy of Religion.  
 
2. New issues are raised: In comparing kalām-e jadīd with its predecessor this 
view finds that new theology has appended previously unchartered areas of 
study. If in the past theology dealt only with discourses on the nature of the 
divine, prophethood, and revelation, today new issues that have more to do 
with religious studies and anthropology have supplanted these older issues. 
 
3. It mends a longstanding shortcoming: This view holds that orthodox theology 
has always avoided fully dealing with normative, ethical, and legal 
propositions in the Qur‘ān and the Sunna and has opted instead to define itself 
by concentrating on prescriptive questions. Traditional theology deals with 
issues such as the characteristics of God, prophethood, and eschatology. 
Kalām-e jadīd breaks with tradition and takes a more critical stance towards 
normative, critical, and legal issues.  
 
4. The difference between old and new theology is a matter of ontology: This 
group believes that there is an ontological difference between new and old 
                                                 
52 Abdolhossein Khosropanah is Associate Professor and Chair of the Department of Philosophy at 
Mo‘asseseh-i Ḥekmat Novīn Islamī (Islamic Institute for New Culture and Thought) in Tehran, Iran.   
53 Abdolhossein Khosropanah, Kalām-i Jadīd [New Theology], Mo‘asseseh-e Ḥekmat Novīn-e Islamī , 
n.d., 5. [The English version of this text may be Modern Theology, 4th ed.  Iran: Qom Islamic Seminary 
Publication, 2009.]  Morteza Motahhari is considered an important ideologue of the Islamic Republic. He 
was co-founder of Hosseiniye Ershad and the Combatant Clergy Association (Jāme'e-ye Rowhāniyat-e 
Mobārez). He was a disciple of Ayatollah Khomeini before the revolution and had a promising career 
ahead of him, a career that was cut short when he was assassinated on May 1, 1979, just a few months after 
the victory of the revolution.  
54 Ibid., 7. 
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theology; that as a result of the scientific revolution, it is no longer possible to 
prove that which is considered divine. The noumenal is not accessible through 
the phenomenal. It is therefore necessary for us to use a different language 
(skepticism) when speaking about God, prophethood, eschatology, and 
revelation.55  
It is clear that the last two classifications in Khosropanah‘s taxonomy refer respectively 
to Kadivar and Soroush.  
In fact, what I would like to suggest is that most if not all of the new theology 
presently practiced by reformists in Iran can fall under these latter two categories, as both 
Kadivar and Soroush also engage the Western philosophy of religion and believe that 
modernity has presented the Muslim tradition with new challenges. In other words, the 
study of kalām-e jadīd can be exhausted through the study of its most distinguished 
theorists Abdolkarim Soroush and Mohsen Kadivar since all the key positions and issues 
are represented in their work. Let us now turn to some central elements of new theology 
in both its incarnations (the modern and the postmodern), to establish the rest of the 
framework and terminology that will recur throughout this dissertation. 
NEW THEOLOGY: CONNECTIONS WITH CONTINENTAL PHILOSOPHY 
Kadivar‘s new theology sheds light on a rarely acknowledged classical 
hermeneutic practice in the Muslim world: selectivity.56 Kadivar holds that the Qur‘ān 
contains determinate and stable messages that are inviolable, timeless, and accessible.57 
This is not the same as saying that the whole Qur‘ān is stable and determinate. There are 
                                                 
55 Ibid., 138-39. 
56 This term is borrowed from Moshe Sokol, ―How Do Jewish Thinkers Interpret Religious Texts?‖ 
Modern Judaism 13, no. 1 (1993): 25-48. 
57 Stable and determinate meaning refers to meaning that has exact and definite limits; it is not as if 
anything goes, or that the horizon of possible meanings is infinite. For instance, the Qur‘ān self-references 
itself as the word of God. There might be some unknowns about the exact details of the revelatory process 
(was the word interjected into the Prophet‘s ear or written onto his heart or both, etc.) but the fact that what 
the Prophet recited to his `umma was the word for word account of that transaction, is not disputable for 
Kadivar. The verses (presented in the next chapter) that speak to the sending down of the Qur‘ān, are for 
Kadivar, stable and determinate and despite the unknown details about the transference, their meaning is 
limited to the Qur‘ān being kalām Allāh. 
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parts of the Qur‘ān to which we do not have absolute access (the mutashabbihāt, or 
ambivalent verses). For those parts that are accessible, the meaning of these messages are 
easier to get to because the intentions of God (the author)58 can, in fact, be retrieved 
through expert excavation: reading and understanding are established practices that can 
be taught and learned. The stability of some parts, however, does not mean that the text, 
as a whole, is immune to the passage of time. Certain parts of the Qur‘ān, if they are 
intended to refer to the world beyond the text, are behind the times and defunct. Certain 
verses, for instance, no longer represent the sensitivities of contemporary followers and 
thus need to be ignored as an understanding of a text is transferred into a context of 
practical religion or theology. Ignoring these verses and selecting certain others does not 
corrupt the main divine message that is inherent in the text, but from a historical 
perspective it is necessary to overlook these verses as a means to stay true to the divine 
message within shifting modern perspectives.59  
Kadivar‘s position about the stable, divine meaning of the text is reminiscent of 
the interpretive approaches of contemporary theological hermeneuticians like Emilio 
Betti,60 whose work is very much in the dominant continental traditions of hermeneutics 
and is known as reconstructive, or objectivist hermeneutics.61 As I demonstrate below, 
like Betti, Kadivar believes that it is possible to extrapolate the intentions of God in a 
systematic reading and maintains that there is a stable meaning within the qur‘ānic text. 
Betti operated at a time when the idea of timelessly reading the mind of the author was 
becoming passé in light of German Romanticist ideals and Nietzsche‘s perspectival 
                                                 
58 A more extensive discussion of this topic will have to include the created vs. uncreated Qur‘ān debate. 
59 Two examples of this treatment (Kadivar‘s treatment of women‘s issues and his pronouncements about 
the fate and salvation of non-Muslims in Islam) are covered in Chapter 3. 
60 Emilio Betti (1890 -1968) was an Italian jurist, Roman Law scholar, philosopher and theologian. 
61 This tradition is summarized in Kurt Mueller-Vollmer, ed., The Hermeneutics Reader (New York: 




position. Betti was one of the few thinkers who remained wary of the death of the author 
theory, which was finally exemplified in Roland Barthes‘ essay by the same name.62 
Although Kadivar also believes in being able to access the mind and intentions of the 
author (in this case, God), he nevertheless parts with Betti‘s objectivist hermeneutics by 
refusing, in very substantial ways, to suppress his own point of view. This subjectivism 
comes through in his strategy of selectively reading the Qur‘ān. Betti seems to have been 
confused about where to draw the objectivist-subjectivist line and refused to join the 
continental hermeneutics movement that stressed the objectivity of the reader as critical 
to the act of reading. Unlike Betti however, Kadivar consciously and intentionally inserts 
himself into the Qur‘ān by being selective and subjectively deciding which parts are no 
longer relevant.  
To better understand what Kadivar does let us look at an outline of Betti‘s 
position in Teoria Generale della Intrepretzione (A General Theory of Interpretation),63 
which appeared in 1955, as understood by Ormiston and Schrift in The Hermeneutic 
Tradition.64 I will follow Betti‘s position via a synopsis of Gadamer‘s response, which 
was provided in the first edition of Truth and Method in 1960.  
First and foremost, for Betti, the ―texts contain a ‗stable determinacy of 
meaning.‘‖65 That is, as long as the interpreter has access to suitable ―historical and 
critical instruments,‖ s/he is able to recreate the permanent meaning of the text in its 
original socio-cultural context [emphasis in original].‖66 In other words, for Betti it is 
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stone for Derrida‘s deconstructionism. This essay can be found in Roland Barthes, Image, Music Text, 
trans. Stephen Heath (New York: Hill and Wang, 1977). 
63 Emilio Betti, Teoria generale della interpretazione [A General Theory of Interpretation] (Milano: 
Giuffrè, 1955). This book has not been translated into English. 
64 Gayle L. Ormiston and Alan D. Schrift, The Hermeneutic Tradition: From Ast to Ricoeur (New York: 
SUNY Press, 1990), 8-20. 




possible to capture the original intent of the author (yet not necessarily only that, or in its 
original form). This is something Betti and Kadivar share. In Kadivar‘s hermeneutics, the 
primary intent of the Qur‘ān (which resides in the muḥkamāt, or certain verses) remains 
intact and can be retrieved with the correct tools, regardless of the idiosyncrasies of the 
exegete or the socio-cultural biases s/he faces. 
Before we proceed further, two helpful distinctions in this discussion come to us 
by way of E. D. Hirsch and Thomas Guarino. The next few paragraphs will be dedicated 
to discussing Hirsch‘s distinction between meaning and significance and then an 
exposition of Guarino‘s difference between form and content will be presented. In his 
familiar text on hermeneutics, The Aims of Interpretation,67 Hirsch points out that there 
needs to be a distinction made between the meaning of a text and the significance it has 
for contemporary readers. A text‘s significance aims to apply the meaning of the text to 
contemporary circumstances and situations.68 By analogy, the meaning of the Qur‘ān 
does not change, but the significance of the Qur‘ān is elevated by promoting the weight 
and significance of certain verses (i.e., the muḥkamāt) and denying the justice and 
rationality of other verses which are no longer pertinent to the times—verses, for 
example, that indirectly support slavery, openly support the secondary social status of 
women, and directly compromise the legal status of non-Muslims living in Muslim lands.  
Kadivar uses the same distinction between the meaning of the Qur‘ān and the 
significance it has for contemporary readers. In the case of slavery, Kadivar insists that 
qur‘ānic judgments (aḥkām) are divided into two groups: 1) ṣābiṭ (fixed, firm) and dā’imī 
(permanent, continual) judgments, which persist through time; and 2) muvaqqat 
(temporary) and mawsūmī (seasonal) judgments, ―whose time has come to an end 
                                                 
67 E. D. Hirsch, The Aims of Interpretation (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978). Hirsch took up 
Betti‘s mantle in the United States. 
68 Ormiston and Schrift, Hermeneutic Tradition, 18. 
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[dawrān-e ʿitibār ān bi sar risīdih ast].‖69 One of the ways in which a faqīh or mujtahid 
(jurist) decides that a judgment is temporary is by deciding if it is still ―just [`ādilānih] 
and rational [`uqalāī] when compared against the precepts of human rights.‖70 If the 
judgment does not satisfy these two prerequisites, as is the case with slavery, then it must 
be considered defunct. This means that for clerics like Kadivar, sources for ijtihād have 
now been expanded to include the Universal Declaration for Human Rights—an extra-
religious source.  
When writing about women‘s issues, for example, Kadivar admits that the ―unfair 
treatment of women not only has textual precedence in the sayings of the Prophet and the 
Imams, but that there are actual verses in the Qur‘ān that support maltreatment of 
women.‖71 Kadivar admits: 
 
Bā ẓavabiṭ-e ijtihād-e muṣṭalaḥ nemītavan bi tasāvi-ye ḥuqūq-w zan o mard dast 
yāft. Īn rā shaffāf, ṣarīḥ va qāṭiʿāneh ʿarz mīkonām [It is not possible to achieve 
legal equality for men and women through the commonly used criteria of 
jurisprudence. I say this in a transparent, explicit and categorical manner].72 
 
In his 2003 article, ―Rawshanfekrī-ye Dīnī va Ḥuqūq-e Zanān‖ [Religious Intellectualism 
and the Rights of Women], Kadivar enumerates the different ways women have been 
treated as second class citizens in civil, constitutional and criminal law. Kadivar takes to 
task many of the injustices women endure in the Islamic Republic and asks his reading 
public to imagine an Islam that would be fair to both genders. ―Would the religion of God 
                                                 
69 Mohsen Kadivar, ―Mas‘aleh-ye Bardehdarī dar Islām‖ [The Issue of Slavery in Islam] (paper presented 
at Second International Symposium on Human Rights, Mufīd University, Qom, Iran, May 18 2002), 15; 
Also online, accessed June 5, 2011, 
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70 Ibid. 
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change if girls, like boys, did not have to receive permission to get married?‖73 Kadivar 
continues, ―The husband is considered the head of the family in family law . . . What 
would be the problem in expecting family issues to be resolved through mutual 
consultation and deliberation [between husband and wife] (Che eshkālī dadad begūīm 
umūr khawnevādigī bā mashvirat yekdīgar sāmān bīyābad)?‖74 Kadivar expects the 
mutashabbihāt of the Qur‘ān to be able to pass the test of being just and rational. This 
strategy maintains that the text‘s integrity be preserved, but makes sure that its 
applications, within certain contexts, also be revisable.  
As for the issue of legal status of non-Muslims living in Muslim lands, Kadivar 
says, ―The question we are trying to answer is whether or not the judgments that are 
applied to the dhimmīs [non-Muslim citizens living in Muslim lands] are ṣābiṭ / dā’imī 
[fixed / permanent] judgments or muvaqqat / mawsūmī [temporary / seasonal]?‖75 It is in 
this 2003 article that Kadivar clearly states that ―some verses of the Qur‘ān can contain 
judgments that are changeable and temporary (baʿzī āyāt-e Qur’ān mītavanad ḥāvī-ye 
baʿzī aḥkām-e mutighayyir bāshand).‖76 Kadivar‘s response to the question is that legal 
issues around this topic can be divided into three categories: fixed judgments, conditional 
judgments, and temporary judgments whose time has passed.77  
Human dignity as presented in Q 17:70 ―We have honored the sons of Adam; 
provided them with transport on land and sea; given them for sustenance things good and 
pure; and conferred on them special favors, above a great part of Our Creation,‖ is, for 
                                                 
73 Ibid., 13. 
74 Ibid., 14. 
75 Mohsen Kadivar, ―Mas‘aleh-ye Ḥuqūq-e Gheyr-e Musalmānān dar Javāmiʿ-ye Islāmī‖ [The Issue of the 
Rights of Non-Muslims in Muslim Lands] (paper presented at International Conference in Reframing 
Islam: Politics into Law, Irish Center for Human Rights, National University of Ireland, Galway, Ireland, 
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76 Ibid. 
77 Ibid., 2 
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example, a declaration that Kadivar reads as fixed in meaning. Q 17:70 yields, for him, 
fixed judgments, such as the fixed judgment that demands non-Muslims in Muslim lands 
be treated with the dignity with which God meant them to have.78 The dhimmī rule was 
established when Muslims were in a position of political power. Today conditions are 
different, and fair treatment is based on the `umma’s less than favorable standards.  In 
consequence, it is now necessary to rethink the law and allow the ruler to decide what the 
expedient policy would be. This does not mean that the newly devised law will hold 
forever. If the Muslim community ascends once again, judgment might have to be 
revisited.79 Kadivar continues: ―How Muslims are treated in foreign lands, in fact, needs 
to be the criterion for foreigners‘ treatment in Muslim lands . . . In other words, if we 
follow the foundational tenets of Islam [usūl va mabānī], the majority of the judgments 
and rulings [aḥkām] that deal with non-worship issues [gheyr-e `ibādāt] have been 
enacted according to contextual details of time and place. Flexibility in ijtihād allows 
contemporary Islam the necessary ability to search for new answers in light of new 
conditions.‖80   
When Kadivar selects certain mutashabbih (unclear) verses and reads them 
against the Declaration of Human Rights, then, he is essentially lowering the significance 
of those verses by evaluating them according to extra-religious sources.  That is, he is 
reading the Qur‘ān from outside of Tradition. But Kadivar stays true to what he considers 
the content and true message of the Book, what he calls the foundational tenets (usūl va 
mabānī) that, he suggests, are very much in synch with the Declaration of Human Rights. 
Guarino‘s distinction, as posited in his 1990 essay ―Revelation and Foundationalism: 
Toward Hermeneutical and Ontological Appropriateness,‖ highlights the difference 
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between form and content.81 Guarino states that while it has historically been the case that 
in Christian theology, horizons of historicity and finitude, as well as cultural and 
linguistic particularities, have gradually been incorporated into classical theology, in each 
case the historicizing of the divine word has occurred only on the condition that these 
delimiting elements not influence the fundamental tenets of Christian theology, and that 
the changes they introduce modify only a particular doctrine‘s context and form rather 
than its content.82 Orthodox theologians would assert that the narrative about the Bible 
may change, but not its necessary fidelity to the text and to fundamental articles of faith. 
This assertion was also true for classical Islamic theology.  
Guarino‘s distinction can be fruitfully applied to the Qur‘ān. An example of the 
change of context and form through a change in narrative would be the asbāb al-nuzūl 
(occasions of revelation).83 This genre of qur‘ānic study attempted to establish the 
historical and situational contexts within which revelation was sent down to Muhammad 
in his twenty-three years as the Prophet. The asbāb literature follows a simple logic: if a 
particular verse or group of verses, or even a phrase making up a part of a verse, treated 
an issue that found a likely context in an event known from the biography (sīra) of the 
Prophet, it was assumed to have been revealed in relation to that occasion.84 According to 
Rueven Firestone, studying these contexts and forms can make all the difference in our 
understanding of the core message of the Qur‘ān. Firestone questions the evolutionary 
theory of the warlike nature of latter revelation (Medinan verses) as opposed to the early 
                                                 
81 Thomas Guarino, ―Revelation and Foundationalism: Toward Hermeneutical and Ontological 
Appropriateness,‖ Modern Theology 6, no. 3 (1990): 222. 
82 Ibid. 
83 Other interpretive methods that change form and context are the genre of ―abrogating and abrogated‖ 
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84 Rueven Firestone, ―Disparity and Resolution in the Qur‘ānic Teachings on War: A Reevaluation of a 
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pacifist revelation of the Meccan period and posits that Islam seemingly became more 
violent in nature not because war became more expedient for Muhammad and his 
community in order to survive, but because of the disparity that arose (the ―internal 
disagreements between early scholars after the Prophet‘s passing‖) when all the verses 
about war were gathered together.85 He contends that the reason that the more violent 
passages gained the upper hand in defining the tone of the Qur‘ān is related to conscious 
choices made by scholars, who marginalized the more pacifist voices and proceeded to 
read the Qur‘ān in a more aggressive voice.86  
Orthodoxy maintains that the meaning of a text is permanent even if the verbal 
formulation changes. Revelation can be ―expressed in varying languages, cultures, and 
conceptual schemas i.e., in a plurality of ‗forms,‘ but the ‗content‘ remains, with some 
nuances, identical.‖87 What we are talking about here is a ―plurality of expressions, 
perspectives and context,‖88 all of which preserve the stable determinacy of the Qur‘ān. 
For instance, Soroush‘s first hermeneutic innovation speaks of an epistemological 
difference between religion and religious knowledge.89 Religious knowledge, any and all 
knowledge currently held by the Muslim community, be they lay persons or clerics, is 
nothing but fallible human knowledge. In the cognitive strategies of new theology, this is 
not an alteration in the content of the doctrine, rather it is only a reformulation in the 
order of religious knowledge—the doctrine‘s form, context, and historical site in which 
its understanding as a narrative is deployed. According to Soroush the current period in 
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Islamic history requires that we bifurcate the underlying conditions for understanding 
religious truth. His second innovation, however, of identifying the Qur‘ān itself as a 
narrative (i.e., as an interpretation of God‘s message), is a denial of a principal doctrinal 
tenet, a redefinition of content. It will now be easier to pinpoint epistemological 
differences positions with the help of the two aforementioned distinctions. 
Betti‘s position is by no means unsophisticated. For him, a proper hermeneutic 
procedure tries for an ―interpretive fidelity‖ to the stable meaning of the text, which 
acknowledges its timelessness: ―All tendencies to relativize the horizon of the text to 
one‘s own point of view must be suppressed.‖90 Simultaneously, however, he does not 
necessarily push for a uniformity of application or significance. Betti even goes so far as 
to hold that even if the meaning of the text is determinate and retrievable in this way, 
―one cannot overlook cultural linguistic horizons.‖91 That each interpreter understands 
the text from her/his own perspective, as well as from the linguistic and cultural resources 
available to that reader, is a fact. The office of the interpreter, Betti says, ―is that of 
researching and understanding the meaning of the ‗other‘; this can hardly mean that the 
interpreter is an inert recipient with a passive and mechanical operation.‖92 But Betti 
draws the line by rejecting the idea that context so dictates any uses or significances of 
the content that any search for stable determinacy of meaning of a text is illusory.93 
Kadivar would agree with both of Betti‘s positions since despite the situatedness of the 
Qur‘ān, it is nonetheless possible to extract an unchanging and eternal message if one 
sticks to the muḥkamāt.     
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As can be seen from Betti‘s and Kadivar‘s positions, there are clear tensions 
between the view of a retrievable message and a subjective and partial interpreter, but 
how possible is it to maintain interpretive fidelity to the text‘s stable meaning while 
simultaneously injecting one‘s perspective into the exegetic process? Betti is not able to 
resolve this tension in his hermeneutic method, but Kadivar has been able to exact a 
concession from tradition by using the distinction between the muḥkam and the 
mutashabbih.94 Kadivar sacrifices the stability of the text as a whole and is willing to 
make do with a stable ―main message‖ since it is only the muḥkamāt that remain stable 
over time.  
That this problem from classical Western hermeneutics interests a new theologian 
like Kadivar is no accident. This tension between perspectivism and the excavation of 
stable meaning can be seen in classical tafsīr literature as well. Arriving at a stable 
reading for certain verses (i.e., the mutashabbihāt) of the Qur‘ān has never been 
automatic or a given. The problem of providing a stable reading of the Qur‘an is 
compounded when the distinction between clear and unclear verses is not made. 
Firestone, for instance, argues that the history of early Islam was mired with intense 
debate about ayah classifications into muḥkam and mutashabbih.95 Lawson argues that it 
is still not clear whether the Qur‘ān is all mutashabbih, all muḥkam, or comprised of both 
since there are ayat to support all three of the claims.96  
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The following very short primer on classical Sunni and Twelver Shī`ī tafsīr 
literatures is presented in an effort to better highlight the long standing efforts behind the 
search for the ―stable‖ meaning of the Qur‘ān. Even though Kadivar and Soroush fall 
within the Imāmī category, Sunni and particularly Early Sunni medieval exegetic trends 
are relevant to this study because there is much to be gleaned about the nature of Shī`ī 
tafsīrs from these works since, as Bar-Asher notes, there is not much difference between 
pre-Buyid Shī`ī and Sunni tafsīrs.97  
The Sunni theological literature of Islam‘s classical era operates within what 
Walid Saleh calls a ―genealogical tradition,‖ one that maintains ―continuity of shared 
hermeneutical principles as the primary mode of operation.‖98 Classical theologians 
worked within an environment of pluralism and ―admissibility of difference in all 
religious matters,‖99 a space where ―the preferred mode of disagreement was to add one‘s 
voice to the pool of interpretations inherited…where changes and innovations were more 
easily overlooked and thus introduced as it were, almost imperceptibly.‖100 At certain 
intervals however, ―individual exegetes would cause major upheavals in the tradition due 
to an emphasis on one of the many currents that constitute the tradition to the exclusion 
of others.‖101  Such acts of interpretation served to show the shaky foundation on which 
the concept of the stable Qur‘ān stood upon. As Norman Calder argues, in creating and 
developing his theory of ijtihād, Shāfi`ī was trying partly, to account for, and justify the 
phenomenon of ikhtilāf (disagreement), and partly to assert the authority of the clerical 
class.102  
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Once the concept of ikhtilāf had taken root, through their acceptance of polysemy, 
medieval commentators preserved the idea that a stable text of revelation can produce 
more than one understanding: ―The Qur‘ān spoke to many meanings, and they were all 
true, unless there developed an ijma` (consensus) concerning a particular meaning.‖103 
But consensus was more often than not an elusive goal. A verse, Saleh says, ―could have 
conflicting interpretations, each of which could be adduced as part of the meaning of the 
word of God without disrupting the notion of clarity of the Qur‘ān.‖104  
To see what this interpretive pluralism implies for the stability of the text and for 
the politics of polysemy, it is instructive to look at al-Tha‘labī‘s work.105 If we agree that 
polysemy signifies textual instability, al-Tha‘labī‘s work is a useful example of how 
apprehensive some medieval scholars were in admitting the inherent instability of the 
Qur‘ān.  
Even though ikhtilāf was agreed upon and openly practiced, this did not mean that 
commentators were comfortable in flaunting their creativity on paper. One of the more 
interesting findings in Saleh‘s study of al-Tha‘labī is that, while al-Tha‘labī takes great 
pains to explain his methodology in his rather meticulously crafted introduction (most 
medieval commentaries do not contain introductions)—a methodology that incidentally 
professes to be devoid of any and all creativity—he  proceeds inside the commentary 
itself to follow a rather different set of rules, this time much more open to what we today 
call tafsīr bi’l-ray, or bringing in his own perspective into the interpretive act. His own 
exegetical practice, therefore, reaches somewhat beyond his own theories. This practice 
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points to how, regardless of the actual polyvalent atmosphere of medieval tafsīrs, there 
seems to have been a tendency towards obscuring difference. Al-Tha‘labī, like some 
contemporary qur‘ānic scholars, was either uncomfortable in bringing attention to what 
set him apart from other commentators, or he had trouble openly professing the less than 
stable nature of the holy text.  
The Sunni pre-modern openness to ikhtilāf has diminished in the twentieth 
century, however. Saleh‘s 2010 historiography of tafsīrs shows how what he calls the 
―genealogical tradition‖ in pre-modern tafsīr works was damaged in the twentieth century 
by the Salafīs‘106 appropriation of tafsīr studies.107 Saleh illustrates how the popular 
distinction between tafsīr bi’l-ma`thūr (hadīth-based interpretation) and tafsīr bi’l-ray 
(deductive or rational interpretation) is in fact merely a ―Sunni ideological position,‖ a 
political move ―without much analytical value.‖108 As indicated by Saleh, the divisive 
terms bi’l ma’thur and bi’l ray were not used as analytic terms until the early twentieth 
century, whereby Salafis who believed that ―tafsīr was not to be a generative field, began 
inserting‖ the two terms into the discourse.109 The Azhari Salafi historians (supporters of 
the Taymiyyan ideology)110 ―used the term to legitimize the Sunni hermeneutical heritage 
on their own terms. Since most of the Sunni exegetical tradition was not of the [tafsīrs 
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bi’l-ma`thūr] mode, they could hardly afford to reject this whole corpus en masse.‖111 To 
them, ―hermeneutics was narration,‖ and tafsīr meant the opinions of Muhammad and his 
followers. Tafsīr presented in this hadīth format (as a narration of what the Prophet and 
the salaf had thought of the Qur‘ān) ―ceased to be a danger,‖ no longer a place where 
―legitimacy or religious and theological positions could issue from an interpretation of 
scripture.‖112  
To summarize, up until the take-over by Salafi polemics in the twentieth 
century,113 the polysemic nature of tafsīrs and the madhhab system of law and theology 
was for the majority of writers within the classical tradition based on the acceptance of 
the concept of ikhtilāf. It was Imam ash-Shafi`ī who established this trend as early as the 
second century after the death of the Prophet with his authorizing of ―ijtīhād.‖114 This did 
not prevent inter-school rivalries or even, at times, violent dispute, but the acceptance of 
difference and the epistemological consequences of such acceptance was essential to the 
intellectual coherence of the Sunni system. The Sunnis agreed to differ among 
themselves.  
It took the Shī`ī much longer to grapple with the concepts of ikhtilāf and ijtihād. 
The principle of ijtihād, the concept that allowed commentators, legislators, and 
theologians to use reason in arriving at new understandings of the Qur‘ān, was rejected 
by Imāmi scholars of the pre-Buyid and Buyid periods.115 They categorically rejected it 
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as an ―invalid principle, leading to ẓann (doubt), not `ilm (knowledge).‖ In a seminal 
paper, Calder suggest that the same reasons that led Shafi`ī to come to terms with the 
concept of ikhtilāf and support ijtihād is also the same reason that caused Imāmi scholars 
to ultimately embrace the two concepts.116 It is also important to note that while the 
following discussion about ikhtilāf and ijtihād take place in the context of legal theory, 
the results are authoritative across the board in other Islamic sciences, such as tafsīrs and 
theology. If it becomes legitimate to use ẓann in producing legal rulings, it follows 
logically that it also becomes equally justifiable to lower the epistemological bar in 
theology and exegesis.   
According to Calder, the character of early Imāmi rejection of ijtihād (a sign of 
not coming to terms with ikhtilāf) is confirmed in Ṭūsī‘s117 `Uddat al-Uṣūl.118 Calder 
suggests that Tūsī recognizes the same issue Shafi`ī had grappled with and devises a 
theory of his own in order to justify the tolerance he had witnessed in the works of past 
scholars and ―to establish for the present and the future a similar broad tolerance.‖119 Tūsī 
introduced doubt and flexibility into a system ostensibly concerned with certainty (`ilm, 
not zann) by ―asserting an area of choice.‖120 ―This acknowledgement of choice as an 
option in the assessment of legal values was in effect a confession of doubt and brought 
the Shī`ī very close to the Sunni theory of ijtihād,  which nonetheless tradition required 
that Tūsī reject‖; he was himself aware that this distinction between ijtihād and choice 
was at best a subtle one.121  
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The next big name in Shī`ī tafsīr is that of Ja`far ibn Ḥasan al-Ḥilli, known as al-
Muḥaqqiq. According to Calder, ―the most striking feature‖ of al-Muḥaqqiq‘s work is the 
addition of ―impingement of doubt as to the content of divine law.‖122  ―If you considered 
the variation [of opinions] amongst the excellent in legal matters,‖ al-Muḥaqqiq writes in 
his Mu`tabar, ―that would indicate to you the difficulty of achieving [an answer] without 
study and reflection.‖123 Calder states, ―Clearly for al-Muḥaqqiq, the sharī`a was not 
structure, easily known, of order and stability, it was uncertain, shifting and doubtful.‖124 
Al-Muḥaqqiq maintained that law was ―doubtful‖ and that scholars should be ―cautious 
expressing their views or should suspend decision (tawaqquf).‖125 The disadvantage of 
this position was an abdication of authority, something that al-`Allama126 corrects. 
Al-`Allama‘s importance in the historical scheme of Shī`ī law is his rendering of 
ijtihād to be the central principle of Shī`ī uṣūl.127 It is therefore al-`Allama who 
authorized ijtihād in Shī`ī thought. The essence of this conclusion means that ―the actions 
of ordinary people (mukallaf / muqallid) could and should be based on the mere opinion 
(ẓann) of mujtahids. All pretension to certainty was thereby lost. ―His system 
acknowledged a complete lack of certainty in the law,‖ states Calder.128 Calder continues, 
―There was an immediate necessary knowledge (ḍarūrī) which related to structural 
elements such as the incumbency of salat (prayer) and zakāt,‖129 the details of which 
belong to the category of `ilm, meaning that there was no doubt regarding the 
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interpretation of these concepts.130 ―The other types of knowledge, devoid of definitive 
indicators, concerned detailed shari`ī values (al-aḥkām al-shar`īyya al-far`īyya), and 
these belonged to the category of ẓann and were the prerogative of the fuqahā’.131 We 
therefore see how the `ulama’ slowly develop a system whereby they are permitted to 
deduce ẓanni values by ijtihād. Although it is incumbent on the mujtahid to put forth his 
best effort, the erring mujtahid is also understood to be forgiven and was not subject to 
the law in case of error since ijtihād is defined as a reasoned effort based on doubt and 




 century, the Shī`ī‘s had conceded that there can be 
no certain knowledge about matters not already established and accepted such as 
prophethood and that all available sources of knowledge at best only give rise to 
opinions.133 Ijtihād was on the surface a purely terminological innovation, but through its 
naming, it justified doubt, uncertainty, and instability in the meaning of the Qur‘ān. 
Of the period from the tenth to the sixteenth centuries, Calder states:  
 
The development of Imāmi uṣūl can be characterized as a move from the 
idealized desire for `ilm through the law, to a recognition that its basic structure 
subsisted with a mass of details (whose boundaries were never, perhaps could 
never be, defined) subject to variation and doubt. Within this area of doubt the 
social, political, economic and personal factors that affected a mujtahid‘s choice 
are not easily, perhaps not all quantifiable.134 
The subsequent struggle between the Akhbārīs and Uṣūlīs dominated Imāmi 
jurisprudence throughout the Safavid period135 and beyond.136 The important 
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transformation during this period was that the profound epistemological doubt al-`Allama 
had established in the Shī`ī system of jurisprudence—that is, the position that the 
requirements for God‘s law were ultimately not within human grasp and that the best 
believers could ever attain was based on the best guesses of their `ulamā’—resulted in a 
desired need for certainty for the Uṣūlīs. Robert Gleaves shows how this ―inevitable 
doubt‖ seen in the works of two representative eighteenth-century scholars, Yusūf ibn 
Aḥmad al-Baḥranī (an Akhbārī) and Muḥammad Akmal al-Bihbahānī (an Uṣūlī), is 
overcome. Al-Baḥranī argues that the way to overcome this doubt is by proceeding with 
caution when encountering doubtful situations and doing the most of what might be 
required. Al-Bihbahānī argues for procedure and method. Certainty for the lay person can 
be gained through the ―procedure of asking for and following a mujtahid‘s opinion 
whereby the mujtahid finds a way to approach certainty by proceeding in terms of 
probabilities.‖137 We can never know for sure if our reading of what God wants is correct 
because the definitive sources for such information (the Prophet and the Imāms) are not 
with us, but we can still proceed based on a qualified cleric‘s best guess, whereby he 
chooses the option with the highest chance of being correct given what is known. 
Gleave understands the difference between the Akhbārī-Uṣūlī positions to 
primarily be ―at root over epistemology‖ even if the disagreement has traditionally been 
―presented as a dispute over ijtihād.‖138 In general, both camps agreed that ―perception is 
always recognized as less than certain,‖ regarding the requirements of God‘s law.139 
These positions present two theories of knowledge, which revolve around the acceptance 
and rejection of the ability of any mujtahid to achieve certainty. Gleave concludes that 
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these two approaches are evidence of ―two radically different epistemologies: one in 
which knowledge is the goal [Uṣūlī], and the other in which knowledge is recognized as 
an ideal, but rare commodity [Akhbāri].140  
Aron Zysow states that ―since the 19th century the mujtahids have been divided 
into two groups . . . One group, following al-Bihbahānī, finds recourse to probability as 
necessitated by the general ‗closing off of the gate of knowledge‘ (insidād bāb al-ʿilm), 
that is, of avenues to certainty earlier available.‖141 A reliance on probability was deemed 
necessary to keep the legal system from breaking down. The other group, which now 
constitutes a majority in Twelver Shī`ī circles, favors the opposing view that certainty is 
only available if the probability may be relied upon (ẓann-e ḵāṣṣ). This is the doctrine 
known as infitāḥ, the openness of the avenues of knowledge and of those types of 
probability that are known to be valid (al-ʿilm wa’l-ʿilmī). It is not necessary to go into 
details about contemporary trends in Twelver ijtihād;142 suffice it to say that Kadivar and 
Soroush are working within a late Shī`ī Uṣūlī background where the epistemological goal 
is certainty and much faith is placed in the ability of the cleric to produce a reliable 
understanding of the divine mandate.  
Working within this late Shī`ī Uṣūlī tradition, Kadivar‘s innovation is admitting 
the instability of the Qur‘ān when it comes to the Mutishabbihāt and suggesting that 
certain parts can be selectively ignored. By being selective in choosing the verses he 
highlights, by elevating the significance of certain verses in favor of certain others that 
are more relevant to the times, he reads the text based on what he considers expedient, 
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but maintains that the meaning of the Qur‘ān—the text‘s integrity—does not change. 
Unlike Betti, Kadivar does not seem to make every effort to control his prejudices and to 
subordinate his a priori understandings. Instead, he insists that the Qur‘ān must be 
understood in light of our present day understanding of, for instance, human rights in the 
process of which some verses no longer remain viable. In effect, one can consider 
Kadivar‘s innovations in ijtihād to be the next iteration of the infitah doctrine, whereby 
ẓann-e ḵāṣṣ, or relied-upon probability, can only come about if one tests the qur‘ānic 
readings and rulings of the mujtahid within the arena of public opinion. For Kadivar, the 
injustice meted against women, minorities, and slaves no longer has a place in Shi‘ī 
doctrine because it fails to pass the minimum requirements of the agreed upon inalienable 
rights of humans.  
Betti was brought into the equation in order to better place Kadivar within a 
Western milieu. The same pedagogical exercise can be repeated with Soroush and Hans-
Georg Gadamer. Gadamer suggests in Truth and Method that, contrary to the 
Enlightenment ideals of presuppositionless understanding, we always bring in our 
prejudices to our processes of understanding, and despite the warnings of modernity, 
having presuppositions is not the calamity it is made out to be. As part of our broader 
contextual horizon, these prejudices can sometimes impede our clear understanding but 
are also indispensable, in that they are necessary to understand anything. Without a 
reference point to start from at the moment of understanding, or a preconceived notion of 
what we are experiencing, we are not able to properly register the experience. In this 
model every act of understanding is the fusion of one‘s horizon with that of the author—a 
reading hypothesis drawn from the reader‘s horizon of expectation that is then corrected 
by the text.  
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This model, however, by no means leads to relativism, or to the conception that 
―anything goes,‖ but stays true to traditional methods because it too posits a stable textual 
horizon of truth; only the description of how an individual approaches that text is 
different. In fact, conventional acts of understanding begin with this acceptance of the 
fusing of horizons and meld it with the careful methods of interpretation that have been 
practiced in the hermeneutic traditions. What is different in Gadamer‘s model is simply 
our epistemological expectation of what happens when minds meet. We no longer are 
afraid of overstepping boundaries because we can never truly know the intentions of the 
author, but only encounter one of its moments, as we seek to understand the text.143 
Vanhoozer summarizes: 
 
Gadamer‘s creative insight is that our horizon does not necessarily hinder but is 
the indispensible means for grasping the claim to truth in a text . . . This is a way 
of recognizing the incarnational dimension of interpretation, namely that no 
reading rises above time and history but rather always originates from a particular 
place and time.144 
Thus the status of the text is clear in this epistemological project, but the interpreter needs 
to work out from an individual point of view toward the stability of the text. 
The fact that interpretation is a situated enterprise (commonplace in Western 
hermeneutics) has always been the little white elephant in the great halls of qur‘ānic 
science. Indeed, Soroush also points to this fact when he says, ―In the realm of 
interpretation we145 have always been pluralists and acted pluralistically; in other words, 
we have accepted plurality and have never accepted anyone as the final interpreter or the 
final commentator.‖146 As shown earlier, a lack of epistemological theorizing around the 
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issue has haunted the Islamic sciences for centuries. Saleh‘s exposition shows how the 
concept of tafsīr bi’l-ray (i.e., the use of reason in interpretive methodology beginning 
with one‘s own opinions, or reason bearing on the process) has actually worked to 
suppress the ongoing but rarely if ever admitted practice of situating the Qur‘ān. Not 
admitting the worldly nature of religious knowledge and its mediatedness has led to many 
rampages of ideological prowess and historical rewriting.  
As can be seen in Saleh‘s work, any commentary worth its weight in paper was 
written by exegetes who, without admitting it, injected their own prejudices into their 
interpretations, not relying solely on tradition. It was the fact of ikhtilāf, and the inability 
of keeping difference from creeping into readings, that first led Sunnī Shafi`ī and finally 
the Shī`ī al-`Allama to concede the necessity of ijtihād. What Gadamer has named ―the 
fusion of horizons‖ has been silently finding its echoes in the Muslim world since the 
advent of the qur‘ānic commentary and theological traditions, and silent creativity in 
Muslim exegesis is now finally given its own modern hermeneutic voice in Kadivar‘s 
writings. 
Qur‘ānic sciences have had trouble admitting their unavoidable reliance on 
prejudice and creativity to make sense of revelation. Considering that the mediatedness of 
knowledge is a lynchpin of postmodernity as defined in Western thought, the question 
then arises for the new theologian: if a theologian like Kadivar is now willing to admit to 
the situatedness of exegesis and openly admit the tradition of selectivity, what is it that 
sets him apart from Soroush, who has consciously moved outside of orthodoxy? Kadivar 
does not openly question the metanarratives and the foundations of Islam, whereas 
Soroush does. For Kadivar, interpretations of certain parts of the Qur‘ān are suspect (the 
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mutashabbihāt),147 but he holds that the muḥkamāt are beyond reproach, Soroush, 
however, suggests that even the meanings of the muḥkamāt verses, dealing with issues 
such as the nature of the divine and the afterlife might someday come under question 
―since even the categories of certainty and ambivalence are subject to change.‖148 All 
religious knowledge, in the radical position, is human knowledge and contingent. 
Soroush states, ―Divine inspiration originates in a realm beyond time and space,‖ whereas 
religious knowledge is a ―branch of human knowledge‖ and ―in constant commerce with 
other realms of human knowledge.‖ Soroush adds, ―Tradition does not yield a sacred 
knowledge either.‖149    
POSTMODERNITY AND POSTMODERN THEOLOGY150 
The spread of the idea of postmodernism began with a desire to critique the social 
and political configurations that originated with the Enlightenment. The modernity that 
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resulted from the Enlightenment, rests on the idea that the world is shaped by reason. As 
long as the secular and religious sciences remain consistent with the norms of this 
sacralized reason, they will be able to uncover the essential structures of human thought, 
life, and discourse. This grand story of the Enlightenment also portrays the uncovering of 
knowledge as a continuous Hegelian march of progress (moral and material) towards 
perfection: ―Modernity homogenized and leveled reality.‖151 The Enlightenment put its 
trust in methodology as the path to truth.152 As a result of modernity, theology‘s 
commitment to methodology, historicity, and the ―nuances, ambiguities and complexities 
of knowing and being‖ were veiled in a garb of empowerment and self-justification 
through reason which led to an inappropriate canonization of the ―foundationalisms of 
positivism and empiricism.‖153  
In the West, Nietzsche, Heidegger, and Wittgenstein were among the first to 
question these foundationalist assumptions, and it is from them that postmodernity 
springs.154 They set the ground for postmodernity emerging as an ideological condition 
that affects the practice of everyday life. Postmodernity rejects several postulates that are 
familiar to modernity.    
The first of these rejected postulates is that reason is absolute and universal and is 
the means for ushering in universal agreement and certainty. Postmodernism is, however, 
not irrational. Instead, it is aware that what counts as rational depends on the prevailing 
account of what society calls rational. For some, the capitalist system seems ―rational‖ as 
                                                 
151 Thomas Guarino, ―Postmodernity and Five Fundamental Theological Issues,‖ Theological Studies 57 
(1996): 654. 
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it provides the greatest amount of opportunity for the individual to achieve her/his 
potential in actualizing and achieving happiness. For others, it is an excuse for the legal 
exploitation of a good portion of humanity. Such rationality, they claim, emerges equally 
situated in culture and history as any other social concept. 
The second postulate of modernity challenged by postmodernity is that 
individuals are autonomous and able to transcend their place in history, class, and culture. 
Again, the postmodern perspective stresses that individuals have the power to be agents 
in creating their own fates, but only to a certain degree. Rather, postmodernism asserts 
that they are bounded by societal constructs that keep them from achieving the myth of 
individuality perpetuated by modernity. In fact, it is not even possible for a person to 
really know her/his own mind completely, let alone control her/his fate. The idea of the 
―knowing subject‖ is, according to postmodernism, just a constructed metanarrative at the 
core of modernity. In contrast, the postmodern self is not a master but is itself a ―subject 
of material and social linguistic conditions of a historical situation that precedes her.‖155 
The final major opposition that postmodernism directs at modernism is that 
principles such as justice, fairness, goodness, and rationality and procedures such as 
democracy and rational dialogue are unifying and universal. Moreover, these 
aforementioned universal principles and procedures are objective and impervious to 
differences in culture and language, whereas preferences are subjective. Best and Kellner 
state:  
 
Postmoderns reject unifying, totalizing and universal schemes in favor of a new 
emphasis on difference, plurality, fragmentation and complexity. When a Modern 
says ―this is the way things are,‖ a postmodern is likely to respond with ―this is 
how things are for you.‖156 
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There is little if any objectivism in the postmodern paradigm as practiced in cultural 
studies in the West; we are all at least partially affected by our prejudices. Truth is a 
compelling story told by persons in positions of power in order to perpetuate their way of 
seeing and organizing the natural and social world. Universal principles and procedures 
are only universal because they have been constructed to come across as all-embracing 
through a legitimating metanarrative.157 It is this last point of opposition, the Lyotardian 
definition of the postmodern outlook (i.e., the incredulity towards metanarratives), that 
frames the current study.  
Yet applying the term ―postmodern‖ (as understood by Lyotard) to theology 
creates a seeming inconsistency or paradox. Since a condition for embracing 
postmodernity is the relinquishing of epistemic certainty and incredulity towards 
metanarratives, one might ask how possible it is to embrace a preordained, divine story 
about the human condition and still be called postmodern. In fact, is not postmodern 
theology a contradiction in terms? The contrary seems to be true, however, as Anderson 
summarizes, ―today, a characteristic of the postmodern condition seems to distinguish 
itself as a pursuit of a general story in which faith as the condition for truth still shapes 
human corporate living, acting and thinking.‖158  
Soroush is called a postmodern because he questions the main tenet of Islam. He 
rejects the centrality of the Qur‘ān and redefines the nature of revelation; he abandons the 
systematizing of all reality under a single Muslim frame of reference by denying that 
there is only one truth or path (i.e., Islam). Notwithstanding, Soroush only has what 
Pamela Sue Anderson calls a ―weak incredulity‖ about master-narratives: he stays 
faithful to some doctrinal tenets by marking them as beliefs rather than as ontological 
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truths.159 Doctrinal tenets are beliefs as opposed to ontological truths. Given that the core 
of the doctrine rests in the muḥkamāt, when speaking of the categories of muḥkam 
(certain) and mutashabih (ambivalent) as applied to the Qur‘ān, Tradition, jurisprudence, 
and even the interpretation of history, Soroush explains that ―the categories of 
ambivalence and certainty themselves are subject to change. It is not as though a verse 
would remain certain or ambivalent forever.‖160 That is, Soroush suggests that even the 
essentials of Islamic doctrine might one day be deemed obsolete. This reveals Soroush‘s 
skepticism towards the tenets, but it does not mean that Soroush is not a believer. In fact, 
Soroush is enough of a believer so that some of his incredulity is directed towards 
secularism, which he argues, robs believers of one source of knowledge. ―Even though 
human knowledge that seeks indubitable certainty has failed,‖ Soroush maintains, ―we 
can, nonetheless still find truth in God.‖ We might not be able to find the ultimate truth 
because our insight into the divine wisdom is limited, and it might not come to us through 
textual analysis, but God‘s wisdom is nonetheless available to us through the avenue of 
religious experience.161  
As will be shown in Chapter 3, Islam has staked a great deal on the notion of 
revelation as the enduring, final word of God. Denying that the Qur‘ān is in fact divine 
speech is no small feat. Through the Qur‘ān, the assumption runs that God has 
communicated himself directly and imparted eternal decisions of His will. With His 
description of the Qur‘ān as unerring and unalterable, He has made sure that revelation 
would abide perpetually in its full integrity and be handed down to all generations of 
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Muslims, the ‘umma. This narrative of the genesis of the Qur‘ān places the theological 
emphasis on notions of presence, identity, continuity, perpetuity, wholeness and integrity, 
characterizing a long tradition of Muslim theology. In response to the tradition, Soroush 
contends that if the word of God equates to a literal and stable ontological truth, the 
orthodox Muslim notion of revelation thus reaches an impasse when faced with 
contemporary, philosophical trends. 
Parallels traced here between postmodern new theology and general hermeneutics 
can be called to  maintain in some sense the universality and normativeness of our 
understanding of God‘s will while attempting to simultaneously incorporate horizons of 
otherness and difference, of plurality and ambiguity. Soroush‘s postmodern Muslim 
theology doubts the authority of any reading of the Qur‘ān as a stable and permanent 
truth and, furthermore, has robbed the book itself of its status as revelation (in which will 
be discussed in Chapter 3). But Soroush‘s ―loss of faith in master narratives‖ need not 
obviate the community‘s faith in narratives themselves and in the ability to extract truth 
from them. It is the narrative of the Prophet and the role of the ordinary citizen in 
expanding the Prophet‘s divine mission that Soroush turns to as an alternative. ―Every 
rational thinker,‖ Soroush contends in one of his most controversial sentences, ―has their 
own conception of religion, that is to say their own understanding of God, the Prophet, 
revelation, felicity, wretchedness, sin and obedience, an understanding that belongs to 
that believer alone, and results from their reflections and is subjected to constant 
questioning and revision.‖162  
This questioning and revision is a result of a discursive / reflective kind of 
religiosity—a religiosity that is not pragmatic. Instead, if we identify pragmatic 
religiosity by its dogmatism, as Soroush states, 
                                                 




On entering the realm of discursive religiosity, dogma is exchanged for doubt and 
wonder, and as dogmatism is left behind, it becomes easier to head down the road 
of certitude. Rationality always brings along two hefty companions: one is the 
tireless raising of whys and wherefore and maybe maybe nots, and the other is a 
relentless individuality. No rational thinker ever stops posing questions, 
destroying and rebuilding ceaselessly, and no two rational thinkers are ever 
identical.163 
Discursive religiosity according to Soroush, is ―unstable and in a state of flux.‖164 
―Constancy and uniformity cannot be expected from discursive religiosity,‖ states 
Soroush, adding:  
 
For the discursive believer, worshipping is precisely all this examining, re-
examining, rediscovering, doubting and pondering, while sin would amount to 
submitting uncritically to beliefs, succumbing to popular vulgarities, following 
superstitions and famous personalities, and refusing to engage in doubt and 
reflection. And the believer‘s felicity lies in the excellence of his theoretical skills. 
Theologians and exegetes are two of the prominent representatives of this 
category. This religiosity is reason-based, investigative, reflective, based on 
choice and free will, wondrous, theological, non-mythical, non-clerical, 
individualistic, critical, fluctuating and non-imitative.165 
Soroush has lost faith in the master-narrative of the text-centered theology but has 
replaced that narrative with a new emphasis on the Prophet as the principal character and 
each subsequent believer as a new incarnation of the prophetic mission. One cannot help 
but be reminded of the Protestant nature of Soroush‘s replacement narrative.     
Soroush has a suspicion of master-narratives and totalizing theories, champions pluralism 
and understanding of the self as multiple, decentered, and hybrid. He sees religion not so 
much as a community space, but as a space for negotiating one‘s identity through 
process, performance, and intertextuality.  In comparison, for Kadivar religion is 
composed mostly of non-negotiable edicts that need to be understood and sometimes 
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performed, and even sometimes treated as data that selectively gets left out of the 
interpretive picture. For Kadivar, however, the Islamic master-narratives, such as the 
sanctity of the Qur‘ān, never come under question.  
In an effort to argue against defining Soroush‘s theology as postmodern, some 
might dispute that the ideological point of contention between Soroush and Kadivar is not 
a matter of quality but of quantity. Both agree that the Qur‘ān must be read historically. 
The question is exactly how much of the Qur‘ān and the Tradition is contingent, and how 
much is non-negotiable? The answer to that question can be framed hermeneutically, as 
outlined above. Kadivar stops at the mutishabbihāt, but Soroush extends the selectivity 
also to the muḥkamāt. Denying the muḥkamāt, however, is a game changer. The 
differences between these two positions go beyond mere squabbling about which ayāt to 
selectively disregard. Soroush has made a break with tradition and is not looking to mend 
it by methodological tweaking.   
Postmodern theory is, in this sense, anti-foundationalist, and Soroush aptly rejects 
foundationalist assumptions about reference and signification in cases like the sanctity of 
the Qur‘ān and the eschatological special status of the Muslim community. Nevertheless, 
Soroush still holds that there exists an ideal object of the Prophet‘s interpretation of 
divine speech, the Qur‘ān, and that there is a desire for truth about that object that 
characterizes the Muslim believer. Thus, he also necessarily believes in metaphysical, 
first principles about self and God—a God who is presumed to stand outside the subject 
who is interpreting his ―Word.‖ And yet, Soroush‘s theology is grounded in the presence 
of the Godhead as concretized in the Qur‘ān, not necessarily in the religious 
establishment. Soroush states: 
 
Religion offers many blessings to its followers. For believers, religion quickens 
the blaze of the sublime quest, delivers from inner attachments, grants ascent 
above earthly concerns, opens the heart‘s apertures toward the sun of truth, and 
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induces a sense of utter wonder in the face of the mystery of existence, so that one 
may hear the call of Ho-val-haqq (God is the truth) from every particle of the 
universe.‖166 
Soroush suggests that the root of the illusion that modernity has erased in humanity‘s 
need for religion is 
 
the belief that the secular and the sacred speak the same language. The truth, 
however, is that the temporal culture is no substitute for religion, only a tool for 
understanding the message. Only if the Qur‘ān and the Tradition were receptive to 
just any interpretation (which is not the case) could we see answers in any random 
collection of teachings.167  
Soroush‘s theology is not only grounded in the Godhead but also in our need for Him. 
The self of each believer is partially defined by its need for the divine, but no matter how 
scientific or unbiased the method of interpretation is, this same self lives in a framework 
that can never be independent of her/his situatedness, and so no reading can be as 
authoritative as a religious establishment would like to proclaim. The interpretive context 
almost always prejudices the interpretation. Soroush and Kadivar agree on this issue. For 
both, hermeneutics trusts that the object of ultimate truth, the Godhead, actually exists, 
and that our goal should be gleaning, understanding, and extracting ultimate truths from 
Him. It is in the method of this extraction of truths that Soroush and Kadivar differ. 
Soroush holds that true extraction can only be done through experiential means, while 
Kadivar argues that orthodox methods have access to truth, albeit with some changes.168    
Founding his metaphysics on the Godhead, means that Soroush is a postmodern but is 
not, however, a Nietzschian. Since there is a stable, extra-subjective foundation from 
which his theology springs, there exist interpretations that our need for understanding 
will satisfy, and those interpretations are limited, not infinite. This assertion is in direct 
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contrast to the deconstructive strand of postmodern belief inspired by Nietzsche and 
continued in Western cultural studies and cultural critique, which concludes that any text 
―may include infinite interpretations.‖ This is not what Soroush suggests, because that 
definition of the hermeneutic act belies context, history, and the stability of the text itself. 
For him, the lubb-e lubāb (kernel of essential truths) of God‘s wisdom, although 
shrouded in mystery, is nevertheless bounded.  
In Nietzsche‘s world, the ineffable is nothing but the meager sum of observations. 
In Soroush‘s and Kadivar‘s worlds, there exists alongside the mundane and human 
something divinely irreducible. For Nietzsche, truths and meanings are illusions that are 
fabricated and introduced into the world through interpretations.169 In Soroush‘s 
postmodern theology, truths and meanings are the irreducible kernels that appear in the 
multiple narratives that communicate human and community understandings, as framed 
in the performances of belief in time and space. 
SOME CONCLUSIONS 
Some parallels have been acknowledged between the shifts in Soroush‘s 
postmodern theology and Kadivar‘s new theology and the traditional and contemporary 
shifts in Western hermeneutics. These parallels allow for a distinction between the status 
of the text and that of its readings (i.e., between the text‘s meaning and its significance), 
as well as a distinctions between the ability to effect change in its form and impinge on 
its content and the text‘s status as a vessel of revelation with narratives that emerge from 
encounters with it. These parallels are more than simply imagined. Soroush himself has 
claimed that, although unaware of Truth and Method when writing his Expansion and 
Contraction of Religious Knowledge, he has since found out how much he has in 
common with Gadamer. Gadamer‘s Truth and Method is indeed a kindred book to 
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Soroush‘s project. In Truth and Knowledge, Gadamer criticizes the ―mania for method‖ 
for which modernity was known.170 Gadamer downplays methodology and warns of not 
falling into the objectivist traps of modernity—a warning that certainly fits with 
Soroush‘s overall program of reclaiming the Qur‘ān as a source of religious experience 
rather than religious orthodoxy. Certainty cannot be expected. Soroush‘s purpose is not to 
lay out the one and only, step-by-step method that must be followed in theology; rather, it 
is to outline the basic framework for doing theology.  
Kadivar, too, is interested in expanding theological narratives. His purpose is also 
not to lay out the one and only, step-by-step method that must be followed in theology; 
rather, it is to outline its basic framework. Yet he embraces method—a necessary step for 
making religious experience a narrative about a community in a specific time and place, 
rather than simply an individual testimony. 
The next two chapters of this dissertation will present two of the  most important 
theological issues addressed by reformist thinkers in the Islamic Republic:171 the nature 
of revelation (Chapter 3) and the finality of the Prophet and the subsequent superiority of 
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171 The other publically debated issue, and perhaps the most pressing theological quandary for Iranian Shī`ī 
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purview of political theology and thus will not be covered in this dissertation.  
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Chapter 3: Revelation Theology 
The concept of velāyat-e mutlaqih-e faqīh (the absolute rule of the religious 
jurist),172 a particularly autocratic solution to the issue of wilāyah (religious guardianship) 
in the post-occultation period, is arguably the greatest innovation in recent Shī`ī history. 
While the issue of wilāyah falls under the rubric of political theology and beyond the 
purview of this work, the topic of this chapter—Soroush‘s claim that the Qur‘ān is 
actually the Prophet‘s interpretation of divine speech—addresses this most controversial 
theological hypothesis to emerge from post-revolutionary Iran. Classical theology has not 
subsumed the topic of revelation under the category of political theology, and neither will 
we in this discussion, but it is important to note that Soroush‘s revelation theology has 
far-reaching political implications, some of which will be discussed in this chapter.  
Soroush first introduced his revelation theology in 2001 in Basṭ-e Tajrubeh-ye 
Nabavī [The Expansion of the Prophetic Experience],173 a book which was published a 
few months after he left Iran in self-exile and in which he elevated the position of the 
Prophet and downgraded the centrality of the Qur‘ān. Islam, according to Soroush, 
centers not around the Qur‘ān but around the Prophet‘s personality, because unlike what 
has classically been held, the words contained in the Qur‘ān are in fact already mediated 
by the Prophet‘s culturally situated consciousness.174 Our next encounter with this 
controversial claim, that the Qur‘ān is not the unmediated word of God comes by way of 
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an article written by ex-Ayatollah Mohammad Mojtahed Shabestari:175 Qerā’at-e Nabavī 
az Jahān [Prophetic Reading of the World]. The article was published in the summer 
(August) 2007 edition of the quarterly Madreseh, in which Shabestari, like Soroush, tries 
to challenge the unqualified and categorical orthodoxy of the Qur‘ān as ―kalām Allāh‖ 
and made an effort to problematize the issue.176 Shabestari dealt with the Qur‘ān as a 
―singular reading of the world by the Prophet‖—that is, a reading essentially established 
on, and rooted in the divine revelation (waḥy), but not equivalent to it.177  
On December 26, 2007, only four months after Shabestari‘s article, Soroush 
conducted a now famous interview in Holland with Radio Netherlands Worldwide, later 
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wa Firāq) for many years. An interesting side note is that Shabestari defrocked himself in the late 1990s. 
For further biographical details, see Shabestari‘s blog: Qerā’at-e [Reading], ―Mohammad Mojtahed 
Shabestari: A Brief Biographical Portrait,‖ http://mojtahedshabestari.blogfa.com/post-39.aspx. For more on 
Shabestari‘s ideas, see: Farzin Vahdat, ―Post-Revolutionary Islamic Modernity in Iran: The Intersubjective 
Hermeneutics of Mohamad Mojtahed Shabestari‖ (2004). 
176 Mohammad Mojtahed Shabestari, ―Qerā‘at-e Nabavī az Jahān‖ [Prophetic Reading of the World], 
Faslnāmah-ye Madreseh [Madreseh Quarterly] 6 (2007): 92-100. 
177 Shabestari has since written eight more tracts on the topic. His views will not be dealt with in this 
dissertation, though my plan is to incorporate his work on the topic in later efforts. 
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published in Zemzem, a leading Dutch magazine on the Middle East, North Africa and 
Islam.178 This interview wrested attention away from Shabestari‘s contentious piece and 
moved the controversy (begun by Soroush himself in 2001) to a new level of explicitness. 
Soroush‘s views about revelation generated more than thirty newspaper and scholarly 
articles in late 2007 and early 2008 and inspired a protest against his claims. Apparently, 
this protest was at least partially instigated by Ayatollah Hussein Nouri-Hamadani, who 
during one of his lectures in the Hawzeh-ye ʿIlmiyeh-ye Qum (Qom seminary) compared 
Soroush to Salman Rushdie and said that if what Soroush had said was intentional (az 
rūy-e gharaẓ), then ―taklīf-e dīgarī dārīm [we have another kind of responsibility].‖179 
This was Nouri Hamadani‘s way of calling Soroush an apostate and proposing 
appropriate legal action against him, which is classically understood to be the death 
penalty. The protest was held by Qom seminarians, where chants of ―ʿazā ʿazāst imrūz 
rūz-e ʿazāst imrūz, Imām Zamān, ṣāḥib ʿazāst imrūz [mourning, mourning we have today 
/ today is a day of mourning / The Twelfth Imam is sitting in mourning today]‖ were 
overheard.180 The metaphorical image of the Twelfth Imam in mourning equates 
Soroush‘s claims about the Qur‘ān with the killing of a member of the Prophet‘s family, 
or possibly the death of Islam itself. At the end of the protest, a statement was read which 
said among other things that ―without a doubt, this fitna (religiously troubling or seditious 
act) is a continuation of the insults of Zionist Americans and the publishing of offensive 
                                                 
178 Michel Hoebink conducted the interview with Abdolkarim Soroush in English for Radio Netherlands 
Worldwide, December 26, 2007. A Dutch translation of the transcript was published in the magazine 
ZemZem as ―The Word of Muhammad: Abdolkarim Soroush on the Koran‖ (2007). The original English 
transcript was published online at ZemZem, Online Edition, http://www.zemzem.org/zemzem/?q=node/21. 
A Persian transcript was published online by Radio Zamaneh at http://www.radiozamaneh.com.  
179 ―Soroush dar Intizār-e Sarnivisht-e Salman Rushdie?‖ [Is Soroush Awaiting a Similar Fate as Salman 




caricatures,181 and this is all to curtail the ever-growing interest of the world in Islam and 
our dear Prophet.‖182 The hoopla culminated in a seminar held in Qom, called ―Waḥy, 
Kalām-e Ilāhī yā Basharī?‖ [Revelation, the Speech of God or Man?] in June 2008. It 
seems from a news report published in Iran about the gathering that the main result of this 
seminar, at which Soroush was absent, was his being accused of ―Christianizing‖ Islam, 
where the Prophet (Jesus is considered to be a Prophet in Islam) is the central figure and 
the text (Bible) a work of human interpretation of Jesus‘ encounter with the divine. 
Soroush, it was claimed, ―was trying to Christianize Islam by elevating the position of the 
Prophet of Islam and marginalizing the Holy Book.‖183  
In the following pages I will present an introduction to orthodox revelation 
theology, followed by analysis of Soroush‘s early position on the topic in Basṭ-e 
Tajrobeh-ye Nabavī as well as his later position, according to his interviews and writings 
in 2007 and 2008. It should be emphasized that Soroush is not pronouncing the death of 
metaphysics or claiming that Islam was fabricated by the Prophet. On the contrary, he 
claims that the Qur‘ān was first and foremost conceived by the Almighty.  
The biggest point of contention between Soroush‘s conception of revelation and 
the orthodox view is that for Soroush the word of God was not heard by the Prophet but 
rather, was written on Muhammad‘s heart. Soroush claims that Muhammad received the 
Qur‘ān through inspiration. As for the differences that theologians have traditionally 
maintained between revelation (waḥy) and inspiration (ilhām), Soroush claims those to be 
a false distinction. Revelation is essentially an inspiration, but an inspiration that is given 
                                                 
181 This allusion refers to the Jyllands-Posten Muhammad cartoons controversy, which arose after twelve 
editorial cartoons, mostly depicting the Prophet Muhammad, were published in the Danish newspaper 
Jyllands-Posten on September 30, 2005. 
182 ―Soroush dar Intizār-e…?‖ <http://www.drsoroush.com>, accessed March, 2009. 
183 ―Neshast-e ʿilmi-ye ‗Waḥy Kalām-e Ilāhī yā Basharī‘ dar Qum Barguzār Shud‖ [The conference of 
―Revelation God -Speech or Human-Speech took place in Qom], June 2008, accessed November, 2008, 
http://www.drsoroush.com [no longer available]. 
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to a person assigned with a mission to rewrite his society and change the world. As such, 
it was not the exact word of God that got relayed to the ʿumma, but Muhammad‘s 
interpretation of that primary message. Finally, the discussion of Soroush‘s position will 
be followed by Kadivar‘s reaction to Soroush, as presented mostly in 2009.  
REVELATION AS UNDERSTOOD CLASSICALLY 
There are two main types of communication or ―mutual understanding‖ between 
God and man in Islam: one is linguistic, or verbal—that is, ―through the use of human 
language common to both parties,‖ classically understood by the orthodoxy to mean the 
Arabic language and the act of tanzīl (sending down)184 of kalām Allāh (the word of 
God). The second means of communication between God and man is non-verbal and 
takes place through the use of ―natural signs‖ on the part of God (manifestations of God‘s 
greatness in the natural world).185 The word āyah (sign) applies to both signs in the 
natural world and divine utterance and, as Izutsu mentions, which is in fact why the 
Qur‘ān ―calls the revealed words, ayāt [plural of ayah] without distinguishing them from 
other ‗signs‘ of a non-linguistic nature that are also called ayāt.‖186  
The subject of revelation is, however, only the linguistic āyah. The linguistic ayāt 
―form by themselves, a very particular class, which is better designated by the technical 
term of revelation or waḥy.‖187 The nature and structure of waḥy is in many ways 
                                                 
184 ―Words derived from the . . . root NZL, like nazala, nuzūl, nazzala and anzala, all relate to the ideas of 
‗coming down,‘ ‗descending,‘ or ‗sending down,‘ and have a strong place-related physical connotation. In 
the Qur‘an, they are used much more often than the words derived from WḤY . . . the various qur‘anic 
occurrences of these two groups of terms convey the clear image . . . of a solemn or even awe-inspiring 
communication, literally originating ‗from on High‘: ‗If We had sent down this Qur‘an upon a mountain, 
you would have seen it humble itself and split apart by the fear of God‘ {59:21}‖ (Yahya Michot, 
―Revelation,‖ in The Cambridge Companion to Classical Islamic Theology, ed. Tim Winter [New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2008], 180). 
185 Toshihiko Izutsu, God and Man in the Koran: Semantics of the Koranic Weltanschauung (Tokyo: The 





different than the nature and structure of the nonverbal ayāt and has been given a special 
classification and much theological treatment in Islam. Revelation is treated as 
―something extraordinary, something mysterious, the secret of which cannot be disclosed 
to the ordinary human being.‖188 Whereas anyone with ―normal capacity of ‗proper 
understanding‘ can have access to God‘s natural signs, revelation can only be ‗sent down‘ 
to an intermediary, a prophet.‖189 But revelation is also ―essentially a linguistic concept,‖ 
and it ―means that God spoke.‖190  
The one thing that stands out as mysterious in the case of waḥy is that it has been 
―sent down‖ (varying cognate nouns being, nuzūl, inzāl and tanzīl). This downward 
movement in Islam‘s cosmological horizon can be witnessed throughout the Qur‘ān. ―We 
sent down the [Qur‘ān] in Truth, and in Truth has it descended.‖191 This is because while 
God rules over the heavens and the earth, He who is in heaven, rules from above.192 The 
other frequent use of the Arabic root n-z-l in the Qur‘ān, after God‘s sending down his 
word, occurs with the verb denoting rainfall, apparently a pre-Islamic poetic use of the 
root, according to Zamakhshari,193 creating a symbolic connection between life-giving 
water and life-giving word.194 Another use of the word in the pre-Islamic era was in 
relation to the speech of the poet, or the speech of the soothsayer. But unlike the source 
of revelation, ―the agent of the poetic tanzīl was the shaytān (Satan).‖195 Other uses of n-
                                                 
188 Ibid., 151. 
189 Ibid. 
190 Ibid. 
191 Q 17:105. 
192 Q 67:16. Rabb as-samawat [God of the heavens] is also a frequent name of God. 
193 Abu al-Qasim al-Zamakhshari (born 466 A.H./1074 A.D.) was one of the most famous Mu`tazilite 
medieval Muslim scholars.   
194 Stefan Wild, ―‗We have sent down to thee the book with the truth . . .‘ Spatial and Temporal 
Implications of the Qur‘anic Concepts of nuzūl, tanzīl, and ’inzāl.‖ In Stefan Wild, ed., The Qur’an as Text 
(Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1996), 142. 
195 Ibid., 144. 
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z-l include, for example, in Q 9:26, where God ―sends down‖ his sakīna (peace) and in Q 
3:151, Q 6:81, Q 7:33 and Q 22:71, where he ―sends down‖ his sulṭān (authority).  
Tanzīl was also a temporal affair, in that the sending down of the Qur‘ān follows 
the biography of the Prophet. Surahs that were sent down earlier in Mecca and those that 
were sent down later in the Prophet‘s life when he became an established statesman in 
Medina are incontestably distinct in nature.196 Without detailing the differences reflected 
in the verses belonging to each era (something not relevant to the current study), I will 
move on to a second, very important aspect of the temporal nature of the Qur‘ān: the 
issue of al-lawḥ al-mahfūẓ (the guarded tablet).  
The seemingly confusing concept of the al-lawḥ al-mahfūẓ revolves around two 
verses in the Qur‘ān, namely Q 2: 185, which says, ―the month of Ramadan, wherein the 
Qur‘ān was sent down (anzalnāhū) to be a guidance to the people,‖ and Q 97:1, where 
God says, ―Behold, We sent it down (anzalnāhū) on al-Laylat al-Qadr (The Night of 
Power).‖ The confusion arises from the apparent contradiction between the historical 
reality of the Qur‘ān being sent down to the Prophet during his twenty three years as the 
messenger of God and the belief that it was also sent down in one night. To resolve the 
contradiction, some commentators—among them al-Zamakhshari—divided the act of 
―sending down‖ into two stages. In the first stage, the holy word was sent down in one 
piece from the seventh heaven to the first (i.e., the closest realm to mankind and earth). In 
the second stage, scribes were garnered to write the whole of the Qur‘ān on a tablet (al-
Lawḥ al-Maḥfūẓ) during Laylat al-Qadr, or the first of Ramadan. From then onward 
                                                 
196 Ibid., 148. Wild states that the reason why the current arrangement of the Qur‘ān (i.e., verses from 
earlier revelation are placed at the end of the text, while verses from later revelation are placed at the 
beginning) does not reflect this chronology remains unknown (Ibid., 149). 
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Gabriel took the written pieces to Muhammad to recite to him as they became 
necessary.197   
Revelation in this linguistic capacity has two separate aspects. One of them 
concerns the fact that it is kalām (speech, or parole in Saussurian terminology) as 
opposed to lisān (language, or langue in Saussurian terminology),198 and the other has to 
do with the fact that, of all the languages in which the word of God could have been sent 
down, the chosen one turned out to be Arabic. ―The Arabic language was chosen by 
design and not by accident,‖ as the Qur‘ān emphasizes in several places.199 The Qur‘ān, 
according to Stefan Wild, ―is the most meta-textual, most self-referential holy text known 
in the history of world religions,‖ as it repeatedly reflects on ―its own divine origin‖ and 
marvels at ―its other-worldly textual nature,‖ in both form and content.200  
The fact that the ayāt are kalām Allāh can be seen in the following two verses in 
the Qur‘ān. In Q 9:6 we read: ―If anyone of the polytheists comes to you [O Muhammad] 
seeking thy protection as a client, make him thy client so that he may have the chance of 
hearing God‘s speech [kalām Allāh].‖201 In Q 2:70-75, in reference to Mosaic law, as 
revelation, we see: ―Can you have any hope that they [the Jews] will submit to you when 
                                                 
197 Ibid., 150. 
198 Langue (language) and parole (speech) are linguistic terms used by Ferdinand de Saussure. Langue is 
the phenomenon of language explained as a system of signs. This understanding is useful when we are 
speaking of language in a social and impersonal context. The rough equivalent in Arabic would be lisan, as 
in al-Lisān al-’Arab (the Arabic Language). Parole on the other hand, describes the individual, personal 
phenomenon of language as a series of speech acts made by a linguistic subject. Its rough equivalent in 
Arabic is kalām, as in the kalām of person X, or in this case, Allāh. Specifically in Saussurian terms, the 
parole that takes place between two people is such that one person plays an active role and the other a 
passive role. For more on langue and parole, see: F. de Saussure, Course in General Linguistics (1972).  
199 Toshihiko Izutsu, God and Man in the Koran: Semantics of the Koranic Weltanschauung (Tokyo: The 
Keio Institute of Cultural and Linguistic Studies, 1964), 152. 
200  Wild, 140. Based essentially on Q 17:88, which states: ―If the whole of mankind and jinns were to 
gather together to produce the like of this Qur‘ān they could not produce the like thereof, even if they 
backed up each other with help and support.‖ Since the second half of the third century A.H. (ninth century 
A.D.) the technical term i`jaz, literally meaning ―the rendering (of something) incapable and powerless,‖ 
has been used to describe the inimitability of the Qur‘ān in content and form.   
201 Q 9:6.  
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a party of them used to listen to God‘s speech [kalām Allāh], then changed it arbitrarily 
and consciously after they had understood it?‖202 In Q 73:5 God, addressing Muhammad, 
says, ―Verily, We are going to cast upon thee a weighty word!‖203  
The Arabic word used here for ―word‖ is qaul. As Izutsu points out, ―It should be 
noticed that here, God refers to his own revelation by means of a word which is the 
commonest of all words of human speech act, qaul‖ The verb qala, for which qaul is the 
noun, meaning ―someone said something,‖ is one of the words most frequently used in 
the Arabic language. In another instance we see, as in Surah al-Shūrā’, the words of God 
referred to by the word kalimāt (words): ―And God will wipe out the falsehood and 
establish the truth as Truth with his words.‖204 From these examples we might get the 
sense that God has actually spoken to his prophets, and that the Qur‘ān is referring to the 
actual words revealed to Muhammad and Moses (―party of them‖ refers to Jews who had 
heard God‘s word through Moses, but then chose to corrupt it).  
Apart from the fact that in classical Islam we are ontologically dealing with God‘s 
speech, that word is also thought to have intentionally been ―sent down‖ in Arabic. Two 
verses specifically point to this claim. Surah al-Ibrahim mentions that the Qur‘ān was 
sent to the Prophet in ―lisān qaumihī (language of his tribe)‖205 and ―‘Arabīyan mubīnan 
(clear Arabic).‖206 The transmission / channeling / transference of the word of God is thus 
claimed to have been carried out in Arabic. This has traditionally guaranteed that 
revelation was in speech form and in fact clarifies that the language of that speech was 
specifically Arabic.  
                                                 
202 Q 2:70-75. 
203 Q 73:5. 
204 Q 42:23-24. 
205 Q 14:4. 
206 Q 16:103. 
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In order to be able to talk about the mysterious and extraordinary category of 
speech (God‘s speech, or kalām Allāh) Izutsu notes that we need to realize that the 
category has two different semantic points of emphasis: God and speech. When we look 
at kalām Allāh from the angle of God, then revelation ―is not a speech act in the natural 
and ordinary sense of the word.‖207 Revelation from this viewpoint becomes a 
―theological mystery, incapable of being grasped by human analytic thought . . . that does 
not allow of analysis; it is something only to be believed in.‖208 But if we realize that in 
so far as it is God‘s speech, ―it must have all the essential attributes of human speech.‖209 
This distinction becomes very important in understanding Soroush‘s claim. 
What does it mean for revelation or waḥy, in so far as it is speech as such, to have 
attributes of human speech? Izutsu claims that it is essential for any speech act (i.e., 
parole qua parole) that the two entities in ―communication share a common set of 
signs.‖210 This common set of signs is in our case the Arabic language. The other 
essential point is that the two entities ―belong to the same category of being.‖211 While 
the first precondition for communication is satisfied in the case of communication 
between God and Muhammad (it is assumed that the speech is ―sent down‖ in Arabic) 
our entities are not of the same ontological category. The semantic structure of waḥy 
contains an element of mysteriousness because it comes from what seems to us to be 
incomprehensible. No linguistic communication can happen between two beings that are 
not ontologically matched unless something extraordinary happens to one or both of 
them. Either speaker, who is assumed to have a higher order of being, needs to descend 
and somehow assume the attributes of the hearer, or ―the hearer should undergo a deep 
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personal transformation under the overwhelming influence of the spiritual force of the 
speaker.‖212  
According to tradition, in general, the Prophet is said to have perceived revelation 
in one of two ways: either by being approached by Gabriel, or without an intermediary. 
According to tradition, during the times that Muhammad was not approached by Gabriel, 
he experienced revelation in panoply of ways: ―The Apostle of God heard a sound like 
the humming of bees near his face; thereupon Qur‘ān, 23:1 was revealed to him.‖213 Also: 
―On the authority of ‗Abd Allāh b. ‗Umar I asked the Prophet: ‗Do you perceive the 
revelation?‘ He answered, ‗Yes, I hear sounds like metal being beaten. Then I listen, and 
often I think I will die (of pain).‘‖214 Saḥiḥ al-Bukhārī quotes the Prophet as having said, 
―It comes as the ringing of a bell; this kind is the most painful. When it ceases, I retain 
what was said. Sometimes it is an angel who speaks to me as a man, and I retain what he 
says.‖215  
The most interesting and very famous Tradition going back to the time of 
`A‘ishah is mentioned again by Bukhari: ―Al-Harith b. Hisham asks the Prophet, saying, 
‗O Apostle of God, how does the revelation come to you?‘ The latter replied, ―Sometimes 
it comes to me like the ringing of a bell (mithla salsalati al-jarasi). And this is the most 
painful manner of revelation to me; then it leaves me and I have understood (waʿaitu) 
from that noise (dawiyy) what He (God) meant to say.‘‖216 The word waʿaitu (meaning, 
―I have understood‖) is quite significant in this hadīth. As Ibn Khaldun notes about what 
                                                 
212 Ibid., 167. 
213 Sunan al-Tirmīdhī, ―On Sūra 23:1,‖ in Tafsīr (n.d.) n.p., quoted in A.J. Wensinck and Andrew Rippin, 
―Waḥy,‖ in Encyclopædia of Islam, 2nd ed., eds. Paul Bearman, et al. (Leiden: Brill, 2002), Vol X1: 53. 
214 Ahmad Ibn Hanbal, ii, 222, quoted in A.J. Wensinck and Andrew Rippin, ―Waḥy,‖ in Encyclopædia of 
Islam, 2nd ed., eds. Paul Bearman, et al. (Leiden: Brill, 2002), Vol X1: 53. 
215 Sahih al-Bukhārī, Badʿ al-Waḥy, bāb 2, quoted in A.J. Wensinck and Andrew Rippin, ―Waḥy,‖ in 
Encyclopædia of Islam, 2nd ed., eds. Paul Bearman, et al. (Leiden: Brill, 2002), Vol X1: 53 
216 Izutsu, 176. 
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Muhammad is trying to convey: ―While he is actually receiving revelation, he does not 
have the consciousness of hearing any intelligible words spoken; all that he hears is 
something like a mysterious, indistinct noise (dawiyy), but the moment it ceases and he 
himself returns to the level of normal human consciousness, he realizes that the noise has 
already transformed itself into distinct meaningful words.‖217 
There are also hadīths about how others perceived Muhammad receiving 
revelation. For example: ―Muhammad covers his head, his color grows red, he snores as 
someone asleep, or rattles like a young camel; after some time he recovers.‖218 
Muhammad‘s color grows livid (tarabbada lahū wajhuhū).219 He falls into lethargy or a 
trance (subāt).220 ―When Muhammad received a revelation . . . this caused him much 
pain, such that we perceived it. That time he separated himself from his companions and 
remained behind. Thereupon, he covered his head with his shirt, suffering intensely, 
etc.‖221 Abd Allāh b. ʿAmr said, ―Sūrat al-Māʾida was revealed to the Apostle of God 
while he was riding on his camel. The beast could not bear him any longer so he had to 
descend from it.‖222 ―`A‘isha relates—and this is considered one of the most authentic 
hadīths about revelation—‗I saw him as revelation came down upon him on an extremely 
cold day. His forehead was running with beads of perspiration.‘‖223 Therefore, it seems as 
though this supernatural communication did not only cause Muhammad to ―undergo a 
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deep personal transformation‖ but in fact caused, at times, the ―keenest of pain and 
torture, not only mental but also even physical.‖224  
Regarding the times when Muhammad was approached by Gabriel, there are five 
references in the Qur‘ān to the appearance of what Izutsu calls the ―Almighty Being‖ that 
transmitted to him Allāh‘s words.225 The details of this Trustworthy Spirit (Rūḥ al-Amīn) 
or Holy Spirit (Ruh al-Quds), Gabriel, are not given. But the method of transmission is 
hinted at in Q 26: 192-195; the act of tanzīl, we are told, is performed onto the Prophet‘s 
heart. Surat al-Najm follows: ―By the Star when it goes down, Your Companion is 
neither astray nor being misled, Nor does he say [aught] of [his own] Desire. It is no less 
than inspiration226 [waḥy] sent down to him: He was taught by One mighty in Power, 
Endued with Wisdom: For he appeared [in stately form] while he was in the highest part 
of the horizon: Then he approached and came closer.‖227 Surat al-Takwir states: ―And [O 
people!] your companion is not one possessed; And without doubt he saw him [ra’āhū] in 
the clear horizon. Neither doth he withhold grudgingly a knowledge of the Unseen. Nor is 
it the word of an evil spirit accursed.‖228  
This mysterious and majestic being who made himself visible to Muhammad and 
transmitted to him the divine word was at first (i.e., in the Meccan period) simply called 
by the symbolic name of Holy Spirit (Ruh al-Quds): ―Say the Holy Spirit has brought the 
revelation from thy Lord in truth, in order to strengthen those who believe and as a Guide 
and Glad Tidings to Muslims.‖229 The entity is also called Rūḥ al-Amīn (the Trustworthy 
                                                 
224 Ibid. 
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226 The translations I use for the Qur‘ān in this chapter are all by ‗Abdullah Yusuf Ali. Here, he translates 
the word waḥy not as ―revelation,‖ but ―inspiration.‖ (The Holy Qur‘ān. Trans. ‗Abdullah Yusuf ‗Ali. 
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Spirit): ―Verily this is a revelation [tanzīl] from the Lord of the Worlds: Which the 
Trustworthy Spirit [Rūḥ al-Amīn] has brought down [nazala] upon thy heart [ʿAla 
qalbika], that thou mayest admonish. In the perspicuous Arabic tongue [bilīsān `Arabīyin 
mubīn].‖230 What is useful to note here is how the mysterious being brought down the 
message not into the Prophet‘s ear or on his mind but ―upon [his] heart.‖ This is again 
one of the points to which Soroush attaches much importance. ―Later in Medina, this 
‗Holy Spirit‘ comes to be identified as the Angel Gabriel [Jibr’īl]. And in many of the 
authentic hadīths, the divine messenger who brought down revelation to Muhammad is 
said to have been, from the first, Jibr’īl.‖231   
It is now possible to see revelation as a three-point communication (GodAngel 
GabrielThe Prophet), but in fact the next phase of the communication process is the 
transmission of the word of God to the public, or tablīgh. As Izutsu points out, this 
creates an interesting and important linguistic problem. The Prophet needs to memorize 
and transmit what he has heard through Gabriel, word for word. The primary duty of the 
Prophet from the moment he hears the Qur‘ān is to keep it in memory so that he may 
relay it to his people without altering even a word. The Prophet seems to have been aware 
of the sensitivity of this issue as reflected in the Qur‘ān: ―Move not thy tongue 
concerning the [Qur‘ān] to make haste therewith. It is for Us to collect it and to 
promulgate it: But when We have promulgated it, follow thou its recital (as 
promulgated): Nay more, it is for Us to explain it [and make it clear].‖232  
                                                 
230 Q 26:192-95. Stefan Wild points out how equating the word tanzīl with revelation is ―as problematic as 
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Izutsu reads this verse to mean that God himself is telling the Prophet not to 
worry about making mistakes, assuring Muhammad that all he needs to do is ―wait until 
the revelation assumes a definite verbal form, and follow the wording passively.‖233  
The orthodox views on revelation portray the Qur‘ān as the unmistakable word of 
God and the Prophet as the passive vessel for the message‘s delivery. In what follows a 
different picture is presented by Soroush‘s early positions on revelation, a message that 
only become even more clearly radical in Soroush‘s later pronouncements on the matter.   
EARLY SOROUSH 
As I mentioned in the Introduction, Soroush‘s theology can be divided into two 
distinct moments. The first is the distinction he makes between religion qua religion 
(which in the case of Islam has traditionally been centered on the sacred nature of the 
Qur‘ān) and religious knowledge. The second, the topic of this chapter, is his demotion of 
the place of the Qur‘ān as the primary source and the elevation of the personality of the 
Prophet as the core of Islam. According to early Soroush, Islam is the ―totality of the 
Prophet‘s gradual, historical deeds and stances . . . the Prophet‘s personality is the core; it 
is everything that God has granted to the Muslim community . . . religion is the inward 
and outward experiences of the Prophet. Anything that he does is the right thing to do.‖ 
This theory, in effect, is the culmination of Soroush‘s theology. The following seven 
points highlight Soroush‘s early revelation theology and Prophetology.  
Point 1: The Substance of Religion Is Experiential in Nature 
The starting point of Soroush‘s investigation into the nature of religion begins 
with the following series of questions: ―What is the essence of religions? What is it that 
belongs to no other discipline and is fully and essentially religious? Does religiousness 
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have its own field of knowledge—as do mathematics, philosophy or psychology—with 
its own particular theorems and concepts? Do religious propositions have their own 
particular and distinctive properties?‖234 The orthodox response to this question has 
invariably been that the Book, or the word of God, is what gives religion its unique 
essence, what sets it apart from worldly knowledge and gives its propositions its distinct 
property. Soroush disagrees and holds that in fact religion per se has no epistemological 
terrain that distinguishes it from other fields of knowledge. ―Religion is a composite of 
propositions, each of which belongs to a different discipline‖ (e.g., philosophy—
especially ethics—history, grammar, rhetoric, etc.), and that ―it is even difficult to 
classify motives as religious.‖235 Instead, he suggests that the substance of religion, any 
religion—that which cannot be deconstructed into its worldly constituent parts and has 
nothing to do with earthly disciplines—―hinges on something of the nature of religious 
experience.‖236  
What is the nature of this religious experience? In order to speak about religious 
experience Soroush first lays out what he thinks are the three kinds of religiosity, 
presenting them in normative order: 1) pragmatic / instrumental religiosity, 2) discursive 
/ reflective religiosity, and 3) experiential religiosity.  
In pragmatic, or instrumental, religion, ―a belief or practice‘s ultimate purpose, 
utility and outcome (this-worldly or other-worldly) are of paramount importance to the 
believer. It is religion for life rather than life for religion. In its other-worldly form it 
wears the garb of asceticism and Sufism, and in its this-worldly form, the garb of politics 
and statesmanship.‖237 It is important to note that, although Soroush (as will be discussed 
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shortly) is a great supporter of the mystic path, he nonetheless points out that mysticism 
itself carries a baser, less desirable, pragmatic form.238 Pragmatic religion is ―causal (not 
reasoned),239 hereditary, deterministic (not arising from choice and free will), emotional, 
dogmatic, ritualistic, ideological, identity-bound . . . outwardly superficial, collective-
communal, legalistic-juristic, mythic, imitative, obedient, traditional and habitual.‖240 
Here the number of good deeds becomes the measure of the intensity or the diluteness of 
conviction: the number of times you have performed the hajj, how frequently you pray, 
whether or not you attend Friday prayers, the amount of alms you give. This type of 
religiosity loses the capacity to tolerate dissent and is prone to casting out and 
excommunicating people. This is the religiosity of the clergy, and those who imitate 
them. These are believers who ―don‘t have the courage to look at the transcendent for 
themselves.‖241 
A higher order of religiosity is the discursive or reflective kind. Soroush states, ―If 
we identify pragmatic religiosity by its dogmatism, discursive religiosity can he identified 
by a lack of dogma or by a sense of rational wonder.‖242 In fact, it is only through 
relinquishing the realm of dogma and ―exchanging it for doubt and wonder that we can 
head down the road of certitude‖ and mysticism (the next and highest level of 
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239 Soroush uses the distinction between cause (`illat) and reason (dalīl) frequently. Something is caused if 
one has no say in its outcome. A person who is born into a Shī`ī Muslim family automatically takes on that 
identity. The cause of her being Shī`ī is accidental and not intentional, but a person who, through 
reasoning, makes good or bad choices wills her present and future. If she is becomes Shīʿī, the reason is 
deliberation. (Soroush, EPE, 76). 
240 Ibid., 182. 
241 Ibid., 182-83. Soroush further divides the pragmatic into the learned and laypeople. While the 
layperson is ruled by emotions in their practical religiosity, the learned person is led by reason. Soroush 
even further divides the learned pragmatic believers into the otherworldly and this-worldly. While the 
other-worldly pragmatic believers (mainly clerics) are concerned about pragmatic moves to guarantee a 
prosperous afterlife, the this-worldly learned pragmatic group seeks movement and change in this world 
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modern religious intellectuals and reformers like `Alī Sharī`atī, Seyyed Jamal al-Din Afghani, Muhammad 
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religiosity).243 Discursive religiosity is saturated with rationality and, as such, brings 
along a tireless need for raising questions, and a relentless individuality. Rational thinkers 
never stop posing questions; they destroy and rebuild ceaselessly. ―Every rational thinker 
has their own conception of religion, that is to say their own understanding of God, the 
Prophet, revelation, felicity, wretchedness, sin and obedience, and understanding that 
belongs to that believer alone results from their reflections and is subjected to constant 
questioning and revision.‖244  
Soroush is in effect suggesting that, within the general boundaries set initially by 
God and interpreted by the Prophet in the seventh century, there could be many Islams, 
each tailor-made based on the practitioners‘ (or groups of practitioners‘), possibly 
transitory, understanding of the Prophet‘s personality.245 Discursive religiosity does not 
succumb to uncritical beliefs, does not follow famous personalities, superstitions, or 
popular vulgarities. Theologians and exegetes are two of the representatives of this 
category. Their belief is based on investigation, reflection, choice and free will; it is non-
mythical, non-clerical, individualistic, and critical; it is filled with fluctuation. In fact, it is 
in a constant state of flux, and tends to be non-imitative. Constancy and uniformity 
cannot be expected from this kind of religiosity. In fact, for a discursive believer it is 
precisely this act of reflection, rediscovering, reexamining, doubting and pondering that 
amounts to the worship of the Almighty.246   
Experiential religiosity, the highest order of worship, is the type of religiosity that 
leads to certitude (the other two led to dogmatism and wonder, respectively). Experiential 
religiosity is  
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passionate, revelatory, certain, individualistic, deterministic, quintessential, 
reconciliatory, ecstatic, intimate, visual, saintly, mystical, and mysterious. Here 
God is graceful, alluring and beloved. The Prophet is the ideal (murād), a 
contemplative man (mard-e bātinī) and a model of successful religious 
experience. To follow him is to share his passions, to extend and repeat his 
experiences, and to be drawn into the magnetic force of his personality field . . . 
Here sin is that which muddies, weakens or destroys the devotional link, the 
power of discovery and the state of union. And worship is that which, tinder-like, 
feeds the flames of ecstasy. Heaven is the experience of union, and hell the 
bitterness of separation . . . Here secularity means experiencing being as deaf and 
blind, void of divinity; a kind of atheistic existentialism. The certainty that is 
unattainable in discursive religiosity is picked like a fruit from the tree of 
experience here, and the free will that was seen as virtue there now gives way to 
the passionate compulsion of love . . . the guardian addresses the believer‘s heart 
not his mind or emotions.247  
This passage echoes Sufi thought and its experiential religious epistemology, which have 
been part and parcel of Islamic culture and theology since the second century A.H (eighth 
century A.D.). Some have even argued that it was the dominant hermeneutic in the 
Iranian milieu until the inception of the Safavid dynasty, and that it was only after Shah 
Ismail‘s conversion to Shī`īsm in the early 1500s that Iran began a tenuous relationship 
with its Sunni Sufi sects, a tension that carried on over to post-revolutionary times.248 
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bin/texis/vtx/refworld/rwmain?docid=4742edf92d. For more on the Ne‘matollahi Sufi order, see: Massoud 
Homayouni, History of the Nematollahi Sufi Order in Iran, 1799-1992 A.D. (1993). 
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Soroush tells us that the most desired form of religiosity is the experiential one, 
but what exactly is experiential religiosity? In the West, the unreasonableness of belief in 
God, the claim that belief in God is not rational, or conversely, defenses that it is rational, 
approaches that recommend groundless belief in God, or philosophical fideism,249 and 
justified belief through religious experience, all fall under the rubric of religious 
epistemology. Reformed epistemology, the view that justified belief can be based on 
religious experience, is advanced by the likes of Alvin Plantinga (whose work Soroush 
quotes)250 and Nicholas Wolterstorff. These thinkers contend that belief in God does not 
require the support of propositional evidence in order to be rational. Neither is the belief 
in God groundless. Belief in the divine is grounded in characteristic religious 
experiences, examples which are beholding the sublime divine majesty from a mountain 
top, or the sense of awe one feels when noticing the creativity manifested in the beauty of 
the flower.  
Other sorts of religious experiences involve a sense of guilt (and forgiveness), 
despair, the inner testimony of the Holy Spirit, or more relevant for our discussion, a 
perception of direct contact with the divine (i.e., mysticism). Religious experience 
understood this way is typically taken as self-authenticating. The experience of many 
believers is so vivid that they describe it with sensory metaphors: they claim to see, hear, 
or be touched by God. The character of religious experience is belief in a cognitive 
faculty that can be trusted when induced by the appropriate experiences; that is, one is 
permitted to trust one‘s initial alleged religious experience as veridical, just as one must 
trust that others of one‘s cognitive faculties are veridical.251 Richard Swinburne alleges 
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that it is also reasonable to trust what others tell us unless, and until, we have good reason 
to believe otherwise.252 So, it would be reasonable for someone who did not have a 
religious experience to trust the truthfulness of someone who did claim to have a 
religious experience. That is, it would be reasonable for everyone, not just the subject of 
the alleged religious experience, to believe in God on the basis of that alleged religious 
experience.  
It is also worthy to note that the kind of religiosity one engages in depends on 
one‘s capabilities. Not everyone has the mental capacity, individuality or courage to 
engage in the doubting and questioning that discursive / reflective religiosity requires. 
Not everyone is able or has the courage to achieve union with the Almighty.253 
Point 2: The Accidentals of Religion Were Essential to the Prophet’s Experiences 
Soroush claims that the contraction and expansion of religious knowledge, which 
happens as a result of new development in extra-religious knowledge (Soroush‘s first 
theological moment), is not limited to the here and now; even the experiential substance 
of religion sent down to the Prophet was contingent upon and colored by the accidentals 
of the age and place in which it was revealed. The contingent nature of knowledge 
applies even in the case of contact with the divine.  
What does Soroush mean by the ―accidentals of religion‖? The Arabic language, a 
majority of what is said in the Qur‘ān (those verses that refer back to specific incidents), 
the fact that Muhammad was an Arab, and the Arab culture with which the Qur‘ān is 
imbued, are all accidentals, local and temporal—not universal and permanent. Soroush 
points out that the essence of religion, what he calls the ―essentials,‖ never occurs without 
the ―accidentals.‖254 ―With its spirit, its muḥkamāt (unambiguous principles) and 
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indisputable elements remaining intact, the Qur‘ān was revealed and realized gradually; 
in other words, it had a historical genesis. Someone would go to the Prophet and ask him 
a question. Someone would insult his wife. Someone would set alight the flames of war. 
Some would accuse the Prophet of being insane . . . The Jews would do something, the 
Christians another thing.‖255 These accidentals, although external to the kernel of 
qur‘ānic truth, have nonetheless exercised a profound influence and played a fundamental 
role in shaping the content of the Qur‘ān.  
Soroush suggests that because religion is a human affair, ―the Qur‘ān could have 
been much more than it is,‖ that it could have figuratively even had a ―second 
volume.‖256 If the Prophet had lived longer and encountered more events, his reactions 
and responses would inevitably have grown and possibly even become different, and the 
accidentals would have occupied an even greater share of the Qur‘ān. Many instances and 
events did not happen at the time of the Prophet, so he did not give an answer to, or take a 
position on them. 
―If ‗those who fought with Muhammad‘ had not accused `A‘isha of having an 
adulterous relationship, would we have the verses at the beginning of al-Nūr Surah 
[Chapter 24]? If the wars of the confederate tribes had never occurred, would we have the 
al-Aḥzāb Surah [Chapter 33]? These were all contingent events in history whose 
occurrence or non-occurrence would have been much the same. But, having occurred, we 
now find traces of them in the Qur‘ān . . . when we say that religion is human and gradual 
and historical, we mean nothing other than this.‖257 
Not only is the Arabic language an accidental in Islam and in the Qur‘ān, but so is 
Arab culture: 
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The fact that the Qur‘ān speaks of the presence in heaven of dark-eyed hūrīs258 
(not blue-eyed women) and portrays them as sheltered in their tents (Q 55:72); 
that it calls to the people to consider how the camel [and not some other animal] is 
created (Q 88:17); that it refers to warm-weather fruits with which the Arabs were 
acquainted with: the banana (Q 56:29), the date and the pomegranate, (Q 55:68), 
grapes (Q 80:28), the olive (Q 80:29), and the fig (Q 95:1); that it uses the lunar 
calendar (the month of Ramadan for fasting, Dhu al-Hajja for the hajj, the 
―harām‖ sacred months for refraining from war and so on); that it speaks of the 
Quraysh tribe and ―their composing for the winter and summer caravan‖ (Q 106 
1-2); that it refers to Abu-Lahab and his wife who ―upon her neck [was] a rope of 
palm fibre‖ (Q 111:5); that is describes the presence in the heaven of ―uplifted 
couches and goblets set forth and cushions arrayed and carpets outspread‖ (Q 
88:14-16); that one of the phrases it uses to convey the coming to an end of all 
things on Judgment Day is ―the pregnant camels shall be neglected‖ (Q 82:4); that 
it mentions the Arab tradition of burying girls alive: ―the buried infant shall be 
asked for what sin she was slain‖ (Q 82:8-9); that it likens the flames of hell to 
bright yellow camels and speaks of ―sparks like golden herds‖ (Q 77:32-33); that 
it refers to animals that were well-known to the Arabs, such as horses, mules, 
camels, donkeys, lions, elephants, pigs, snakes, etc. and mentions such things as 
wool, cotton, camphor, ginger and 70-cubit chains, all objects of daily use for the 
Arabs; as well as many other similar examples, which can be found through a 
diligent exploration of the Qur‘ān and the noble Sunna of the Prophet.259 
The same can be said of the use of many non-Arab words (Hebrew, Greek, Persian, 
Syriac, etc.) that appear in the Qur‘ān and number more than two hundred. What Soroush 
is referring to is how the language of the Qur‘ān is basically repositioning already 
familiar words and concepts by creating new central and peripheral relationships between 
them.  
Think of words such as shukr (thanksgiving), ṣabr (patience), neʿmah (blessing), 
munʿem (beneficient), tavakkul (trust), taubah (repentence), maʿṣiyah (sin), du’ā’ 
(prayer), ʿebādah (worship), taqwā (piety), kufr (disbelief and rejection of God), islām 
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(submission to God), imān (faith), irtidād (apostasy), wilāyah (guardianship), tasbīḥ 
(glorification of God),  jihād (struggle), and many more. These words and their meanings 
belonged to the Arabs and were products of their culture and world-view. Nonetheless, 
within Islam and with reference to the new source of authority, they took on a new spirit 
and hue. In other words, the Prophet of Islam used the bricks at his disposal within Arab 
culture to construct a new structure which is related to that culture but also surpasses it.260 
As the Qur‘ān says, ―And We have made the Qur‘ān easy to understand and remember. 
Then, is there any that will receive admonition?‖ (Q 54:32) Religion by way of its 
accidentals brought about new judgments, formulations and word systems. 
Point 3: The Accidentals Have No Lasting Authority 
Accidentals of religion are temporal in nature. They made their way into the 
doctrinal core, but they could easily have been left out if the Prophet had encountered 
other issues instead. As such, accidentals ―don‘t have lasting authority.‖261 
Point 4: Islam Is Founded on the Prophet’s Divinely-Sanctioned Personality 
If the accidentals are contingent, what are the essentials of religion, according to 
Soroush, and do they (unlike the accidentals) have lasting authority? The essentials are 
nothing other than the ―teachings‖ of the muḥkamāṭ, which ―all issue from one source, 
(prophetic revelation).‖262 Islam can be exclusively described as ―the Prophet‘s spiritual 
and social experiences, and it is therefore subject to him, and since these [experiences] 
are not arbitrary, but are founded on the Prophet‘s holy and divinely-sanctioned 
personality, it becomes binding on all his followers, as well as the Prophet himself.‖263 
The Prophet reached that level of consciousness within which God dwells in one‘s sight 
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and over one‘s faculties at all times. Soroush says that despite what has traditionally been 
imagined about the process of revelation Muhammad was not a passive vessel but an 
active participant. He was in fact the impetus behind the ―sending down‖ of the 
revelation. He was the one who commanded its descent.264   
Point 5: The Prophet’s Religious Experience Is the Same as Reception of Revelation 
What exactly happened during this process of revelation? Traditionally, as I 
mentioned earlier, revelation having originated from the Almighty and mediated through 
the angel Gabriel, although a mystery at the detailed level, is understood to have been 
heard by the Prophet in the Arabic language. Upon hearing the word of God Muhammad 
is believed to have acted as a passive conduit, memorizing the message, word for word 
without any change and then relaying it to his people. Soroush, however, suggests that 
what Muhammad was experiencing was nothing more than a religious experience: ―This 
religious experience is exactly that which, in the case of the prophets, is known as 
‗reception of revelation.‘ And so . . . the Prophet did have a role in the delivering of the 
teachings.‖265 ―Let me add in passing,‖ Soroush continues, ―that viewing divine discourse 
as nothing but the prophetic discourse is the best way of resolving the theological 
problems of how God speaks (kalām-e bari).‖266  
The quintessential constituent of a prophet‘s personality and prophethood and his 
unique capital is that divine revelation of what is described today as the paradigm case of 
―religious experience.‖ In this experience it appears to the Prophet as if someone comes 
to him and proclaims messages and commands to him and tells him to convey them to the 
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people. The Prophet is filled with such conviction on hearing these commands and 
messages, he feels such certitude and courage, that he prepares himself to stride forth and 
carry out his duty single-handedly in the face of the most bitter attacks, enmities and 
hardships.267     
What then is the role of Gabriel? Soroush proposes: ―It was not he [Muhammad] 
who was under Gabriel‘s sway, but Gabriel, who was under his [Muhammad‘s] sway. It 
was he who would make the Angel appear. And, when he wanted to, the Prophet could 
go beyond the Angel, as the experience of the Mi‘raj testifies.‖268 Soroush, in good Sufi 
fashion, uses lines 3800-3805 from Rumi‘s Masnavi to make his point, but there is also 
proof for his point in other works.269 
According to Soroush the prophetic experience was constantly renewed 
throughout the Prophet‘s twenty-three years as the messenger of God. It was not as if the 
Prophet experienced revelation once. The blessing of revelation rained down upon him 
constantly, ―giving him ever greater strength and flourishing. Hence the Prophet grew 
steadily more learned, more certain, more resolute, more experienced; in a word, more a 
prophet.‖270 In fact, Soroush suggests that it wasn‘t only the Prophet‘s experience that 
expanded. Through the questions they were asking the prophet and the problems they 
were posing—questions and problems that would induce the Prophet to ask for 
revelation—―the people were never mere observers, even in the loftiest aspects of 
religiosity, such as revelation itself.‖271 This twenty-three year process of prophethood 
was a period of growth and spiritual and social expansion for all those involved—the 
Prophet and his ʿumma. Must this expansion stop just because revelation has stopped?  
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Point 6: Being Religious Means Expanding the Prophetic Experience 
What does it mean to be religious? Soroush considers religiousness and religiosity 
and their continued endurance to hinge on religious experience. He sees the Prophet as 
the recipient of these experiences, as agent and guide, and as a result Soroush considers 
the evolution and endurance of religion to hinge in the endurance of Muhammad‘s 
―prophetic experiences.‖272 In the absence of the Abrahamic Prophets ―the inward and 
outward prophetic experience must expand and grow, thereby enriching and 
strengthening religion.‖273 Historically, it has been the mystics, the Sufis, who have 
carried the experiential mantle, among whom Soroush cites Hafez, Rumi, al-Ghazzali, 
Sheikh Mahmoud Shabestari, and Seyyed Heydar Amoli. They are the ones ―who find 
vicarious rapture in the Prophet‘s rapture.‖274 They are the ones who stride in the 
Prophet‘s shadow and follow the path of the master. Each and ―every one of these 
experiences is unique and singular, and therefore, magnificent, precious and laudable.‖275 
The era of prophethood has ended, however. Because the Prophet of Islam was the seal of 
all the prophets, we are no longer able to take anyone‘s word to be the indisputable truth 
in religion. This character of being the ―seal of the prophets‖ relates to Muhammad‘s 
personne juridique (shakhsīyyat-e ḥuqūqī), rather than his personne physique 
(shakhsīyyat-e ḥaqīqī). The Prophet‘s personne juridique, that aspect of his personality 
that was bequeathed a mission and the guardianship of the ʿumma, causes his personality 
to be his proof and argument. It is the weight of the fact that he is chosen by God and 
speaks on His behalf that aids the ʿumma to believe his lofty claims. If the principle of 
finality276 is assumed, we need to realize that this finality is an attribute of prophethood 
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only and not religion, and that this finality applies not to the personne physique of the 
Prophet but to his personne juridique. This guardianship is what ceased with the 
cessation of prophethood. We do not accept anyone‘s word now unless they give us 
reasons and appeal to laws. The religious experiences of the Prophet became ―binding on 
others,‖277 but in his absence others‘ religious experiences cannot be binding because the 
―experience of mystics is solely for their own theoretical and practical benefit, most 
certainly not binding on others, and liable to criticism and improvement like any other 
human product.‖278 After the Prophet of Islam, no one‘s feelings, experiences and 
certitudes are religiously binding on others, nor do they constitute the last word. The 
prophet-fertile era is over, but this was not the case with the Prophet. ―They, themselves, 
by virtue of their personality as prophets were the backing for their words and 
commands. They were their own proof . . . This is the prophetic legal mission,‖ states 
Soroush.279 As a guardian deriving his authority from God, a prophet constitutes all the 
proof and force that is necessary to back his word.  
Soroush, at the core a Sufi, as will become further evident as we proceed, has 
nonetheless brought under question a totalitarian aspect of Mystic Islam.280 The mystics‘ 
claims to divine knowledge and authoritative pronouncements are subject to debate and 
doubt. No one‘s word will ever carry as much weight as that of the prophets. This is very 
different from the traditional, deferential relationship between the pīr / murshid / sheikh 
(Sufi master) and his students. Soroush is redefining the nature of authority and 
guardianship even within the Sufi context.  
                                                                                                                                                 
on reason and experience cannot prove the necessity of the finality of Muhammad‘s prophethood, just as 
the completeness of the religion of Islam cannot be proven on this basis (Soroush, EPE, 50). 
277 Ibid., 45.  
278 Ibid. 
279 Ibid., 41-42. 
280 Ibid, 41. 
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How is it then that those who wish to expand the prophetic experience do so? 
Soroush defers to Ibn ‘Arabī‘s discussion about the guardianship of the wali (guardian) in 
this context and says, 
 
The walī’s vision (kashf) does not surpass the contents of the Prophet‘s Book and 
revelation. Junayd281 said that our knowledge is bound by the Book and the Sunna 
and another said, any discovery that is not underwritten by the Book and Sunna is 
false. Hence, the wali will not arrive at any discovery that is not of the nature of 
an understanding of God‘s scripture . . . Hence, the wali will not utter a precept 
that violates the precepts of religious law. Nonetheless, on occasion, the 
inspiration comes to him to place a number of components alongside one another 
to form an aggregate that was not to be found in religious law, although all the 
individual components were to be fond therein . . . This level of law making is 
permissible for the wali, and, if you were to ask specifically where in religion God 
has granted this right to awliya, the answer lies in the Prophet‘s words when he 
said, if anyone establishes a worthy tradition, he shall be rewarded for it, as will 
anyone who abides by it until Judgment Day . . . This is a wali’s share of 
prophethood, and it forms a component of prophethood, just as true visions are 
components of prophethood.282  
If the concept of finality applies only to prophethood and Islam is in fact in need 
of being expanded, then how are we to make sense of verses like the following: ―This day 
have I perfected for you your religion and completed My favor on you‖ (Q 5:3)? Soroush 
defers to another great thinker Fakhr al-din al-Razi283 to explain the meaning of this 
verse:  
 
Those who accept the validity of analogy have said that what is meant here by 
religion being perfected by God has made known His specific precepts about 
some actions in the Text, whereas He has made known His percepts about some 
others by providing us with the instruments of analogy. It is as if God has divided 
things into two categories, those that have direct precepts and those for which the 
                                                 
281 Junayd al-Baghdadi (215 A.H./830 A.D.) was one of the great early Muslim mystics and is a central 
figure in many Sufi orders. 
282 Ibn ‘Arabī, Al-Futuhat al-Makkiyah [Meccan Illuminations] (Beirut: Sadir Pub., 1970), 3:56, quoted in 
Soroush, EPE, 48. 
283 Fakhr al-Din al-Razi,
 
or Imam Razi, was a Sunni polymath and theologian of the Ash‘ari school, born in 
544 A.H./1149 A.D. in Ray (now part of the Province of Tehran), Iran.
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precepts must be derived from the first category by analogy. And since God has 
commanded the use of analogy and made it incumbent on believers to apply it, he 
has in fact made his precepts clear about all things in advance. Hence, religion is 
perfect / complete.284  
For Soroush, the above discussion about the completeness of Islam, demonstrates that 
there is no contradiction between assuming minimalism and assuming perfection. It is 
religion‘s285 aim and mission only to provide these minimums (whether in the realm of 
precepts, in the realms of ethics, in terms of a world-view and of religious knowledge, 
and in terms of guidance in general. A ―religion that has provided these minimums has 
performed completely and is no way lacking.‖286 
 If we now replace Imam Razi‘s word ―analogy‖ (qiyas) with the word ijthād 
(independent legal reasoning), which has a more general meaning and is accepted by both 
Sunnis and the Shī`ī ʿulema’, then we will have the sum total of what classical and 
modern commentators have achieved in their attempts to prove the perfection of religion. 
The message of finality means that we should understand religion and the purpose of 
religion in such a way ―as to leave the door open to its dynamism and vitality. And the 
very minimum that we can do to make religion dynamic is to see it as minimal.‖287 
Point 7: The Best Way to Be a Non-Imitative Believer Is to Be a Scholarly Gnostic 
The highest form of piety, and this seems to be the path Soroush has chosen for 
himself, is ―scholarly Gnosticism‖—to be one ―who proceeds with criticism and 
questions‖ and has ―a probing kind of faith.‖288 One has to ―peel away the accidentals and 
incidentals‖ in order to ―deconstruct religion‘s historical body.‖289 It is only through this 
                                                 
284 Fakhr al-Din Muhammad al-Razi, Mafatih al-Ghayb, vol. 3 (Beirut: Dar al-Fikr, 1978), 358. 
285 This use of the word ―religion‖ is different from its uses as ―religion qua religion‖ and as a concept with 
an essence. ―Religion‖ in this context means all things related directly to the sciences of the Qur‘ān, like 
fiqh, exegesis, theology, ethics, et cetera—including religious experience. 
286 Soroush, EPE, 113.  
287 Ibid.  
288 Ibid., 235. 
289 Ibid., 91. 
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probing Gnostic path that one can continue the mission of the Prophet. Soroush, in an 
interesting instrumental comment, suggests that the only way to keep religion from 
disintegrating and going down the path of secularization is to ―find a mechanism that 
perpetuates the Prophet‘s presence and experience.‖290 He states, ―The task for the 
religious scholar is to identify the whole range of accidentals that has penetrated the very 
core of the essence of Islam and imposed its own nature on it.‖291 In a possible jab against 
the Islamic Republic‘s general negative stance towards Sufis, Soroush verbalizes his 
frustration at the limitations the regime imposes against Sufi tendencies by saying, ―If we 
accept that there is a type of religiosity that begins with criticism and questions, we 
cannot construct a barrier halfway down its path and ask the Gnostic believer to proceed 
no further. We have to accept that there is also a probing type of faith as well an imitative 
one. This probing faith will find, and has found, its own way.‖292 
Soroush‘s revelation theology/prophetology in his 2001 work Basṭ-e Tajrobeh-ye 
Nabavī, can be summarized in the following two points: 1) the Prophet‘s personality is 
the singularly pivotal point around which Islam was born as a religion and 2) the Qur‘ān 
is already an interpretation of the Prophet‘s and not the direct word of God. Downplaying 
the interpreted nature of the Qur‘ān, Soroush in that work accents the role of the Prophet 
as the activator of the Qur‘ān. In 2007, however, with caustic bluntness, Soroush presents 
the two ingredients of his neo-Sufi theology in their totality and without hesitation. 
 
                                                 
290 Ibid., 200. Soroush defines secularism as the acting on the basis of non-religious motives, explaining 
the world, life and human beings on the basis of non-religious concepts and constructs, and discovering the 
independence of such constructs as science and politics from religion (Ibid., 196). 
291 Ibid. 




In his December 26, 2007 interview with Radio Netherlands Worldwide293 
Soroush drew attention to four main features of his revelation theology: 1) ―revelation is 
‗inspiration [ilhām],‘‖294 2) that the Prophet‘s reaction to waḥy was much like that of a 
poet‘s,295 3) that ―the Prophet played a pivotal role in the production of the Qur‘ān,‖296 
and 4) that ―revelation may be wrong in matters that relate to the material world and 
human society.‖297 Soroush had already presented two of these four claims in Baṣṭ-e 
Tajrobeh-ye Nabavī [The Expansion of Prophetic Experience]—the relationship between 
revelation and inspiration, and the Prophet‘s essential role in the production of waḥy. 
While he had hinted at the role of extra-religious information in interpreting qur‘ānic 
content in his discussion about accidentals of religion,298 in the 2007 interview he 
explicitly states that the Qur‘ān contains certain inaccuracies. He also expands on the 
nature of the Prophet‘s production of the Qur‘ān by comparing it to poetic divination.  
Soroush claims that waḥy (revelation) and ilhām (inspiration) are qualitatively the 
same thing. What is different is not the status of the message, but the role of the 
messenger: that the prophets‘ experiences were deeper and that they were also inspired to 
have the inclination (meyl) to spread God‘s message. Is Soroush‘s claim reasonable?  
In the Qur‘ān, waḥy sometimes denotes revelation in the form of communication 
without speech, presented as an exceptional modality of God‘s speaking to His creatures, 
meaning that prophets are not the only recipients of waḥy: the bees (Q 16: 68) and heaven 
and earth (Q 41:12) are also spoken of. Nor is God the only source of waḥy: the Satans 
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(shāyāṭīn) among humans and jinn also inspire via waḥy, as in Q 6:121: ―The Satans 
inspire (yuhūna) their friends to dispute with you; if you obey them, you are idolaters.‖  
But we also have instances where the Qur‘ān is spoken of as the ―literal‖ word, as 
opposed to communication without speech. This identification of the literal message as 
the product of waḥy is fully developed in a passage such as Q 29:45, which associates 
―the Book‖ with waḥy: ―Recite what has been revealed (ūḥiyā) to thee of the Book.‖ Q 
62:7 speaks of an Arabic Qur‘ān as the product: ―And so we have revealed to thee an 
Arabic Qur‘ān.‖ In this usage, the word may be seen to be functionally equivalent to 
tanzīl, the word frequently used with the image of a literal ―bringing down‖ of a message. 
And so it is possible to conclude that waḥy is a difficult term in the Qur‘ān, and that a 
search for a single meaning for the word has proved frustrating to scholarship, given that 
within it there is not only a reference to the source of the revelation, but also to its agents. 
In the Qur‘ān, the word ilhām (inspiration) appears only in 91:8: ―And inspired it 
[fa  alhama-hā fujūra-hā wa taqwā-hā] [with conscience of] what is wrong for it and [what 
is] right for it.‖  By far the most important use of ilhām is in connection with the doctrine 
of saints. Here, the Sufi tradition and orthodoxy make a distinction of authority explicit in 
the two ways Allāh reveals himself: to men individually by knowledge cast into their 
minds (ilhām) and generally by messages sent through the Prophets (waḥy). In the first 
case, saints especially are the recipients of this ilhām because their hearts are purified and 
prepared for it. It differs from intellectual knowledge (‗ilm-e ‘aqlī) in that it cannot be 
gained by meditation and deduction, but is suddenly communicated while the recipient 
cannot tell how, whence or why. It is a pure gift from the generosity (fayḍ) of Allāh.299  
                                                 
299 For more on the Sufi nature of ilhām, see: Alan Godlas, Sufism’s Many Paths (2000); Annemarie 
Schimmel, Mystical Dimensions of Islam (1975); Leonard Lewinsohn, ed., The Heritage of Sufism, Vol. I: 
―Classical Persian Sufism from Its Origins to Rumi (700-1300)‖ (1999).  
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Yet, here arises the deeper epistemological issue: what is the status of the 
recipient of that revealed knowledge? In the traditional understanding of waḥy not only 
do we know that the source is outside the prophet, namely God, but that this information 
is also known to the prophet himself. Soroush‘s suggestion that waḥy is equivalent to 
ilhām obscures the lines a bit. Abdullah Nasri, in one of the many articles published 
during late 2007 and early 2008 as a result of Soroush‘s Dutch interview, suggests that 
Soroush is claiming that waḥy is being generated from within the Prophet.300 In that same 
interview, Soroush points out that:  
 
The question of whether the inspiration comes from outside or inside is really not 
relevant, because at the level of revelation there is no difference between outside 
and inside. The inspiration comes from the Self of the Prophet. The Self of every 
individual is divine, but the Prophet differs from other people in that he has 
become aware of his divinity. He has actualized its potential. His Self has become 
one with God. Now don‘t get me wrong on this point: This spiritual union with 
God does not mean that the Prophet has become God. It is a union that is limited 
and tailored to his size. It is human size, not God‘s size. The mystical poet 
Jalaluddin Rumi describes this paradox with words: ‗Through the Prophet‘s union 
with God, the ocean is poured into a jar.‘301  
Reminiscent of the concept of fanā’ in Sufism, Soroush suggests that at the moment 
when the prophet is receiving his ilhām he has become so close to God that his internal 
voice is that of God‘s.302 That is, in either case, the issue is not revealed knowledge, but 
closeness (qurb). Here, traditional definitions of the state of the knower become critical.  
 There are two allied definitions given to the Sufi term fanā’: 1) the passing-away 
of all things from the consciousness of the mystic, including himself, and its replacement 
by a pure consciousness of God and 2) the annihilation of the imperfect attributes (as 
distinguished from the substance) of the creature and their replacement by the perfect 
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attributes bestowed by God.303 What is at stake in Soroush‘s attempt to taper the gap 
between the authority of the Prophet and the mystic becomes evident in Mustafa 
Husseinī-Ṭabāṭabā‘ī‘s negative reaction in March 2008. Husseinī-Ṭabāṭabā‘ argues that, 
according to the ʿurafā (the mystics), a sālik (one who is searching) who leaves (az 
khalvat be dar āmadan) the path of ascetism (kashf o shuhūd) in order to take up political 
and social life, as was the case with the Prophet, and gets caught up in worldly affairs 
witnesses the lessening and eventual cessation of his ascetic sensitivity. Since we know 
that even though the Prophet was caught up in the affairs of the people for twenty-three 
years, he nevertheless continued to receive a constant stream of what is called waḥy. We 
therefore cannot compare waḥy with gnostic contemplation.304   
But the state of revelation must be further specified. Accordingly, Soroush points 
to baqā’, which means 1) persistence in the new divinely bestowed attributes and 2) a 
return to the mystic‘s consciousness of the plurality of the creaturely world.305 The 
second follows from the first, since, in this tradition, being with God means also being 
with the world that has been created by God and in which He is manifested, however 
imperfectly. ―The Sufis generally regard this state of baqā’ as being more perfect than 
that of mere fanā’, and this is the meaning of their dictum that sobriety supervenes on 
intoxication.‖306 This ―return‖ to the world is, Sufis emphatically state, not a simple 
return to the pre-fanā’ state of the mystic since the experience provides an altogether new 
insight. Instead, it helps one to perceive the world‘s inadequacies and endeavor to make it 
more perfect.‖ 307   
                                                 
303 Fazlur Rahman, ―Baḳāʾwa-Fanāʾ,‖ in Encyclopædia of Islam, 2nd ed., ed. Paul J. Bearman, et al. 
(Leiden: Brill, 2002), 1:951. 
304 Mustafa Hussieni Tabātabā‘ī, Vahy va Mukāshifeh ʿIrfānī? March 2008, accessed April 2008, 
http://www.drsoroush.com [no longer available]. 
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Soroush‘s use of the doctrine of baqā’ throws into bold relief the distinction 
between the mystical and the prophetic consciousness. Whereas the ordinary mystic stops 
at fanā’ and does not wish to return to the world, it is the function of the prophet, despite 
what Husseinī-Ṭabāṭabā‘ī finds problematic, to be the mystic par excellence according to 
Soroush‘s interpretation—that is, it is the prophet‘s function to be constantly both with 
God and the world, to transmute the course of history through the implementation of the 
religio-moral divine Truth.  
Soroush then proceeds to show how the Prophet‘s reaction to waḥy was much like 
that of a poet‘s. In his first response to Ayatollah Ṣobḥāni, his most ardent critic during 
this period, Soroush borrowed from `Allāmeh Ṭabāṭabā‘ī 308 to clarify that waḥy is not a 
shu’ūr-e marmūz (mysterious understanding) but a honar-e marmūz (mysterious creative 
talent)—using art in a sense more closely related to artisanship or making.309 This is 
supported by his recourse to yet another extension of the agentive side of prophetic 
revelation. Ilhām, Soroush claims, can be experienced by many, be they artists (poets for 
instance), gnostics, or finally, prophets. In each case it is not an internal process but an 
external one that characterizes what the result of that revelation will be—not just an inner 
state, but something directed externally, at the community. Waḥy is ilhām, or religious 
experience that poets, artists and gnostics experience, but at a higher, more refined level 
(sahth-e bālātar).310 When asked by Ayatollah Sobhani whether he was equating waḥy 
and poetry, Soroush responds, ―For understanding the unfamiliar concept of waḥy we can 
                                                 
308 Grand Ayatollah `Allāmeh Seyyed Muḥammad Ḥussein Tabātabā‘ī (b. 1892 - d. 1981), famous for his 
commentary Tafsir al-Mizān, was one of the most prominent clerics of contemporary Shīʿī Islam. He was 
considered the main marjaʿ of his time upon Ayatollah Borūjerdī‘s passing.  
309 Soroush, ―Bashar and Bashīr: Soroush‘s First Response to Ayatollah Sobhani,‖ in EPE, 292. 
Grand Ayatollah Ja‘far Sobhani (b. 1930) is an Iranian Twelver Shīʿī marjaʿ and an influential theologian, 
who is a senior member of the high council of Qom seminary. For more on Ayatollah Sobhani, see: 
Ayatollah Ja‘far Sobhani, Doctrines of Shi`i Islam: A Compendium of Imami Beliefs and Practices (2001).  
310 Soroush, EPE, 292. 
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use the more understood and accessible concept of poetry or, more generally, human 
creativity. This is only a means to better imagine an alien concept. Did not al-Ghazzali 
contend that, to better understand waḥy, we can envision the human‘s often encountered 
experience of satanic temptation?‖311   
In his third claim, Soroush divides the Qur‘ān into two parts, claiming that while 
the muḥkamāt are accurate, the scientific and historical parts of the Qur‘ān are susceptible 
to error. Soroush maintains that certain parts of the Qur‘ān are inaccurate: ―Those parts of 
the Qur‘ān that have to do with the characteristics of God, life after death, and the rules 
of worship are not susceptible to error, but waḥy has made mistakes about life on earth 
and human society . . . What the Qur‘ān says about historical events, other religions and 
scientific truths do not necessarily have to be true.‖312   
Soroush takes issue, for instance, with stories about the prophets, calling them 
fables—that is, stories that need to be read allegorically.313 This is despite that fact that in 
Q 20:99 we find: ―Thus do We relate to thee some stories of what happened before: for 
We have sent thee a Message from Our own Presence.‖ He also finds verses such as Q 
37: 1-10, which seems to set up a relationship between comets and shayātīn (devils),314 or 
Q 2:275-81 which seems to claim that madness could be caused by jinns to be 
problematic. Commentators, he claims, have used ta’wīl when necessary to make sense 
of the verses they felt incommensurate with scientific findings, but they do not go far 
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314 37: 1-10: ―By those who set the ranks in battle order (1) And those who drive away (the wicked) with 
reproof (2) And those who read (the Word) for a reminder, (3) Lo! Thy Lord is surely One; (4) Lord of the 
heavens and of the earth and all that is between them, and Lord of the sun‘s risings. (5) Lo! We have 
adorned the lowest heaven with an ornament, the planets; (6) With security from every forward devil. (7) 
They cannot listen to the Highest Chiefs for they are pelted from every side, (8) Outcast, and theirs is a 
perpetual torment; (9) Save him who snatcheth a fragment, and there pursueth him a piercing flame. (10) 
Then ask them (O Muhammad): Are they stronger as a creation, or those (others) whom we have created? 
Lo! We created them of plastic clay.‖  
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enough.315 For instance `Allāmeh Ṭabāṭabā‘ī, when commenting on 37:1-10, suggests 
that ―perhaps these are examples of the metaphors that God uses and what is meant by the 
sky is the kingdom of heaven, which is home to the angels, and what is meant by meteor 
is celestial light that drives away devils. Or, perhaps it means that devils attack truths in 
order to upend them, and the angels drive them away with the meteors of truth and repel 
their falsehoods.‖316 
Why is this tafsīr not enough for Soroush? Because for Soroush these amount to 
mere stabs at patching up the ―incongruities between the Qur‘ān and human inclination,‖ 
and as such, they are just not good enough.317 ―It is as if the late Ṭabāṭabā‘ī had forgotten 
that the projectiles were being hurled at the devils from the lower sky, not the kingdom of 
heaven,318 since according to Q 37:6, ―We have indeed decked the lower heaven with 
beauty [in] the stars.‖ Why is it so hard for Soroush to believe in an omnipotent God who 
can produce all of existence and at the same time exist without us being able to prove his 
existence? Or, why is it so difficult for Soroush to believe that madness can be caused by 
some other form of invisible being called jinn, or that devils can be driven away meteors? 
The answer is because Soroush believes that, despite what orthodoxy has come to uphold, 
the prophet was not told all the secrets of the universe and was not privy to all of God‘s 
creation. As a result, Muhammad‘s interpretations of God‘s perfect message, the message 
that was written on his heart, is riddled with cultural misunderstandings.  
                                                 
315 The meaning of ta’wīl is very similar to tafsīr. Apparently they were used interchangeably up until the 
third century A.H (ninth century A.D.). However, a close scrutiny of multitude definitions of the two terms 
in a wide variety of sources reveals that ta’wīl, in the understanding of most scholars, was based upon 
reason and personal opinion (raʾy), whereas tafsīr was based upon material transmitted from the Prophet 
himself, his Companions, or the Successors in the form of ḥadīt h ; hence, the former is generally defined 
as tafsīr bi ʾl-raʾy (interpretation by the use of reason), while the latter as tafsīr bi ʾl-maʾt h ūr (interpretation 
according to what has been handed down) (I. Poonawala, ―ta’wīl,‖ in Encyclopædia of Islam, 10:390). 
316 Soroush, EPE, 298. 
317 Ibid. 
318 Heaven is purported to have seven levels, and the angels are thought to reside in the higher ones. 
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The orthodox argument for working through scientific inconsistencies has been 
that we cannot, as of yet, understand the truth in the words of the Qur‘ān about madness 
and the galaxies because our current understanding of the world is limited. We can only 
judge the truth in the Qur‘ān based on our own understanding of the world, which is at 
any time, at best, incomplete. Soroush‘s response is that God meant for there to be error 
in the Qur‘ān; He simply chose a Prophet, and the Prophet made mistakes according to 
his understanding of the times. This is how the program of prophecy works. These errors 
do not reduce the importance of the real message because the real message was that of 
tawhīd (oneness of God).  The Qur‘ān thus is not here to teach us astronomy or 
medicine.319   
Soroush then makes his final move, claiming that the Prophet was instrumental in 
creating the Qur‘ān. Orthodoxy claims that the function of the prophet with relation to 
waḥy is one of passivity. He had neither a role in its content (mazmūn) nor its rendition 
(sūrat-dihī). Soroush asserts, however, that the prophet actually had ―a pivotal (mehvarī) 
role in the production of the Qur‘ān.‖320 As noted earlier waḥy is a type of ilhām. Ilhām 
is, however, not a verbal communiqué but a kind of knowledge cast into the minds and 
written on the hearts of those whose hearts are purified and prepared to receive it. In this 
way, Soroush proposes that the content of the Qur‘ān is from God (mazmūn), but that the 
rendition (sūrat-dihi) is from the Prophet. What does this rendition entail exactly?  
Soroush says that when we read the Qur‘ān, we are left with no choice but to 
believe the Prophet had a hand in its production: 
 
The Prophet‘s personality plays a large role in the molding (shekl-dādan) of the 
Qur‘ān. The history of his life, his mother, his father, his childhood, even his 
psychological states have played a role in the Qur‘ān. When we read the Qur‘ān, 
                                                 




we sense that the Prophet is at times rejoicing and joyful and extremely eloquent, 
while at other times melancholy and quite ordinary sounding in his utterances.  
All of these have left their imprint on the Qur‘ān. This is what I call the human 
aspect of waḥy.321 
Abdolalī Bazargān322 points out that there is not even one verse in the Qur‘ān where the 
Prophet addresses his audience with his own words.323 The Qur‘ān has made sure to 
inform us that Muhammad did not know what a book was or what faith was (Q 42:52), 
that he had in fact not read a book in his life and had not written a single line (Q 29:48), 
and that he was only given the waḥy as pointed out in Q 7:203: ―If thou bring them not a 
revelation they say: ‗Why hast thou not got it together?‘ Say: ‗I but follow what is 
revealed to me from my Lord: this is (nothing but) lights from your Lord, and Guidance 
and Mercy, for any who have faith.‘‖324 Bazargan continues by saying that, 
 
for example, the Prophet was given the command qul (say), 332 times, and so he 
used qul in the Qur‘ān in the form presented to him. We also have in the Qur‘ān 
not just a praise and glorification of the prophets but at the same time an 
admonitory tone (19 times they have warned him against hasty judgments), and at 
least four times he has been asked to ask for forgiveness in relations to topics like 
his judgment among the people, his tolerance of his adversaries, tawhīd (oneness 
of God) and qiyāmā (afterlife), and sometimes he has even adopted a threatening 
tone, nine times he has been warned against obeying the non-believers (lā taṭiʿ al-
kāfirīn), the hypocrites (al-munāfiqīn), the unaware and the straying majority (al-
ghāfilīn).325  
Of course, there are instances where we see the phrase, ―qāla rasūl Allāh‖ (said the 
Prophet), but the speaker is God and not the Prophet. Bazargan calls the Qur‘ān 
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323 Abdolalī Bazargān, ―‗Havā yā Hudā‘ dar Kalām-e Vaḥy,‖ February 2008, accessed March 2008, 
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―khodānāmeh,‖ or the book or letter of God,326 ―which is scattered throughout with 
pronouns such as ‗I‘ and ‗We,‘ where sometimes the angels speak, sometimes the 
prophets become the speakers and sometimes even Iblis (Satan). So the orator is not 
unitary.‖327   
For Soroush, the metaphysics of those he calls khoshkeh-faqīhan (bookish jurists) 
is a metaphysics of remoteness and detachment (bu’d). In contrast, his metaphysics is one 
of qurb, or intimacy and warmth. The picture that he accuses Ayatollah Sobhani of 
depicting of the relationship between God and the Prophet is one in which the Prophet is 
confronted with a mechanized speaker, (or even a recording device, where the orator is 
removed from the presence of the audience altogether) speaking down at him. A divine 
apparatus is thus equated with a human managerial system. Trying to reconcile modernity 
and Islam, Soroush has tried to create a theory of religion in the Western meaning of the 
word according to the Sufi world view. In so doing, however, he has yet to respond to 
self-reflexive verses such Q 69:44-46, which state, ―And if the messenger were to invent 
any sayings in Our name, We should certainly seize him by his right hand, And We 
should certainly then cut off the artery of his heart: Nor could any of you withhold him 
[from Our wrath].‖ 
KADIVAR RESPONDS TO SOROUSH 
Mohsen Kadivar began responding to Soroush‘s revelation theology only after 
Soroush‘s interview with Radio Netherlands Worldwide in 2007. Since that time, he has 
presented his critique of Soroush‘s revelation theology in an interview and in four 
separate talks.328 The interview and talks cover, not just his position on Soroush‘s 
                                                 
326 Ibid., 2. 
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328The list of the interview and talks are below can all be found on Mohsen Kadivar‘s official web site, 
<http://www.kadivar.com> (accessed May 2011), except for Hussein: Modāfeʿ -eKalām Allāh (Hussein the 
Defender of God-Speech) which is an audio file and made available to author by Dr. Kadivar. Talks: 
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innovations, but also the reflections of the late Grand Ayatollah Hussein Ali Montazeri. 
Montazeri wrote a tract in response to Soroush shortly after Soroush‘s interview with 
Radio Netherlands Worldwide, which he later expanded into his book Safir-e Haqq va 
Safir-e Vahy [The Ambassador of Truth and the Soundbox of Revelation] in Winter 
2008.329 As will become clear, Kadivar‘s discussions about the topic do not engage with 
Soroush‘s claims in a very detailed manner. He has suggested that writing about the topic 
is something he means to do in the future.330   
Kadivar’s Position 
Kadivar‘s position is best represented by his talk ―Qalb-e Islām‖ [The Heart of 
Islam], given on December 20, 2008.331 Finding the proximity of the Christmas holiday 
to be fortuitous, he makes an obscure reference to Soroush‘s prophetology by pointing 
out that it is in fact Christianity that revolves around the being of Christ, and that it is 
                                                                                                                                                 
Tala’lu-e Cherāq Dīn (The Radiance of the Light of Religion), December 26, 2009 (the night of `Ashūrā‘), 
presented in the memory of Ayatollah Montazeri (7
th
 eve of his passing), The Center of Light and 
Knowledge, NJ. Another talk, Namāyandeh-ye Islām-e Ḥaqīqat (The Representative of the Islam of Truth), 
commemorating Ayatollah Montazeri  was broadcast for a group of students gathered at the 
Islamic Cultural Center of Northern California (ICCNC), Oakland, CA, on the same night; Hussein: 
Modāfeʿ-e Kalām Allāh (Hussein the Defender of God-Speech), January 18, 2008, Husseiniyeh-e Ershad, 
Tehran, Iran.  Qalb-e Islam (The Heart of Islam), December 20, 2008, Islamic Cultural Center of 
Northern California (ICCNC), Oakland, CA, USA; Interviews: Bayānīyeh-ye Panj-Nafareh va Manẓarha-
ye Motefāvit-e Dīnī dar goftigū ba Mohsen Kadivar (The Five-person Manifesto and Different Religious 
Positions in Discussion with Mohsen Kadivar), Interviewer Bahareh Azadi with Jaras News Agency, 
January, 16, 2010. 
329 Montazeri‘s book is by far the most engaging analysis of Soroush‘s theory, as it not only shows how his 
theory is not supported by the Qur‘ān and the hadīth but, more importantly, attacks the theory‘s foundation. 
Soroush underpins his theory by proposing that he is not the first Muslim to this kind of prophet-centered 
revelation theory. He claims that many of the medieval notables have come to same conclusions. What 
Montazeri does is systematically attack this particular claim. Since this is a comparative work between 
Soroush and Kadivar, using Montazeri‘s work as reflecting Kadivar‘s position might seem out of place. In 
the interview he conducted about the topic, when asked if he agrees with his teacher‘s position, Kadivar 
answers, ―Shāgerd dar in mas’aleh hamānand-e ustadash mīandīshad [the student thinks like his teacher 
when it come to this issue]‖ (Mohsen Kadivar, ―Bayānīyeh-ye Panj-Nafareh va Manẓarha-ye Motefāvit-e 
Dīnī dar Goftigū ba Mohsen Kadivar‖ [The Five-Person Manifesto and Different Religious Positions in 
Discussion with Mohsen Kadivar], interview by Bahareh Azadi, Jaras News Agency, January, 16, 2010.) 
330 Personal communication on May12, 2011. 
331 Qalb-e Islam [The Heart of Islam], December 20, 2008, Islamic Cultural Center of Northern California 
(ICCNC), Oakland, CA. 
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Christ that is the center and the heart of Christianity. This reference to Christianity could 
be construed as an effort to point a finger at Soroush for attempting to ―Christianize‖ 
Islam in an effort to modernize it. In the case of Islam, however, Kadivar insists that the 
heart of Islam is the Qur‘ān.  
Kadivar launches into a methodological critique of Soroush‘s position by asking 
who it is that sits in judgment on theological discussions. Does the scientific world judge 
theological debates, or do the debates have to live up to an internal standard? Is it in fact 
possible to conduct discussions about theology from the outside and in essence pay no 
heed to what the Qur‘ān and the Sunna have said about Prophetology and revelation and 
the centrality of the Book?332  
Whatever one decides to define as a precept in Islam, Kadivar insists, must either 
be supported by the Qur‘ān, the Sunna and our rational capacity—or not denied by them. 
In order to arrive at a valid conception about revelation, we have no choice but to ask the 
following questions: ―How has the Qur‘ān defined itself? How has it defined the nature 
of waḥy? . . . Being aware of what the Qur‘ān says about waḥy and the Prophet is a 
necessary condition for conducting theological research.‖333  
It is true, says Kadivar, that the concept of becoming a Muslim began with trust in 
the person of the Prophet, but it is also important to keep in mind that the message of the 
trustworthy (amīn) Muhammad was the Qur‘ān. If the Qur‘ān itself says that the message 
it contains is directly from God and given to Muhammad to be relayed without any sort 
of interference, and if we indeed trust the word of the Prophet (as Soroush has pointed 
out that he does), then we must trust what he has also brought to us: the Qur‘ān.   
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―Studying relevant verses in the Qur‘ān allows us arrive at the following points: 
1) that the Qur‘ān is revelation and not the interpretation of revelation, 2) that 
Muhammad was nothing but an ordinary human being who was nonetheless elected to 
prophethood, 3) that revelation was sent to the ―heart of the Prophet‖ in the form of inzāl 
(a sending down of) either directly from God, or via Gabriel, 4) that revelation was sent 
in Arabic, 5) that revelation was not sent when Muhammad willed it and that the Prophet 
had no control over the act of nuzūl (descent), 6) that revelation is not human speech but 
divine speech; 7) that revelation is immune from the devils‘ hands, 8) that the Qur‘ān 
does not contain error, and 9) that the Prophet was not the creator of revelation (fā`il-e 
ān) but was able to receive revelation (qābil-e vaḥy būdeh). 
In short, Kadivar‘s main issue with Soroush is the same epistemological objection 
that I present in Chapter 4 on religious pluralism: judgments about religion must 
primarily proceed through intra-religious discussion. Kadivar does not have an answer for 
charges of epistemological irresponsibility, and the fact that his arguments beg the 
question remains unresolved.  
SOME CONCLUSIONS 
In his attempt to theorize Sufi piety, Soroush has come up with a theology, a 
theory of religion steeped in orthopraxy. In the heart of Soroush‘s theory of religion, we 
find that the personality of the Prophet and not the Holy Qur‘ān constitutes the heart of 
Islam. The echo of this axiomatic statement dominates the rest of his theory. Claiming 
that it was the Prophet who rendered God‘s will into speech means that the Qur‘ān as we 
know it was already an interpretation, situated and contingent and (most importantly) 
open to error and revision. No longer is it necessary, in Soroush‘s lexicon, to tread warily 
and stealthily in the domain of ijtihād. It is no longer obligatory to apologize for entering 
one‘s subjectivity into the interpretive process since the Qur‘ān itself, being but one 
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interpretation, is no longer sacrosanct. This is the most foundational of Soroush‘s 
postmodern positions. 
In comparison to Soroush‘s highly postmodern neo-Sufi theology, in which he 
mixes Muʿtazilite rationality and Sufi mysticism, Kadivar is unwilling to even concede, 
as he claims some theologians have done in the past, that the Qur‘ān shares the stage with 
the Prophet in a symbiotic relationship that resembles not the earth with the sun, but an 
ellipse with two centers.334 For Kadivar, the Qur‘ān is the nonnegotiable heart of Islam.  
The two theological points grappled with in this study are revelation theology and 
the salvation of non-Muslims according to Muslim theology. Chapter four concentrates 
on the 1999 national uproar about religious pluralism, presented as a solution to the 
reality of religious diversity in the world by Soroush. As has been shown in the case of 
revelation and shall be shown for the case of religious pluralism, both cases shore up the 
contention that Soroush approaches theology from a postmodern orthopraxy while 
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Chapter 4: The Issue of Religious Pluralism 
The goal of this chapter is to unpack Soroush‘s soteriology. As a by-product of 
this theological study, it will also present Soroush‘s groundbreaking epistemological 
pluralism (his theory of religious epistemology)—the fact that he endorses a plurality of 
truths as opposed to a singular truth.335 As we shall see, there are arguably two main 
examples of Soroush‘s dedication to the idea of pluralism: one, that he finds the bases for 
social / national / ethnic unities to be at best unstable, and two, that he supports a 
fragmented and decentered self and multiple and conflicting identities.  Both are crucial 
in fact for understanding his theory of religion.  
Although religious pluralism is the main issue at hand, the chapter will also 
pursue examples of Soroush‘s positions on social and cultural pluralism as they emerge 
along the way. Since pluralist tendencies have become a hallmark of the postmodern 
condition, such diversions away from the main thread of the chapter's argument on 
eschatological theology into Soroush‘s socio-cultural thought seem justified in the hope 
of further acknowledging him as a postmodern thinker. This chapter ends with a glimpse 
at a hermeneutic innovation about which Ricœur and de Certeau have theorized, and 
which help us understand how Soroush‘s writings on pluralism mimic his own theory.  
These writings are hybrid and pluralistic in nature, and this hybridity has a strangely 
transformative effect on his audience. The discourse of religious pluralism championed 
by Soroush and rejected by Kadivar thus emerges in this optic as yet another example of 
how Soroush speaks from a postmodern position, while Kadivar enters the conversation 
from the edges of orthodoxy.  
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Before I move to the core of my argument, let me begin this chapter by presenting 
short introductions to Western scholarship on the topics of 1) religious pluralism and the 
classical understandings of the finality of Islam and the Prophet,  and 2) the place of the 
`umma in relation to ―other‖ people of the Book. These beginnings will allow me to 
pursue the debate between Kadivar and Soroush, as well as their other writings, in more 
nuanced ways. In similar ways, the allusions to Soroush‘s socio-cultural pluralistic 
tendencies throughout this chapter help to profile what is at stake in their respective 
views on religious pluralism and the future of Islam.   
RELIGIOUS PLURALISM 
As calls for global human rights increase, the discussion about religious diversity 
and the responses to it have also turned global during the last fifty years. The observable 
realities of religious diversity throughout the world beckon religious scholars of all 
persuasions to ask questions of the following nature: Does the reality of the apparent 
religious diversity require a response to justify belief in any single creed? Can a person 
who acknowledges religious diversity remain justified in claiming just a single 
perspective as correct? Can it justifiably be claimed that only one religion offers a path 
into the eternal presence of God? Is it justifiable to claim that, although a few other 
religions offer a path to God, that one‘s own religion is still the best means of attaining 
salvation? Answers to these questions are relevant not just to the academic study of 
religions; the responses to these questions have come to increasingly impact how we treat 
others, both personally and on a global level. According to Ghamari-Tabrizi, it is exactly 
the emergence of such non-academic questions into the Islamic world that have driven 
Soroush to engage in the topic.336  
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Most authors in this field work with three models that show what is at stake when 
one religion contemplates its reaction to these questions: religious exclusivism, religious 
inclusivism, and religious pluralism.337 No matter the difference in scholarly approach, 
there seems to be some general agreement about the concepts of exclusivism and 
inclusivism. Exclusivism is the view that one religion has it mostly right, while all the 
other religions go seriously wrong. An exclusivist Jew or Christian would therefore 
consider Islam not as a continuation of the Abrahamic message but as a false religion. In 
clarifying their exclusivist Christian positions, for instance, Alston and Platinga claim 
that epistemic obligation requires an awareness of the seeming religious diversity, and 
that this awareness does in fact have an impact on an exclusivist, which can range from 
causing minor uneasiness to significantly reducing the believer‘s level of confidence in 
the truth of certain beliefs to even causing belief abandonment.338 In contrast, inclusivists 
believe that religions or sects other than one‘s own carry some amount of the truth, of 
which the complete version is nonetheless found in one‘s own doctrine.  
The third model, pluralism, however, has been subject to growing debate as a 
much more complex epistemological claim. To nuance such discussions of pluralism, a 
recent work by Paul Knitter is useful for summing up the various theological trends in 
addressing pluralism and classifying Christian approaches to it. Knitter posits four 
models to capture various dynamics in a pluralistic religious framework: replacement, 
fulfillment, mutuality and acceptance; he touches on a fifth category but does not actually 
categorize it, as he describes essentially what Anthony, Hermans and Sterkens refer to in 
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a similar study as relativistic pluralism.339 Each of these models shows trade-offs of 
authority, belief, and credibility in cultural fields considered pluralist.   
For the present study, it is critical to note that Soroush specifically denies 
agreeing with the elements of this fifth category, thus making it crucial to understanding 
the very specific thrust of his work. Therefore, I will also include Anthony, Herman and 
Sterkens‘ designation of relativistic pluralism as I now turn to discuss Knitter‘s 
categories. As I read them, Knitter‘s replacement and fulfillment models coincide with 
the respective, traditional definitions of exclusivism and inclusivism outlined above. The 
mutuality model (i.e., the first kind of pluralism Knitter addresses) presents a kind of 
pluralistic encounter among religions based on underlying, often amorphous, 
commonalities.   
The person who best represents Knitter‘s model of plurality defined as mutuality 
is John Hick, who is incidentally the most influential proponent of religious pluralism. At 
the heart of Hick‘s pluralistic hypothesis is his assertion that an Ultimate Reality, which 
he calls ―the Real,‖ is the actual ground for all religious experience.340 Hick resolves the 
dilemma of the diversity and contradiction between the different conceptions of the Real 
in different religions by borrowing from Kant. According to Hick, Kant ―distinguish[ed] 
explicitly between an entity as it is in itself and as it appears in perception.‖341 Hick 
applies Kant‘s distinction to religious phenomena and proposes a distinction between the 
Real (as it actually exists) and the Real as perceived and experienced by individuals 
within a particular tradition.342 Therefore, the reason that individual religious traditions 
have conflicting conceptions of the Real is that none of them has direct access to it. 
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Rather, all perceptions of the Real are mediated through a unique religious tradition 
which acts as a conceptual lens.  
Putting his hypothesis into the Abrahamic context, Hick proposes that each 
concrete ―historical divine personality—Jahweh, the heavenly Father, the qur`anic 
Allah—is a joint product of the universal divine presence and a particular historically 
formed mode of constructive religious imagination.‖343 In other words, religious beliefs 
come partially from experience of the Real and partially from one‘s own imagination. 
Knitter‘s apt critique of Hick‘s model is that ―this model tends to disregard the fact that 
common grounds are often identified from the perspective of one‘s own religious 
framework.‖344 Referring to Hick‘s body of work, Soroush rejects his disregard for 
difference in The Expansion of the Prophetic Experience, stating:  
 
The historical existence of religions is indisputable, but the existence of a 
common essence or spirit among them is more open to dispute; in fact, it is 
virtually impossible to prove. Religions are not individual instances of a universal 
known as ―religion‖ and, rather than having a common quidity, they simply bear a 
family resemblance, like the members of a family whose eyes, eyebrows, mouth, 
cheekbones and figures are more or less alike, but have no common core.345 
The second of Knitter‘s models for pluralism, the acceptance model, is, as Knitter 
says, ―characteristic of the postmodern era and underscores that differences between 
religions are real and that their particularities are opportunities for reciprocal enrichment 
and growth . . . This model espouses the fact that ‗the many‘ cannot be melted into 
one.‖346 It insists that if we seek to remove diversity, as Hick‘s system suggests we 
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should, we will end up destroying the vitality of religions altogether. Knitter identifies 
three different perspectives within the acceptance model: 
1. Post-liberal, cultural-linguistic perspective 
George Lindbeck, who launched this trend, claims that religious experience is 
shaped by religious language. Our experience, Knitter suggests, is determined by 
the common religious language. Religions cannot claim to give us a clue about 
ultimate reality according to this outlook; they only serve as a framework for 
understanding everything else by setting up a common language.347 
2.  Plurality of ultimate perspective 
Represented by S. Mark Heim, this perspective holds that differences between 
religions are not just language-deep; rather, they reach into the very soul of 
religions. Difference in religions may also point to differences in the Divine 
Ultimate. Real differences between religions present the potentiality for us to 
learn something new.348 
3. Comparative theological perspective 
Represented by Francis X. Clooney and James L. Fredericks, this perspective 
claims that the foundations for a theology of religions are to be found in dialogue 
rather than in theology. One must be committed to one‘s own religion but at the 
same time open to the fact that there might be truths to be found in other religions 
also. Comparative theologians, Fredericks claims, ―are open to the tensions 
arising from ‗double claims‘ . . . between our commitment to the Christian 
tradition, on the one hand, and at the same time to the allure of other religious 
traditions.‖349 
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These three complementary perspectives on the acceptance model underline the 
importance of religious diversity and tend to downplay any assertions of the importance 
of common underlying elements. Soroush‘s position falls generally within this 
acceptance model and seems specifically closest to the plurality of ultimate perspective 
category. Soroush argues for a plurality of truths, but does he, like Heim, hold that 
differences between religions point to differences in the Divine Ultimate? This difference 
will require independent attention to Soroush‘s position to demonstrate how, albeit 
postmodern in nature, his position is different from all of the ones delineated by Knitter. 
Soroush's pluralism is not of the kind represented in the work of these other theorists.  
In Chapter 6 of Soroush‘s Expansion of the Prophetic Experience, a chapter 
which earlier had comprised his introductory essay to Serāṭhā-ye Mustaqīm [Straight 
Paths to God]350 (1998), Soroush accepts Hick‘s rendition of religious pluralism as an 
―authentic plurality‖351 and one of the many ways Rumi had justified religious pluralism. 
Soroush surpasses Hick, however, to introduce other, more important ―pillars 
underpinning plurality‖352 via a systematic and repeated unveiling of sections of Rumi‘s 
Masnavi.353 Why Rumi? Because, according to Soroush, ―Rumi must be given the last 
word‖ on the topic of plurality:  
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I emphasize Rumi‘s work on this subject, first because I consider him to be the 
Seal of the Mystics (khātam al-`urafā) and, secondly, because I find his manner 
of expression the sweetest and most telling.354  
Soroush begins by using Rumi‘s wisdom to defy orthodoxy, which is a commonplace in 
Islam. In this account, orthodoxy has only ever considered the religions of the Book (i.e., 
those which fall within the Abrahamic tradition) worthy of explication and to that end has 
maintained that the reason for successive versions of God‘s word has been due to 
evolutionary necessity and corruption. Humanity was not ready for Qur‘ān until the 
seventh century A.D. Each period has seen a message, commensurate with the 
understanding of the people of its time. Another classical reason given for the existence 
of successive versions of Abraham‘s religion is corruption. Earlier versions underwent 
distortions and alterations and consequently a readjustment of the word was needed and 
granted by God.  
Soroush says that religious diversity ―is not just a matter of changing social 
conditions or of one religion being distorted and then being replaced by another.‖355 
Utilizing Rumi‘s use of the term manzar (perspective, or point of view), Soroush 
introduces the first pillar on which Rumi‘s theory of religious pluralism stands. Soroush 
proposes an independent approach to pluralism when he cites Masnavi 3:1256: ―From the 
place of view (manzar), O (thou who are the) kernel of Existence, there arises the 
difference between the true believer [Muslim] and the Zoroastrian and the Jew.‖356 Rumi 
says, according to Soroush, that ―the difference between these three does not lie in any 
disagreement over the truth and falsehood, but precisely in the difference between their 
perspectives; and not in the perspectives of the believers at that, but in the perspectives of 
                                                 





their prophets [emphasis added],‖ since it is the prophets that initially introduce the 
religion to the people and it is they who are the reference by which standards are set.357 
As I demonstrated in Chapter 3 of this dissertation, the importance placed on the 
prophets‘ role in defining their religions runs through Soroush‘s work:  ―There was only 
one multidimensional truth and the prophet‘s viewed it from three different angles . . . 
and these view points [sic] are all one and the same.‖358 Soroush gives Rumi‘s 
perspectival theory further depth. Rumi‘s allegory of how a group of people formed 
different impressions of an elephant in the dark shows that there are many versions of the 
same ultimate reality (to borrow a term from Hick) out there but none of those renditions 
are complete. What Rumi is trying to tell us, Soroush says, is that ―we are all groping in 
the dark‖ but will ―never grasp reality in its entirety . . . everyone sees that reality and 
understands it to some extent and from a particular angle, and they describe it to exactly 
that extent.‖359 This same sentiment is also found in the first few lines of the Masnavi, 
thought to hold the main message of the work at large: ―the breath which the flute-player 
puts into the flute—does it belong to the flute? No, it belongs to the man (the flute-
player).‖360 Soroush adds, ―We are all flutes held against the lips of truth, and truth 
breathes into us. And even if we were flutes with mouthpieces ‗as wide as the universe,‘ 
we would still be too narrow for the truth to tell its full tale.‖361 
Soroush admits that Hick ―makes this same point but using the Kantian 
noumena/phenomena362 distinction.‖363 Hick‘s use of Kant revolves around the concept 
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of antinomies. Kant‘s antinomies of pure reason can be used to show why we are unable 
to effectively compare religions. To be able to prove that my religion has more truth 
content than yours, it is necessary to reach beyond the perspective of personal beliefs into 
a vantage point from which the totality of all religions can be surveyed. This is equivalent 
to stepping out of the noumenal and into the phenomenal realm in order to judge the 
noumenal as the realm of creation. Comparing religions, an activity belonging to the 
phenomenal world, creates a Kantian antinomy.  
Starting from this epistemological assertion, Soroush begins his debate with 
Kadivar by highlighting this same antinomy, suggesting that the human mind is unable to 
determine the superiority of any one religion. To have a scientific discussion about 
religion, it is necessary to carry on religious debates from a scientific and extra-religious 
standpoint.364 This was a radical enough statement in itself in the Islamic Republic of 
Iran, but Soroush goes even further to suggest that even engaging in extra-religious 
debate soon uncovers the fact that it is patently impossible to make any definitive claims 
about religion, regardless of one‘s epistemological position. ―Belief assessment in the 
face of religious diversity will never resolve debate over conflicting religious 
perspectives in an objective manner.‖365 In other words, if we assume that issues of self-
consistency and comprehensiveness have been taken care of, there exists no set of criteria 
that will allow us to resolve most religious epistemic disputes (either between or within 
religious perspectives) in a way that is neutral and does not end up ―begging the 
question.‖366 
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But Soroush does not agree with Hick‘s position, calling it a kind of ―negative 
pluralism,‖ a kind of pluralism where ―something is always lacking.‖367 Soroush prefers 
―positive pluralism,‖ a pluralism that is based on the belief that ―existing alternatives and 
rival [religions] are unique in kind and irreducible.‖368 It is for this purpose that he gives 
more value to Rumi‘s second pillar of understanding religious pluralism. Soroush calls 
this second pillar ―the immersion of truth within truths,‖ ―the heart and kernel‖ of Rumi‘s 
stance on religious pluralism.369 In Masnavi 6:1636 Rumi says, ―Nay, the truth is 
absorbed in the truth; hence seventy, nay, hundred sects have arisen.‖370 Soroush 
interprets this verse of the Masnavi to mean: 
 
The subdivisions of religions into sects and the multiplicity and plurality of 
religions themselves [do] not lie in distortions, conspiracies, the ill doings of ill-
wishers, the falsifications of falsifiers or the infidelity of the infidels (although no 
creed is free from any of these things). The division and subdivision of religions 
is not a question of the accumulation of deviation upon deviation, Rumi 
maintains, but the product of the labyrinthine nature of the truth and the 
immersion of truths within truths. He teaches us that it is the accumulation of 
truths and their intricate interconnectedness and the difficulty of choosing 
between these truths that leads to authentic and unavoidable diversity. It is 
imperative to take this point to heart, to alter one‘s view and aspect, and, instead 
of seeing the world as consisting of one straight line plus hundreds of crooked and 
broken lines, to see it as consisting of an aggregate of straight lines which meet, 
run parallel and overlap: truths immersed in truths. And does the fact that the 
Qur‘an describes the prophets as following a right path—in other words, moving 
along one of the straight paths and not the straight path—not substantiate this 
[emphasis in original]?371 
The qur‘ānic verses Soroush is referring to above are those addressing Abraham 
and Muhammad: ―He rendered thanks for His favors, so that He chose him and guided 
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him to a straight path [ilā ṣirāṭin mustaqīm]‖ (Q 16:121); ―by the Wise Qur‘ān that you 
are sent upon a straight path [`alā ṣirāṭin mustaqīm]‖ (Q 36:3-4); ―that He may guide you 
to a path that is straight [yahdīka ṣirāṭan mustaqīmā]‖ (Q 48:20). Although there might 
be many more verses in the Qur‘ān that speak to the existence of a straight path than 
there are ones that contain the term ―the straight path,‖ two of the most widely recited 
verses that form part of the daily prayer clearly point to what seems to be a unitary path 
(al-ṣirāṭ al-mustaqīm): 
 
Ihdinā al-ṣirāṭ al-mustaqīm ṣirāṭ al-ladhīna an`amta `alayhim ghayr al-maghḍūb 
`alayhim wa la ḍālīn [Lead us on the straight path, the path of those on whom 
Thou hast bestowed Thy Grace, those whose portion is not wrath, and who go not 
astray] (Q 1:6-7). 
Soroush unfortunately does not explain how he dismisses what seems to be a designated 
singular path in the very first verses of the Qur‘ān.  
But what does the existence of many truths really mean? Soroush says that he 
―has consented to plurality and accepted it,‖ and acquiesces that there is ―no other 
alternative‖ because ―religious texts and experiences naturally admit of a multitude of 
interpretations,‖ that ―reality is intricate and multifaceted‖ and that ―divine providence 
and protectiveness dictate multiplicity and rivalry.‖372 In other words, reality is made in 
such a way that every non-imitating believer who searches for an answer will have 
alternative readings of the divine and that these ―existing alternatives and rivals‖ to our 
own religious views ―are unique in kind and irreducible. None of them can be swallowed 
up or dissolved by any others, and each of them has incommensurable particularities; like 
multiple, correct, irreducible answers to a single question.‖373 Does this mean that there 
are an infinite many number of valid readings? Have we stepped into a Nietzschean 
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world within which there exist an unlimited number of interpretations? Does Soroush‘s 
postmodernism in some ways resemble deconstructivism in its conclusion that any text 
―may include infinite interpretations‖? When Soroush says, ―Every rational thinker has 
their own conception of religion, that is to say their own understanding of God, the 
Prophet, revelation, felicity, wretchedness, sin and obedience; an understanding that 
belongs to that believer alone, [resulting] from their reflections and [subject] to constant 
questioning and revision‖374 does he mean to say that any view of the core concepts of 
Islam are acceptable? If this were true he would not advise us, as Rumi does, to proceed 
on the path of this rational and discursive religiosity without a master. It is the master that 
determines what is permissible and what is not. Soroush states, 
 
It is true that guidance is impossible without a guide; nevertheless, this guide may 
operate visibly or invisibly. He may be near or far. Be that as it may, his business 
is assistance. We must keep our eyes fixed on the ultimate destination (viz. 
salvation), for the starting point and the journey do not matter much here and do 
not have their own laws.375 
That is, there is a correct path and an incorrect path. Although there are a multitude of 
paths, there is only one destination and not all paths lead us to the goal.  
The nature of acceptable paths becomes even clearer as Soroush turns again to 
Rumi for help. A guide is needed but we are not always aware of the guide‘s presence. 
Rumi advises a friend who had come to him for advice to ―seek a master and warns him 
against embarking alone in the spiritual journey‘s fearsome trail,‖ Soroush writes. He 
continues: 
 
[Rumi] considers it impossible to travel this road without the assistance and effort 
of masters, and adds that, even people who seem to have had no master and have 
nonetheless managed, in rare instances, to get somewhere, have secretly benefited 
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from the solicitude of an unseen master and have supped at the table of an 
invisible but hospitable guide.376 
―The starting point and the journey do not matter,‖ which is also clear from 
Rumi‘s allegory of the camel. The story can be summarized as follows: A man loses his 
camel and as a result spends his days searching for it. At times, he finds a sign from his 
lost camel, and that encourages and assures him that the camel can eventually be found. 
At other times, hearing news that is potentially negative makes him go weak in the knees. 
Another person, in imitation and without actually having lost a camel, walks in the first 
person‘s footsteps. Like him, the imitator tries to locate his camel by asking others. The 
true seeker and the false imitator continue for a while until finally the lost camel is 
reunited with its owner. But, lo and behold, the imitator finds that next to the true 
seeker‘s camel stands another camel, at which point he says, ―My evil deeds have 
become pious acts entirely—thanks [to God]! Jest is vanished and earnest realized thanks 
[to God]! Since my evil deeds have become the means to [my] attaining unto God, do not 
then throw any blame on my evil deeds.‖377 
By ―all roads‖ Soroush understands Rumi to mean that ―the true and the false both 
lead to guidance (hidāyat) and deliverance (nijāt). God will take any honest student of the 
righteous path by the hand and deliver them to the destination. The honest for sure, but 
even the dishonest who is nonetheless looking, is not left without her or his share and 
portion of divine mercy and pardon. The insistence here is on the ‗sincerity of the seeker‘ 
and the existence of the ‗unseen guide‘ instead of the path and a visible, religious 
guide.‖378 
As for the last category, Knitter only points out that ―relativists are people for 
whom the notion of truth is either so broad, or so diversified, or so distant, that they can‘t 
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ever trust themselves to know whether they, or anyone, really have the truth.‖379 This is 
what Anthony, Hermans and Sterkens call relativistic pluralism. In the relativistic 
pluralism model, all religions are held to be of equal value and significance, irrespective 
of common or different elements among them.  
Relativism is in fact what Kadivar accuses Soroush of during their debate:  
 
What I wanted to show is that believing in antinomies in religious matters is 
incompatible with the core of our Shī`ī beliefs. Also, when we speak of the text it 
isn‘t true that all parts of the text have many interpretations. Some do but one 
cannot argue that all verses do. It is not possible to beat everything in the Book 
and Sunna with the same stick of inextricable ambiguity (ibhām-e nāzudūdanī). 
To be able to say that everything in Islam is a text and that, as a result, it can be 
read multiple ways just opens the door to absolute relativism.380 
 
When asked about the issue in an interview published in Ṣerāṭha-ye Mustaqīm (later 
published in The Expansion of the Prophetic Experience), Soroush defines relativism as 
the suggestion that ―everything is relatively true,‖381 denies that he is a relativist by 
calling his method ―critical rationalism‖ and claim that the misunderstanding between 
what he does and relativism is caused by conflating two distinct epistemologies.   
 In Soroush's reading, relativist epistemology contends that all knowledge is 
caused knowledge, while critical rationalist epistemology is more inclined to think that 
the attainment of knowledge is more a matter of reasons. What Soroush means by 
―causes‖ are the ―non-rational factors‖ that make ideas and actions emerge.382 If a person 
is a Muslim because s/he has converted into the faith after much thought and 
contemplation, their knowledge has come to them by way of reason, but if s/he born into 
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a Muslim family and remain one by way of chance, their faith was caused and not 
reasoned. Soroush holds that when we look at great post-Enlightenment thinkers like 
Bacon, Marx, Freud, Foucault and Habermas we see ―how they have all demonstrated in 
one way or another how non-rational factors (of the nature of causes) play games with 
rationality (and reasons), thereby distorting and tarnishing it.‖383 This does not mean that 
Soroush does not think that culture, geography, emotions, interest, internal and genetic 
factors, the subconscious, power and the like do not distort and influence perceptions and 
consciousness. When Soroush is pushed to form an opinion about an issue (e.g., what 
position to take in light of the reality of religious diversity), it is reason that plays the 
primary role in the attainment of knowledge for him. ―However, when reasons have 
completed their work and arrived at parity,‖ as was the case with ranking religions 
according to truth value (it was not possible to rank religions because they belonged in 
the noumenal world), ―causes come into play.‖384 In other words, Soroush admits that he 
could have just as easily been a Christian and been on a divine path, but he is on a Sufi 
path because he was born a Muslim.385 Soroush‘s dedication to pluralism is not because 
―any religion will do.‖ It is because he has carefully reasoned his way through 
alternatives and come to the conclusion that there is no better choice. Pluralism is not a 
caused view for Soroush; it is a reasoned one. Thus, Soroush is a religious pluralist who 
can be classified under Knitter‘s general ―acceptance‖ model. His is a positive pluralism 
that denies relativism, celebrates difference, and argues for a restricted plurality of truths.   
                                                 






I turn now to a presentation on the classical Muslim scholarship that addresses 
religious pluralism in terms of the salvation of the ―Other‖ in Islam. Most of the 
discussion about religious pluralism in classical Islamic theology has centered on salvific 
theory, which poses the question: Who shall be saved in light of divine mercy? If the 
answer to this question is only Muslims, then the position medieval scholars held would 
be considered exclusivist. The rest of this chapter will be dedicated to discussing the 
1999 debate between Soroush and Kadivar, in light of Soroush‘s other writings in defense 
of pluralism both religious and cultural. 
According to Muhammad Khalil, the standard view regarding prophethood and 
salvation in classical Islam was that ―Muhammad‘s path is the ideal path [emphasis in 
original].‖386 This could engender an inclusivist position regarding salvation, as the ideal 
path for one group does not necessarily mean doom for all else. As Khalil shows, 
however, this is in fact not the case; classical orthodoxy held an exclusivist position on 
religious diversity. Among the thinkers that Khalil uses as his case studies (al-Ghazālī, 
Ibn Arabī, Ibn Taymiyyah, Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyyah, Muḥammad Rashīd Ridā, and 
Seyed Qutb), some maintained more than others that divine mercy would intervene at the 
last minute and save non-Muslims from everlasting hellfire.  
Al-Ghazālī, Ibn `Arabī, and Rashīd Riḍā (particularly the first two, who held Sufi 
leanings) made efforts to create loopholes for the salvation of non-Muslim communities. 
But other scholars, such as Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyyah, ―do not seem to 
leave much room for Divine mercy on the Day of Judgment for any sane, adult non-
Muslim who had received the Message.‖387 An important note to make here is that those 
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who have never come in contact with Islam (i.e., had not received the Message) were not 
considered subject to judgment. Although Khalil initially claims that ―Divine mercy, 
always finds a way—some way—to make its presence felt in all the case studies 
[emphasis in original],‖388 he ends his dissertation with the conclusion that ―despite the 
fact that the majority of case studies examined here argue otherwise, we can only 
conclude that the view of a never-ending punishment in hell and the prohibition of some 
from ever receiving pleasure in the Afterlife has tended to be the norm, rather than the 
exception‖ for the non-Muslim Other.389  
In consequence, the dominant classical Sunni position on the issue of the 
salvation of the Other seems to have been exclusivist according to Khalil‘s study.390 As 
far as divine mercy goes, another interesting observation by Khalil is that although mercy 
is clearly emphasized and ―arguably given priority in Islamic Scripture, it almost seems 
as if any discussion of the salvation of non-Muslims involves apologetic reinterpretations 
of specific qur‘ānic verses and hadīths.‖391 
THE DEBATE 
In 1999 a debate on the topic of religious diversity and the salvation of the non-
Muslims took place between Soroush and Kadivar inside Iran. The debate revolved 
around the following question posed in Serāthā-ye Mustaqīm [Straight Paths to God] the 
year prior, about the topic: ―As Muslims, what should our response be to the reality of 
religious diversity?‖392 The debate began with Soroush‘s introduction of the Kantian 
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concept of antinomies. Belief assessment, according to Soroush, ―can never resolve 
debate over conflicting religious perspectives in an objective manner;‖ a claim with 
which Kadivar repeatedly refused to engage.393 One can argue that because no more than 
one among a set of incompatible truth claims can be true, Kadivar is only justified in 
continuing to maintain that his claim of justified inclusivism is true if he possesses non-
question-begging justification for believing that Soroush‘s incompatible claim is false. 
But the point is exactly, as Soroush points out, that no disputant in religious conflicts 
possesses such justification—no disputant can be justified in holding his own claim to be 
true because it is essentially impossible to prove a religious claim once we step outside 
religious boundaries. And this is exactly what Kadivar refuses to recognize.  
Soroush points out that we have no choice but to conclude that in the absence of 
objective, non-question-begging justification in religious disputes, disputants do not have 
justification for supposing the claims of others to be false, or their own to be true.394 In an 
effort to bridge their epistemological gap and speaking intra-religiously, Soroush suggest 
that these antinomies can even be seen within Islam in the area of fiqh (jurisprudence).395  
 
One faqīh (jurist) knows all the reasoning behind a certain edict. Faqīh number 
two uses [reasoning] but is not convinced and steadfastly defends his personal 
reading and judgment. The third faqīh does the same. This is how differences of 
opinions come about and continue to linger. The disagreement between the three 
is not from a lack of intelligence, virtue or piety. The same situation holds for 
different sects. Assuming that Shī`ī scholars hold the ultimate divine truth, why 
have Sunni scholars not accepted the Shī`ī reasoning and converted? If we were to 
assume that both sects have sought the truth, have been ordained on average with 
the same kind and amount of intelligence throughout the ages, then one reason 
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why divisions hold between the sects could be that we are wrong as Shī`īs . . . or 
that every single Sunni has been under the influence of passions and desires.396 
 
A third choice is that the strength of our reasons for choosing our paths are of the 
same magnitude . . . In the end, we have to say that Sunni and Shī`īs are just two 
different interpretations of the same religion. This is the explanation I choose. 
Any other choice is problematic, and this is why I suggest that we have no choice 
but to be pluralists.397 
Kadivar responds that ―plurality in fiqh is an extricable quality [of jurisprudence]. If we 
were all of sudden placed in the presence of one of the Fourteen Innocents (chahārdah 
ma`sūm),398 the source of all these disagreements would vanish because they would 
respond to all our questions about truth and reveal the divine will.‖399 This is in fact the 
same response he had given when speaking of extra-religious antinomies.  
 When speaking about Islam, it is the Qur‘ān and the Fourteen Innocents that have 
the final word. The main question Kadivar poses to Soroush by way of a rejection of his 
extra-religious discursive methodology is ―cherā az ḥekmat-e khodā ghāfelīd? [Why do 
you not take notice of God‘s wisdom?]‖400 Kadivar continues,  
 
The criterion for distinguishing truth from falsity has been given to us; it is the 
word of the prophets and the words of the final Prophet containing the most truth. 
There is a reason why the Jews didn‘t accept Muhammad‘s words despite his 
miracle [the Qur‘ān]: it‘s called rebellion and greed. Understanding this denial, 
this negation, this disavowal of God‘s truth as an antinomy is falling short of what 
is expected of you [kam loṭfī].‖401  
Soroush responds by saying that he also believes in the sinlessness (`iṣmat) of the Prophet 
and holds great value for his words. However, Soroush states,  
 
                                                 
396 Ibid., 69. 
397 Ibid. 
398 The Fourteen Innocents are the Prophet, his daughter Fatima, and the twelve Imams. In Shī`ī thought 
they are sinless. 
399 Soroush and Kadivar, 69. 
400 Ibid., 48. 
401 Ibid., 50. 
125 
 
Innocence is an extra-religious affair, meaning that in order to accept the sayings 
of a prophet, it is logically necessary to see him without sin. This is a prerequisite 
of being able to see him as a prophet. In other words, we are not convinced of the 
fact that the Prophet is sinless, we believe his words because we believe 
[emphasis added] that he is sinless and immaculate and chaste. If we take the 
sinlessness of the prophets as one of our foundational beliefs, then prophets fall 
outside the purview of those who can epistemologically commit error.402 
That is, it is just as epistemologically responsible for us not to accept the Prophet as 
sinless and as a result not accept his position. Both choices come from outside religion. 
Soroush thus accused Kadivar of engaging in extra-religious reasoning without being 
aware of doing so.   
Kadivar asks if Soroush truly believes that it is not possible to assume that one 
side (Sunni, Christian, Jew, etc.) is more affected by their desires and greed than the other 
side (Shī`ī)?  
 
Is it really not possible to think of one side as being in the wrong and the other as 
justified in their position? Is it not possible that the reasons presented by one side 
are preferable to the ones presented by the other?403 
No, Soroush responds; rather, we can only say that there is disagreement between these 
two groups:  
 
Either both [emphasis added] groups are grappling with their desires and greed 
and are just as susceptible to human weakness, or they both have reasons for what 
they believe in. In either case, we are in the same position; neither side has a 
stronger reason for winning the argument. Whatever epistemological rule we 
come up with is reflexive.404 
After repeated returns to this same argument throughout the debate, Soroush finally 
expresses his frustration by saying, ―Don‘t say that God has messed up the brains of those 
who defy us. Give me a real reason. Remember, whatever theory you come up with is 
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reflexive. Don‘t keep repeating that the reasons one group gives are weak, while those of 
the other group are strong. This is not an answer; this is exiting the topic.‖405  
Kadivar asks Soroush point blank: ―Is it true that in your opinion there isn‘t 
necessarily a single truth in this world?‖406 Soroush responds by saying ―yes, that is 
exactly the case‖407: 
 
There is no singular discovery of meaning that can be called ‗the truth.‘  There is 
a multiplicity of truths. In fact this multiplicity is the same as the discovery of 
these different meanings . . . The genus [of what we understood in orthodoxy to 
be truth] has changed, it is now the tafsīr of one‘s personal experiences.408 
Kadivar, revealing what has really been worrying him about the concept of religious 
pluralism, admits that ―a person who arrives at antinomies in the extra-religious arena 
cannot believe in the truth of any one particular religion.‖409 Since pluralism works with a 
plurality of truths, faith is made obsolete.410 With the advent of the plurality of truths and 
religious pluralism there will no longer be any reason for believing in any one religion. 
Soroush allays Kadivar‘s fears by reassuring him that people do not become religious 
because they have rationally come to the conclusion that their religion has the most truth-
value, but because it generates meaning in their lives. In fact, Soroush adds, it is 
epistemologically impossible for us to decide the comparative value of religious truth-
content because we are not provided with the kind of information needed to make such a 
judgment.411  
The debate ends with participants thanking each other and neither Kadivar or 
Soroush having been convinced of the other‘s position.  
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THE RHETORIC OF PRE-REVOLUTIONARY IDEOLOGUES 
Perhaps the most interesting effect of Soroush‘s discussion about religious 
pluralism is the transformative effect the physical reading of his material or listening to 
his debate with Kadivar had on his audience. Before delving into these transformative 
effects of Soroush‘s discourse, it would be instructive to look at the nature of his rhetoric 
and compare it to the rhetoric of pre-revolutionary ideologues. The 1970s introduced a 
new trend, the democratization of the interpretive process. Thinkers like `Alī Sharī`atī412 
and Mehdī Bāzargān413 redefined who could and could not engage in speech about 
religion. They helped desacralize religious discourse, a mode of engagement that was 
until then reserved only for classically trained clerics. Today, it seems as if the Qur‘ān 
and its supporting textual infrastructure are no longer a special language. Divine 
language has been subsumed under human language and, as a result, human / non-
religious approaches / theories are being legitimately applied to it. Reading and 
interpreting divine intentions is now open not only to the traditional cadre of the 
classically learned but also to lay intellectuals and even the non-intellectual government 
officials. Soroush, although classically trained in the `ulūm al-Qur’ān (qur‘ānic sciences), 
has not been anointed by the authority of the establishment, yet speaks authoritatively 
about Islam and is considered one of the main theorists of the religion—so much so that 
symposia are held in Qom to debate his work.  
Not only have religious intellectuals like Sharī`atī and Soroush widened the 
definition of Islam by infusing non-scriptural material (i.e., extra-religious material) into 
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the process of ―reading‖ the text of the Qur‘ān, but they have also changed its 
manipulation—a change in form and rhetorical mode of discourse. While the classical 
exegetic format is the argumentative, descriptive study of the text, from the first āyah all 
the way to the end, the predominant trend in symbolic creative hermeneutics since the 
1960s is the monograph, a work of scholarly writing focused on a single subject.414 
Monographic tafsīrs are not new; they have a history in qur‘ānic studies.415 But the likes 
of Sharī`atī and Soroush turned them into political tracts. Alongside this change in form 
is a change in rhetorical mode. A recurring characteristic of the pre-Revolutionary (1960s 
and 1970s) monographs was their heavy-handed use of narrative to manipulate the 
interpretation of historical events, core religio-cultural symbols and Islamic identity. In 
narratives, a story is created in a constructive format (as a work of writing, speech, 
poetry, prose, pictures, song, motion picture, etc.) that describes a sequence of fictional or 
non-fictional events. Consider, for example, the narrativization of the Hussein 
paradigm.416   
The martyrdom of Hussein, the grandson of the prophet, captured the 
imaginations of the Shī`ī community almost immediately after his death. The ―Karbala 
narrative,‖ as Aghaie calls it, is a ―systematic reconstruction of the historic battle of 
Karbala.‖417 The general consensus is that this narrative has served as one of the central 
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416 The Shī`ī interpretive process does not restrict its sources to the Qur‘ān and the Sunnah but also 
includes the lives and sayings of the twelve Imams, who are believed to be the Prophet‘s legitimate heirs.     
417 Hussein, grandson of the Prophet and third Imam of the Shī`ī, was believed to have been martyred at 
Karbala (current day Iraq) during a battle of the same name that took place on Muharram 10, 61A.H. 
(October 10, 680 A.D.). This highly uneven battle pitted a small group of supporters and relatives 
of Hussein against a large military detachment from the forces of the Umayyad caliph Yazid I, whose 
caliphate Hussein had refused to recognize. Hussein and all his male supporters were killed in battle, 
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sources for Shī`ī symbols and rituals.418 The dominant Karbala narrative in Iran from the 
fifteenth century to the 1960s seems to have been the one devised by Vā‘iz Kāshifī.  
According to Vā‘iz Kāshifī‘s Rawzat al-Shuhadā (1502), Hussein had foreknowledge of 
his death at Karbala and invited martyrdom upon himself in order to set a virtuous 
example for future Shī`ī generations. The enemy in Kashifī‘s narrative is the unjust 
Other, or in this case, ―the munāfiqūn (hypocrite Muslims), among whom the Sunnis 
were the most prominent.‖419 The true believers are those who ―remained loyal to 
Hussein, and they are the ones who will be rewarded through worldly and heavenly 
bounty as a result of their loyalty and of their steadfastness in tolerating the oppression 
and injustice they encounter in the world.‖420  
Kashifī‘s message is one of quietism, where he preaches silent resilience in the 
face of injustice and ―does not use the events of Karbala as a political role model for 
literal emulation.‖421 That is, he does not advise the masses to take up arms against the 
illegitimate government of Shah Isma‘il Safavi as Hussein had done against Yazid.422 
Instead, the events at Karbala represent an ideal for commemoration through ritualistic 
weeping and mourning. Having had foreknowledge of Hussein‘s martyrdom several 
accounts, according to Aghaie, ―record that the prophet and Hussein promised earthly 
                                                                                                                                                 
including his infant son. The women and surviving children were taken as prisoners. The dead are regarded 
as martyrs by the Shī`ī, and the battle holds a central place in Shī`ī history and tradition. The battle is 
commemorated annually during a ten day period in the month of Muharram by the Shī`ī as well as many 
Sunnis. The event culminates with the death of Hussein on the tenth day (`Ashūrā). 
418 For further information on Shī`ī symbols and rituals, see: Mahmoud Ayoub, Redemptive Suffering in 
Islam (1978); Kamran Aghaie, ―The Karbala Narrative: Shi‘i Political Discourse in Modern Iran in the 
1960s and 1970s‖ (2001); Syed Akbar Hyder, Reliving the Karbala Martyrdom in South Asian Memory 
(2006); David Pinault, Horse of Karbala: Muslim Devotional Life in India (2000); Frank J. Korom, Hosay 
Trinidad (2003); Vali Nasr, The Shi’a Revival: How Conflicts within Islam will Shape the Future (2006). 
419 Kamran Aghaie, ―The Karbala Narrative (2001): 154.  
420 Ibid. 
421 Ibid. 
422 Before the great occultation (gheybat al-kubra) of the Mahdi (the Twelfth Imam) the Shī`ī state was 
only considered legitimate if ruled by one of the Imams.  After the occultation the only legitimate state is 
the one the Mahdi reinstates upon his return at the end of time. 
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rewards (thawab) to anyone who shed tears for what Hussein had suffered.‖423 However, 
the climactic moment of the narrative, Hussein‘s martyrdom (itself a symbolic act) did 
not become a call to arms in the face of worldly injustice. ―Narratives like Kashifī‘s are 
not explicit efforts to contest the legitimacy of the ruling elites.‖424 In fact, as Aghaie 
points out, Kashifī‘s narrative ―stresses the inappropriateness of active political 
mobilization in the face of political injustice.‖425 In line with classical Shī`ī political 
theology it was the role of the Mahdī (the twelfth Imam) to deliver the people from 
political oppression.  
During the 1960s and 1970s, however, Vā‘iz Kāshifī no longer ―fit the political 
mood of the time.‖426 Ṣaliḥī Najafābādī, a religious scholar who had studied with 
Ayatollah Khomeini in the 1960s, took up the interpretive challenge and revolutionized 
Kāshifī‘s quietist narrative. Najafābādī encouraged Muslims to actively emulate Hussein, 
not simply to mourn for him. In 1968 he wrote Shahīd-i Jāvīd (The Immortal Martyr), in 
which he reinterpreted the Karbala paradigm in a more ―politically activist light.‖427 He 
spoke primarily about the need to ―defend Islam from corruption‖ and from bid’a 
(innovation), a common charge brought against the Shah as a result of his Westernizing 
policies.428 What was unusual in what Najafābādī did was to insist that the only way 
Hussein could have ―achieved [his] objective was by seizing power from the Umayyads 
and taking over the government.‖429 He also denied the quietist argument that Hussein‘s 
actions enjoined people to become better Muslims through the endurance of hardship and 
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sacrifice. Thus, by highlighting certain aspects of Hussein‘s character and mission, 
Najafābādī rewrites the events by recreating a new version of the Karbala narrative.430   
Although Najafābādī‘s narrative encountered much resistance among the `ulamā‘, 
his unconventional interpretation of the event at Karbala served to inspire some clerics 
(Mutahhari, for instance)431 and one particular ideologue of the revolution, `Alī Sharī`atī.  
A Sorbonne-educated doctor of philology, Sharī`atī kept Kashifī‘s core narrative but 
introduced a radically new meta-narrative into the story material, one largely derived 
from Marxist concepts of universal class struggle and anti-imperialist rhetoric. Sharī`atī, 
like Kashifī, agreed that the Hussein movement was for the purposes of ―promoting good 
and discouraging evil, and also for the purposes of revitalizing the spirit of Islam that was 
in danger of extinction.‖432 But unlike Kashifī and more in line with Najafābādī‘s 
sensibilities, Sharī`atī concentrated more on the method of achieving change.433  His was 
a theology of action and liberation and not just an invitation to mourning, and the method 
proposed by the movement was martyrdom in the face of oppression.434 
In summary, Najafābādī‘s narrative of the tragedy of Hussein and his followers 
―created an oppositional discourse that made justice and injustice a central theme of 
Shī`īsm.‖435 The manipulation of the narrative led to a reordering of socio-political 
priorities. The Pahlavi regime and its international allies (mainly the United States) were 
seen as the imperialist powers representing injustice on the one hand, and the suffering 
masses represented by the populace of the third world, Islamic world and Shī`īs in 
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particular were seen as the just and righteous.  Thus, ―a set of symbols originally used as 
a vindication of the Shī`ī cause became a vindication of oppositional movements in 
Iran.‖436 
SOROUSH’S TRANSFORMATIVE RHETORIC 
As we see, the political debates of the 1960s and 1970s were about a political 
theology that wove revolutionary rhetoric by manipulating the symbolic martyrdom of 
the greatest of Islamic warriors. The post-revolutionary era, in contrast, and in particular, 
the post-war (Iran-Iraq War of 1980-1988) period, is characterized by a move away from 
symbolic rhetoric and into the realm of theory-building, reflected in a shifting perspective 
regarding the ontology of the text in the 1990s and beyond. In the new rhetorical mode, 
the symbolic is minimized, and while maintaining the monographic format, thinkers have 
begun highlighting exposition and argumentation instead of narrative. This does not mean 
that they do not use narrative, but it does not dominate their hermeneutics. Soroush‘s 
rhetoric style is a mixed prose and verse genre called prosimetrum. Prosimetrum is ―a 
text composed in alternating segments of prose and verse . . . Typically the verse portions 
serve as lyric, emotive, or personal insets within a philosophical or narrative frame, often 
with connectives between prose and verse sections.‖437 Scott-Meisami points out that this 
particular genre has a long history in Persian intellectual thought. In her account, up until 
the nineteenth century, poetry  
 
remained the central genre, to which all others are in some sense poor relations . . 
. it is considered perfect speech, superior to prose because of its metricality and 
the coherence of its parts, its universal appeal, its ceremonial functions, its 
relationship to music, its eloquence, its importance as a source of knowledge, etc. 
. . . Prose is loosely organized and follows the thought; poetry is highly organized 
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and works through heightened language to create a sense of wonder and produce 
an emotional effect.438 
Through studying the works of Ahmad al-Ghazālī, Rāvandī and Sa`dī‘s Gulistān, 
Meisami shows the effect of the prosimetric work as a whole on the audience. The 
―author‘s didactic purpose‖ is served by this genre because the poetry‘s ―affective nature 
. . . engender[s] wonder and produce[s] an immediate response,‖ while information is 
conveyed via prose.439 ―The authority of the poetry as poetry is based both in its affective 
quality and on its status as the highest form of eloquence.‖440 In this instance the ―artistic 
prose seeks to approach the poetic, from which it takes inspiration, to exploit to the 
fullest the resource of the language.‖441 This didactic and highly poetic genre is the 
rhetoric milieu within which Soroush operates.        
The prosimetrum genre in the hands of Soroush has had the potential to be 
didactic and affective enough to engender what de Certeau calls a ―complex form of 
transformation‖ for his audience, a transformation that works through speech itself. When 
speaking of revolution, revision and challenge at the end of his essay, The Capture of 
Speech and Other Political Writings, de Certeau addresses the manner in which speech 
itself can be a transformative event, replacing the political revolution with a symbolic 
one.442 De Certeau speaks of how what in the past would be called ―real transformation‖ 
has now become virtual change. Soroush‘s use of hybridity, not just in the intermingling 
of prose and poetry but also in his mixing of Sufi and Western epistemologies, creates a 
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hybrid rhetoric that has achieved just this kind of transformation experience for a whole 
generation of Iranians.  
De Certeau, however, does not allow the uncertainties of a virtual victory to go 
unregistered: ―Speech is neither effective occupation nor the seizure of power.‖443 He 
recognizes that rhetorical gestures only turn political and ethical values into aesthetic 
ones; nevertheless, this is the only way forward that he can see. He states, ―Out of failure 
and a lack of resources a virtual triumph is fashioned which, for the moment, curtains the 
void, the hole. It is fashioned out of words.‖ 444 Having been caught in a similar situation 
where the only tool at hand for which one might not have to pay as high a price as free 
speech, Soroush uses aesthetics to bolster, or as some have argued, to instigate a 
reformist movement.445 
Investigating Soroush‘s rhetoric in his 1998 book Serāthā-ye Mustaqīm, and in 
the Kadivar debate of 1999, a hybrid rhetoric can be detected, composed as it is of both 
Western and Sufi statements.446 This new presentation of Islam, this new hybrid way of 
being a Muslim, is at once devout, rational and mystical, containing belief structures that 
have (even to this day in the West) been traditionally construed as incongruent. The 
statements in Soroush‘s works, cited in this chapter, should seem inappropriate and 
incompatible when used to support each other but they are not.447 What Soroush has done 
by way of intermingling these seemingly jarring statements and making the exercise seem 
natural and unproblematic, is to lend interchangeable credibility to different ideological 
positions (Sufi, Western and Islamist), and in doing so codify a hybrid identity.  
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Soroush has actually spoken about hybrid identities before in his essay The Three 
Cultures.448 In that essay, he speaks about how Iranian culture is actually an ―overlapping 
cultural web‖ of Pre-Islamic, Islamic, Persian and Western ways of being, and that 
―whatever solutions we divine for our problems must come from this mixed heritage to 
which our contemporary social thinkers, reformers, and modernizers have been heirs, 
often seeking the salvation of our people in the hegemony of one of these cultures over 
the other two.‖449 It is in this essay that Soroush denies the stable bases of social /  
national / ethnic unities and supports a fragmented and decentered self and multiple and 
conflicting identities. Soroush, while acknowledging the indivisible nature of Ancient 
Persian culture form the Iranian psyche, warns against the hazards of Nationalist 
extremism. He recognizes that Islam is the dominant culture among the three competing 
customs but invites his audience to ―come to terms with Western culture‖ (the supposed 
enemy of Islam according the revolutionary rhetoric) and ―move beyond‖ the discourse 
of Gharbzadegī (West-toxification).450   
In a fascinating discussion about identity, Soroush then asks the following 
question: ―Where among these three cultures does our identity lie?‖451 Soroush answers 
that it lies in all three. The source of our problems, Soroush contends, ―is the baneful 
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equation of identity with rigidity.‖452 ―One must seek purification in exchange with 
others‖ instead of ―using the pretext of persisting in one‘s identity to continue a slovenly 
and secluded life.‖453 What causes fear of other cultures, Soroush maintains is the ―lack 
of a strong cultural digestive system and also the misconception that each culture is an 
indivisible monolith‖—that accepting one part ―equals accepting the whole.‖454 There is 
no ―eternal cultural identity,‖ Soroush argues; cultures must be given room to grow to 
―achieve self-awareness,‖ to be allowed to ―peek out of the cozy blanket of‖ their 
boundaries and strive for the ability to look at oneself with a self-reflective eye (chashm-e 
`ibrat).455 Once a person starts looking at their culture in this way, it becomes impossible 
to embrace age-old ways without having to ―examine, revise and adjust‖ them.456  
In his debate with Kadivar and writings on religious pluralism, Soroush clarifies 
further his theory of religion and his position on the salvation of non-Muslims in Islam, 
which is an old theological question and falls under the purview of kalām. Also, he again 
embarks on a cultural discussion; this time, however, his position comes to this 
discussion not as theses to be defended (as was the case in The Three Cultures) but by 
way of methodology—his rhetoric. If in The Three Cultures Soroush talks of the 
overlapping presence of pre-Islamic, Western and Muslim cultures in Iran, when 
speaking about religious pluralism he methodologically uses the two languages of 
Continental and Analytic Philosophy and Sufism to make his point. Reading the pages 
where these (as we have been led to believe) epistemologically incompatible 
epistemologies are used alongside each other, one realizes how well they work together. 
Perhaps as Soroush states in The Three Cultures, ―Rebellion against oneself is also part 
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of one‘s ‗self.‘ Rectifying one‘s identity is part of one‘s identity. Becoming, is also a part 
of Being. And this implies causing oneself and one‘s culture to move . . . If movement 
means anything, it means avoiding imitation.‖457 Soroush refuses to imitate even in 
speech and breaks epistemological boundaries. He believes that we are at once 
simultaneously indebted to Western ways of knowing and Being and Islamic ways of 
knowing and Being, where Islamic language manifests in its Sufi incarnations.  
To suggest that reading Soroush‘s works somehow magically changes the reader 
is a farfetched idea for some. In ―From Text to Action: Essays in Hermeneutics II‖ 
Ricœur explains that the world of the text is the means by which the reader attains self-
understanding. This self-understanding is achieved by appropriating the work through the 
―distanciating‖ effect of writing, which divorces the work from the author‘s intentions.458  
Ricœur suggests that the text creates its own world, and it is then up to the reader to 
inhabit that world, finding within it realities that explains her/his own particular situation.   
By peppering his work with Western thought and Sufi poetry, Soroush creates a 
space where the reader has the opportunity to reconcile seemingly disparate ways of 
being -- to perform his own kind of philosophical pluralism as well as asserting it. As in 
real life, these seemingly incongruent ways of being are in tension with each other, but 
Soroush‘s methodology points to a solution in grappling with this tension. The effect 
Soroush has on those with hybrid identities, for example, ―thinking‖ Muslims in Iran who 
seek to be intentional about their choices as Muslims, and who are more than likely 
familiar with Western thought, is to create a world in which these disparate ways of 
understanding (the ineffable) can coexist (e.g., Sufism and Kantian liberalism). A reader 
can witness these less than complementary ways of being intertwined, mirroring 
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everyday life in the safe environment of a page, and at least momentarily, apprehensions 
about being pluralistic in the makeup of the self gradually dissolve. In fact, apart from the 
arguments he gives in the debate and interview and writings on the topic, this is another 
way Soroush invites the thinking Muslim to religious pluralism. 
SOME CONCLUSIONS 
Contemporary Western theories of religious pluralism hold, at a minimum, that 
we are not able to speak definitively about the salvation of non-coreligionists. In its most 
permissive version (Hickian), religious pluralism allows for equal chance of salvation 
regardless of religion as long as one stays true to internal precepts. The dominant 
classical position on the issue has been that those who have been exposed to Islam and 
have rejected it are met with never-ending punishment in hell and are prohibited from 
ever receiving pleasure in the Afterlife. Kadivar, as a representative of the reformist 
orthodox Shī`ī camp holds a similar view. People of the Book can be saved, but he says 
nothing about what happens to those who refuse the message of Islam.  
Soroush openly defies this orthodoxy and contends that to assume that there is 
one truth presented by the Prophet of Islam is naïve. There is a plurality of truths, and by 
that he means that every non-imitative, thinking Muslim practicing discursive / reflective 
religiosity has the capacity of coming up with their own understanding of what the 
Islamic sources say about God, the Prophet, revelation, felicity, wretchedness, sin and 
obedience. This is an understanding that belongs to that believer alone and is a 
consequence of their reflections—an understanding that is constantly being revisited and 
updated in light of new questions and information. This pluralist, discursive and 
individualistic way of looking at religiosity is inspired by Rumi, but when put forth by 
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one of today‘s leading Muslim thinkers it becomes revolutionary, especially in an 


























Chapter 5: Conclusion 
Post-1990s reformist Iranian theological debates, called kalām-e jadīd, have 
consisted of issues such as wilāya (guardianship), revelation theology and soteriology. 
Apart from the topic of wilāya, which falls directly under the purview of political 
theology and is not covered here, the study of the other two themes have revealed a 
reformist movement that is torn between at least two theories of religion, two forms of 
Islam—one that stays bound to classical precepts, and another that breaks with tradition 
completely while still calling itself Islam. Kalām-e jadīd, or new theology, has become 
the discourse within which these two Islams have come to be represented and debated. 
Reformist seminarians and religious intellectuals are either working (to differing degrees) 
within a ―theology of selectivity‖ (e.g., Montazeri, Yousefi-Eshkevari, Sane‘i, and 
Kadivar) or have decided to reread/reformulate some of Islam‘s core tenets with their 
―postmodern theology‖ (e.g., Soroush and Shabestari). Although the topic of this 
dissertation is not political theology per se, the discourse around revelation theology and 
soteriology illuminate what is particularly political about theology in this era, and how 
theological debates need to be seen directly as potential interventions into ideal path(s) to 
self-realization, forms of polis, and the political logic of citizenship. 
The fact that a postmodern movement bent on shattering religiously foundational 
precepts exists in Iran is surprising in itself; that it has garnered the amount of support it 
has signals the wide-ranging receptiveness of Iranian reformist intellectual communities 
towards discourses that question not just metanarratives but specifically metanarratives of 
the religious kind. Soroush and Shabestari are ready to have traditional Islam engage 
directly and unapologetically with Western thought, even at its peril. Islam, they insist, 
must make sense to the modern mind in order for it to survive. ―Adapting‖ the tradition to 
a new era has not worked because there are deep inconsistencies between classical 
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understandings of Islam as a system of thought and our contemporary sensibilities. The 
young generation can sense these inconsistencies and finds it difficult to maneuver 
through life in the jarring space created by the juxtaposition of these two ways of being. 
Postmodern theology is a call for an Islam that ―works‖ as opposed to an Islam that 
―recaptures original purity.‖ In fact, postmodern Islamic theology questions the authority 
of the ―original‖ voices and interpretations that have over time become standardized, be 
they interpretations of the aṣḥāb (the Prophet‘s inner circle) or the Prophet himself. The 
true historical picture of Islam according to Soroush is very different from that which we 
are accustomed: a prophet was chosen by the Almighty, and his heart was imprinted with 
the divine message. The Prophet then interpreted and rendered (ṣūratdihī) that imprinted 
message into a world view that made sense to him and shared it with the people he was 
commanded to direct.  
The Prophet having interpreted and rendered the Qur‘ān means that it is no longer 
necessary to tread warily and stealthily in the domain of ijtihād. It is no longer obligatory 
to apologize for entering one‘s subjectivity into the interpretive process since the Qur‘ān 
itself, being but one interpretation, is no longer sacrosanct. Neither is it necessary to 
consider the Muslim community as inherently worthy of salvation. The fact that 
Muhammad was given the last series of divine messages is a fact, but that does not give 
the Muslim community any advantage today. At this day and age, whether someone 
achieves salvation ultimately depends on the nature of their personal relationship with the 
divine and not on what religion they belong to. This is a fundamentally atypical picture of 
Islam, one that acknowledges the central role of the Prophet and his finality but rejects 
the pivotal place of ―The Book‖ Muhammad relayed from God and the special status of 
the Prophet‘s followers in relation to ―Others.‖    
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One of the most interesting results of Soroush‘s postmodern theology is the 
democratization of the interpretive process. Soroush contends that to assume that there is 
one truth presented by the Prophet of Islam is naïve. There is a plurality of truths, and by 
that he means that every non-imitative, thinking Muslim practicing discursive / reflective 
religiosity has the capacity of coming up with their own understanding of what the 
Islamic sources say about God, the Prophet, revelation, felicity, wretchedness, sin and 
obedience. This is an understanding that belongs to that believer alone and is a 
consequence of their reflections—an understanding that is constantly being revisited and 
updated in light of new questions and information. This pluralist, discursive and 
individualistic way of looking at religiosity is inspired by Rumi, but when put forth by 
one of today‘s leading Muslim thinkers it becomes revolutionary, especially in an 
environment like Iran where the state-sanctioned form of Islam is the only legal option. 
In comparison to Soroush‘s highly postmodern neo-Sufi theology, in which he 
mixes Muʿtazilite rationality and Sufi mysticism, Kadivar sees the Qur‘ān as the 
nonnegotiable heart of Islam and Islam containing more truth content than other 
religions, resulting in its followers being more likely to achieve salvation. The dominant 
classical position on the issue of salvation has been that those who have been exposed to 
Islam and have rejected it are met with never-ending punishment in hell and are 
prohibited from ever receiving pleasure in the Afterlife. Although he says that People of 
the Book can be saved, he chooses to say nothing about what happens to those who 
refuse the message of Islam. 
What ultimately sets postmodern theology apart from its counterparts is that it 
takes the direct human intuition of God‘s presence in the world seriously and thus begins 
with respect for the religious experiences of others. It considers God‘s continuing 
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creative energy at work through ongoing divine communication. The word is not final 
anymore; it is jārī, or flowing, even through the common practitioner.  
A fuller version of the discussion presented here would also need to accommodate 
the conception of ethics in the works of Kadivar and Soroush. The first step would be to 
show the classical connections between ethics—a field of study that has traditionally 
fallen under the purview of fiqh (jurisprudence) and theology. Once that is accomplished, 
the goal would be to present Soroush‘s postmodern ethical theory. Traditionally, moral 
progress is thought to be possible via the marshaling of wisdom in the Qur‘ān, the sunna 
(the life and sayings of the Prophet and the Imams), and the use of reason (divinely 
ordained rational self-development). Soroush‘s rejection of the sanctity and timelessness 
of the Qur‘ān and the sunna—that is, his reframing and historicizing of religious 
authority—shatters the Qur‘ān‘s totalizing and timeless power over defining what is 
―good,‖ or the importance of the sunna in Shi‘i thought. Soroush recasts Islamic ethics in 
postmodern terms as a non-qur‘ānic / non-tradition-based endeavor that finds its compass 
in the mundane ethical practices of the culturally contingent, average citizen. Soroush 
suggests that the Islamic ethical master-narrative that casts ethics as ―fit for God,‖ ―ideal 
morality,‖ ―an imagined inviolate morality,‖ ―even if there is such a thing,‖ must be 
subordinated to an ethics ―fit for the servants of God.‖459 In other words, moral 
exceptions (conduct expected only from gods and prophets) should not set the rules 
of behavior because they ―sit above mundane, everyday life‖ and ―do not solve any real 
human problems . . . where different situations require different mores and manners.‖460 
Soroush suggests that we should abandon ideas of ―universal morality‖ and embrace the 
fact that ―even if there is such a thing as ideal morality, it is the same as actual morality,‖ 
                                                 




and to top it off, that this actual morality is contingent on the particular culture from 
which it stems.461 Kadivar, however, remains true to classical ideas that regard the Qur‘ān 
and sunna as supreme, reason as supplementary, and ethics as monolithically applicable 
to all humanity once derived from the three sources.  
Another closely linked discussion that deserves further attention is a study of 
Soroush‘s and Kadivar‘s views on political theology. Soroush‘s work signals a turn, a 
break, or even a possible schism in Iranian theology in its outlook on governmentality. 
The bulk of Kadivar‘s work falls within this category, and he has done much in 
categorizing and scrutinizing Shī`ī literature related to wilāyā. When compared to 
Soroush, however, Kadivar‘s position falls in line with modern sentiments. Kadivar 
places his trust and faith and personal investment in big politics and hence in the Nation-
State (especially of an Islamic nation-state, although he has been backing away from this 
position since late 2010). Soroush believes in a separation not only of religion from 
politics but also an investment in micro-politics, identity politics, local politics, and the 
necessity of ever present institutional power struggles.  
This dissertation was centered on Soroush‘s work and included Kadivar‘s 
responses as a means to give an introductory view to the two main strands of kalām-e 
jadīd in Iran. A more complete picture of kalām-e jadīd would have to include more 
thinkers on each side. I hope, nonetheless, to have introduced kalām-e jadīd as an integral 
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